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ABSTRACT
The thesis is a st:ud,y of' industry localization, the geographic
concentration of fil:-ms in specific or related activities. The
stUdy centers on two principal issues: the process througtl
which industry agglomerations form, and the relationship
between the trade regime and the pattern of geographic
concentration. We consider ttle particular case of the Mexican
garment industry. Evidence is drawn from extensive firm-level
interviews, as well as published and unpublished government
sources.
Part one studies t.ht~ formation of industry agglomer'ations.
The industry follows a process of geographic concentration we
term dispersed agC;flomeration. The industry beq ins
concentrated in a single marketing center. Over t.l.me,
production activities separate from the marketing center and
relocate to periphery regions, but not until wages in tIle
center far exceed those in the periphery. Under dispersed
agglomeration, the location decision involves investment
issues that are similar to an innovation process. A pioneer
firm is the first to relocate, and undertakes the investments
that are necessary to open a location to production. other
potelltial entrallts wait and free r ide off piC'neer investments
in latel~ pe:t-iods. Tht~ pioneer remains will.ing to open a
periphery location due to temporary monopsony power enjoyed in
the new location. Econometric analysis of industry location
in Mexico offers positive support for the theory.
Part two studies how economic i~tegration affects the pattern
of geographic concentration. The particular case we consider
is the integration of the Mexican garment industry into a
North American Free Tl-a(ie Area. Inte:gratic)n reshapes the
pattern of vertical specialization b~tween countries and the
location of production within each country. Marketing
externalities lead to the geographic conceTltration of
distr ibutl.on acti.vities. Under t.he closed economy I Mexico
city was the country's gar·ment market ing center 0 New York a11d
Los Angeles fUflct ion as gclrment marketing centf~rs ill the U. s.
with free trade I small (~OtJ.ntry prodllcers provide assembly
servic~s for firms in the large country marketing centl~r.
Mexican garment producers, who previously served the dOlnesti.(~
3
market, are shifting to off-shore garment assembly for u.s.
firms. In the small country, production relocates to regions
near the large country market; in the large COllntry,
integration favors marketing centers with better access to
small country producers. Garmen"t production in Mexico is
relocating from central Me:h:ico to the Mexico-U. S. border
region; in the U.S., the Los Angeles marketing center h~s been
the principal benef iciary of the opening of the Mexicarl
economy.
Thesis supervisors: Michael Piore, Paul Krugman
Titles: Professor of Economics, Professor of Economics
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response to the def iciencies in my account. Paul l<rtlt~man is
a second person who has had i:ln ilnrflecIE;'-ll~clblE~ impact on my
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The thesis is a study of industry local iza.tion, the
geographic concentration of firms in SiJecif ic or- related
activities. The study centers on two principal issues: the
process through which industry agglomeratio11S fOl-ro, alld tJ1e
relationship between the trade regiJne and t:he pattern of
geographic concentration. We consider the particular case of
the Mexican garment industry. Evidence is drawn from
extensive firm-level interviews, as well as published and
unpublished government sources.
A first motivation for the thesis is current policy
concerns about the transition from government to free market
regulation of economy activity. Radical reform in Eastern
Europe has attracted much attention, but these changes follow
a decade of economic opening ion developing countries. A
common feature of recent regime shifts is the speed with which
the transition is carried out. In Chile, Mexico, and Poland,
change came virtually overnight. Trade barriers, or even
whole planning structures, were dismantled in one fell swoop.
The shock approach is based on the idea that a rapid
transition minimizes disruptions to econocic activity.
Underlying this approach is optimism about haw long it takes
individuals and firms to adjust the arrangements through which
they organize production and trade. The pattern of industry
agglomeration represents one such set of arrangements. The
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arrangements that develop under a closed regime are likely to
be very different from those that eventually emerge i.n an open
regime. We expect a transition to alter the organization of
industry, but we know little about how economies actually
adjust. A study of how firms in an industry absorb the shock
of a rapid transition can pro"~·ide insight into how regime
shifts affect the organization of economic activity.
A broader motivation for the thesis is renewed academic
interest in the sUbj ect of industry localization. 1 Re(~ent
attention is due in part to an apparent increase i~l the
phenomenon of geographic concentration. A la~ge case study
literature documents localization in a diverse cross-section
of regions and industries, ranging from the Sassuolo tile
industry in Central Italy to the micro-electronics industry in
silicon Valley. The sUbject is by no means new to economics.
The classic treatment of localization is Marshall's discussion
of nineteenth century industrial districts; his original
observations are the starting point for the current
1 i terature. 2 Marshall attributes localization to external
economies of scale in the supply of industry-specific inputs.
His collection of e>:ternal economies includes the creation of
a pool of workers with specific skills. knowledge spillovers
The recent liter~ture is largely unrelated to earlier
work on location theory. See Enright (1990) and Backman and
Thisse (1986) for surveys of the early literature.
2 For more complete discussions of Marshall, see
Becattini (1990) and Krugman (1990).
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between firms, and the growth of sUbsidiary industries that
provide specialized inputs.] Marshall's principal arguments
provide a useful framework to discuss the recent literature. 4
A first reason firms localize is to gain access to a pool
of workers that have specific abilities, or what Marshall
terms the creation of a "constant market for skill."S !?irms
benefit as they have access to a pool of trained workers;
workers benefit as they have access to a variety of employers
that value their skills. Rotemberg and Saloner (1990)
incorporate this concept of external effects into a model of
interregional specialization. In their story, workers will
only invest in acquiring industry-specific human capital if
they know a number of firms will locate in their area. Real
world localized industries entail a variety of arrangements
that promote the acquisition of specific skills. Piore and
Sabel (1983) emphasize the importance of the family in
preserving and transferring skill in Italian industrial
districts. Enright (1990) and Porter (1990) suggest that
pools of highly skilled labor have contributed to the
development of numerous industry agglomerations, such as the
film industry in Hollywood, the advertising and financial
3 A subordinate theme is that localization is tied to
community structures, such as the family, craft guilds, or tl1.e
church, which support the growth of local industry.
4 This format follows Krugman (1990).
Marshall (1920: 271).
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services industries in New York, and the microelectronics
industries in silicon Valley and along Route 128 in
Massachusetts.
A second reason firms localize is to benefit from
spillovers of industry~specificknowledge. In this case, the
accumulation of knowledge by one firm contributes to a local
stock of knowledge from which all members of an agglomeration
benefit. For Marshall, knowledge was transferr~d through the
interchange of ideas between localized firms. Modern
conceptions of knowledge spillovers vary widely. Jacobs
(1984) identifies knowledg~ spillovers as a key ingredient il1
the economic function of cities. Piore (1990) suggests that
knowledge sharing is commonplace in Italian industrial
districts, and is part of a "peculiar combination of
c;ompetition and co-opera'tion" between localized firms.'~
Relationships between firms are typically embedded in local
community institutions, such as the family, labor union, or
local politica.l party. Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkrnan and
Schleifer (1990) insteact suggest firms acquire knowledge
through "spying, imitation and rapid inter-firm movement of
highly skilled labor."?
A third reason firms localize is the grcwth of sUbsidiary
trades that provide intermediate inputs, especially wlle:re
these inputs are specialized or involve large fixed costs.
6
7
Piore (1990: 54).
Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Schleifer (1990: 2).
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Krugman (1990) provides a model of localization in which the
agglomeration of end users allows intermediate good producers
to expand production and reduce average cost~. Porter (1990)
observes that industry agglomerations gerlerally include a
number of related industries. Enright (1990) describes how
agglomerations attract specialized buyers and suppliers. As
an example, he cites the Sassuolo ceramic ti Ie indust.J:"y, \~hich
has spawned a local tile equipment industry.
Marshallian external economies help explain why incl\l~;try
agglomerations exist. A number of questions remain about the
dynamics of geographic concentration. A first set of
questions relate to how agglomerations corne into existence.
with positive externalities, firms clearly benefit from
localization. The literature models the location decision as
a simultaneous-move process, or one in which firms and workers
take actions in a well-ordered sequence. 8 In reality,
location decisions are rarely so well-coordinated. Do firms
move in bunches or does a first mover initiate agglomeration?
Is tllere indeed a natural sequence of moves? How do the
actions of first movers shape the actions of subsequen't
movers?
A second set of questions relate t.o how agglomerations
adjust to changes in market conditions. An agglomeration, by
definition, is a collection of independent firms where
decision-making is decentralized. Dramatic changes in mar~et
8 See, for instance, Rotemberg and Saloner (1990).
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conditions often require firms to retrain workers, choose new
technologies, or redesign the product they produce. All of
these are actions that may have spillover effects on nearby
firms. Do firms attempt to coordinate actions O~ does rampant
individualism prevail? If firms no coordinate actions, what
are the me=hanisms that allow them to do so? When nations or
regions with established industry agglomerations integrate,
external economies imply it is efficient for a single
agglomeration, or at most a limited number of agglomerations,
co serve the entire market. Wi th integrati'Jn, which
agglomeration becomes the new industry center? Do
agglomerations in integrating regions also integrate
activities in any way?
The stu~
The thesis studies geographic concentration in the
Mexican garment industry. Mexico provides a unique
opportunity to analyze both how industry agglomerations form
and how industries adjust to the transition from a closed to
an open trade regime. Between 1940 and 1985, Mexico developed
behind prohibitive trade barriers that were part of a
conscious strategy of import sUbstitution industrialization.
A pattern of geographic concentration emerged in which Mexico
City functioned as the country's principal industrial center.
In 1980, the capital was home to nearly half of the country's
manufacturing labor force. 'the development of all other
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regions in the country was in some way tied to the center. In
i985, Mexico decided to join the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs, or GATT, formally declaring an end to import
substitution. In the following three years, the government
eliminated, or at least drast ically reduced, all barriers te·
trade. President Carlos Salinas, who came to power in 1988,
has broadened the scope of trade liberalization to include a
free trade agreement with the united States.
The most feasible way to study agglomerati.on is to focus
on a single indust:ry. There is of course a loss of general i ty
with this approach, but it allows a more detailed analysis of
how firms in an industry are organized. The structural
features of the garment industry make it logical choice.
There is a basic Ioeational tension in garments between
production and marketing: production pushes firm to disperse
whereas marketing draws firms to agglomerate. In marketing,
access to information about frequently changing consumpr
tastes necessitates proximity to concentrated areas of
consumer demand. In production, the predominance of low-skill
work and the amount of labor required compel firms to locate
the activity in low-wage areas. Translating ffidrketing
knowledge into product designs requi res a cadre of skilled
design workers. Opening new locations to production requires
initial i.nvestments ill tra inillg des ign workers, even tl\ough
these workers comprise a minority of the production work
force.
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In an open economy, the labor-intensive nature of garment
production gives Mexico a pre~urned comparative advanta~e in
the activity, at least in relation to the u.s. The precise
role Mexico would play in a North American garment market.
remains unclear. Mexico has no clear advantage in design or
marketing. In marketing, wages are less a factor than market
size. The relatively sma11 size of the Mexican economy puts
Mexican firms at a disadva~tage, especially in relation to the
large u. s. market. In design, the knowledge and ski lIs
acqui.red under a closed economy may not be directly
transferable to production for foreign market.:;. This Inay
limit Mexico's participation, at least initially, to low-skill
activities in production.
The thesis utilizes three sources of data: firm-level
interviews, the Mexico Industrial Census, and unpublished
government figures. The information necessary to study an
industry is rarely available trom off icial sources. The
principal source of industry data in Mexico, as in most
countries, is the Industrial Census. The Census provides a
snapshot of the establishments in an industry at a given point
in time. While useful, this snapshot lacks depth in that it
provides no information on vertical or horizontal
relationships betweE':n establ ishments. Gi ven the lack of parlel
data on individual establishments, the Census also provides no
way to relate snapshots taken at different points in time.
Many of the rea.sons for which firms agglomerate are not
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captured in tIle data that cenSllS takers collect. Consider
MaL'shall's three basic localization economies. If we wallt to
study firm-specific training, the exchange of information
between firms, or the transactions that link t~e firms in an
industry,it is necessary to go inside f irms themselves.
Until more sophisticated survey data become available, the
obvious approach for this task is firm-level intervJ~ws.
There are various problems with firm-level interviews as
an empirical tool. Each requires careful consideration, but
none are inSUrmO\lntable. Interviews are only uS objective and
complete as the imperfect eye of the researcher. This a valid
concern in principal, but not given the alternatives. There
is no reason to believe the researcher's eye is any more
imperfect than that of the census taker. The importance of
personal contacts in arranging interviews implies sUbjects are
not drawn from a random sample. An obvious solution is to use
Census data to verify empirical regularities suggested by
interviews and follow these regularities back in time. A more
practical concern is that interviews consume a great deal of
time. Their ultimate justification is that they remain the
only means of obtaining certain kinds of data. If we take
strategic interaction between firms seriously -- and the bull:
of current research in industrial organization suggests that
we do -- we inevitably confront situations where we cannot
econometrically distinguish between competing explanations.
Our only recourse in this instance is to actually confront the
19
sUbjects we study.
outline of Thesis Chapters
The body of the thesis contains five chapters B The
chapters form an integrated whole, but each can also stand
alone. The self-contained format of the thesis requir'es som(~
repetition of material. This is unavoidable as each chapter,
with the exception of Chapter Six, relies on the same body of
interview data. Chapter Two presents the interview data in
systematic fashion. Chapters Three and Four study how
industry agglomerations form. Chapter Five studies the
relationship between the pattern of geographic concentration
and the trade regime. Chapter Six, the only purely
theoretical chapter, presents a model of industry localization
that is an extension of the discussion in previous chapters.
A brief review of each chapter is presented below.
Chapter Two provides regional histories of indust.ry
agglomeration in Mexico. The histor ies are based on extensive
firm-level interviews with m~nufacturers, subcontractor~, and
trader~ in the Mexican garment industry. The story of how
agglomerations form is equivalent to the story of how regions
become linked through trade or of how industrialization
spreads across regions. Each version revolves around pioneer
firms who expand or create opportunities for trade. The
descriptive material contained in the chapter forms the
empirical founda'tion for the dissertation. S\lbsequent
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chapters u~e the interview data as a nase from which to
develop and tast hypotheses about industry agglomeration.
Regional histories of garment manufacturing in Mexico are
interrelated. The chapter follows the industry from its
inception to the recent opening to trade.
Chapter Three studies the formation of industry
agglomerations. The industry follows a proce~s of geographic
concentration we term dispersed agglomeration. The industry
begins concentrated in a single marketing center. Over time,
production activities separate from the marketing ce~ter and
relocate to periphery regions, but not until marketing center
wages far exceed those in the periphery. Under dispersed
agglomeration, the location decision involves investment
issues that are similar to an innovation process. A pioneer
firm is the first to relocate; it undertakes the investments
that are neceasary to open a location to production. other
potential entrants wait and free ride off p~oneer investments
in later periods. The pioneer's incentive to open a location
is temporary monopsony power enjoyed in the periphery.
Chaptel" Four tests the empirical implications of the
theory of dispersed agglomeration developed in Chapter Three.
The theory predicts that industry location is determined by
the interaction of wage differentials and industry-specifi.c
agglomeration economies. Agglomeration in a previous period
expands the local skill base and enhances the productivity of
local workers. The probability a location will be occupied i.s
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a function of the difference between local production costs
and those in an alternative location. The cnapter uses a
probit model to test for agglomeration effects in the location
decision of Mexican garment firms. The Mexico Industrial
Census provides state-level observations on sixteen six-digit
garment industries. The results provide positive support for
the theory. Agglomeration, by reducing uni t labor
requirements, raises the probability a location will be
occupied in the future. The chapter then uses estimation
results to predict the probability a location will be occupied
for given wage differentials and levels of agglomeration.
Chapter Five studies how economic integration affects the
pattern of geographic concentration. The particular case we
consider is the integration of the Mexican garment industry
into a North American Free Trade Area. Integration reshapes
the pattern of vertical specialization betwe@D countries and
the location of production within each country. Marketing
externalities lead to the geographic concentration of
distribution activities. Under the closed economy, Mexico
City was the country's garment marketing center. The u.s. has
garment marketing centers in New York and Los Angeles. with
free trade, small country producers provide assembly services
for firms in the large country marketing center. Hex ican
garment producers, who previously served the domestic market,
are shifting to off-shore garment assembly for firms in u.s.
marketing centers. In the small country, production relocates
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to regions near large country markets; in the large country,
integration favors marketing centers with better access to
small country producers. Garment production in Mexico is
relocating from central Mexico to the Mexico-U.s. border. In
the u. S., the Los Angeles marketing center has been t:he
principal beneficiary of the opening of the Mexican economy.
Chapter six studies industry localization in the later
stages of industrialization. Previous chapters focus on
situations where skilled labor ~nd industry-specific knowledge
are spread unevenly across regions. When a large pool of
skilled labor has accumulated in periphery regions, there may
still be reasons for firms to localize. This chapter offers
a formal model of industry location in which firms agglomerate
in order to reduce bargaining costs associated with spatially
dispersed production. Agglomeration represents an alternative
to vertical integration. Industry location is the result of
a three-stage game between traders and producers. Traders
make costly ex-ante investments; producers have specific
skills and offer production services to traders. Through
agglomeration, traders increase competition among producers
for the services they provide. The creation of a thick market
reduces the potential for hold-up and increases traders' ex-
ante incentives to invest.
23
24
CHAPTER TWO: REGIONAL HISTORIBS
OP IHDO'iTRY AGGLOMERATION IN MEXICO
This chapter presents a series of regional histori.es on
the geographic concentration of firms in one industry. In the
industry we consider, the story of how agglomerations form is
equivalent to the story of how regions become linked through
trade or of how industrialization spreads across spaceo Each
version revolves around a single actor, the pioneez firm, who
expands or creates opportunities for trade. The discovery of
these opportunities, however accider-ltal, confers upon the
pioneer the role of innovator: by expanding markets, the
pioneer enhances the productive potential of existing
Lesources in the economy. The public good aGpect of this
innovation is extreme. Once realized, a trading opportunity
in principle becomes available to all ~ What. is striking about
the instances this chapter describes i3 the le~gth of time
pioneer f inns control access to the markets they have created.
The histori~s are based on 95 interviews wi th
manufacturers, subcontractors, and traders in the Mexican
garment industry I conducted betweell September, 1990 ~!'!d May,
1991. 1.'able 2.1 TnllntJ;nn._- ........ _ ........... ":J the text
methods and the sample of firms. The descriptive material
capsulized in this chapter forms the empirical foundation for
the dissertation. SUbsequent chapters use the interview data
as a base, from lh'hich to develop alld tast hl'potheses about
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il1,justry agglomeI"attun. The chapter follows the ind1Jstry from
its inception to the recent opening to trade.
1. Tbe Rise of t~e Mexico City Marketing Center
until the 19205, most garment production in Mexico was on
a made-~o-order basis. Housewives and neighborhood tailors
used factory-made fabric to produce cllstom garments for family
members or local patrons. It was not until the Me~ican
Revolution (1912-1917) tha~ industrial garment production in
Mexico became feasibleM Rural dwellers fleeing violence in
the countryside swelled the ranks of the capital and other
ma.Jor The sudden urban agglomeration created the
first mass consumer markets for garments ill Mexico. 9 The
individuals that initiated the production of ready-to-wear
garments were primarily L'sbanes-=1 and Jewish immigrants wh~ had
come to Mexico during the first thr~e decades of this century.
Many had been textile and garment m~rchants in their countries
of origin. They left marketing centers in the Middle East and
Eastern Europe to escape war, persecution, and ecorlomic
9 Mass markets in text.".les existed as early as t:he nlid
18008 in Mexico; mass consumer markets in g~rments did not
appaar until nearly two centuries later. See Walton (1977).
One explanation is that search costs delay the
industrialization of production until markets have reached
some minimum size. For differentiated products, like
garments, the minimum market size is larger. While individual
fabrics can be used to make a wide variety of garments, even
basic garments are differentiated by size.
26
instabi lity. 10
The first immigrant-traders arrived around the turn of
the century. They continued their trade as textile merchants,
distributing fabrics from textile factories to housewives and
tailors. Commerce generated the financial capital they would
later use to launch irldustr ial enterpr ises. 11 The Mexican
Revolution provided the immigrant-traders an unexpec'ted
advantage in textile commerce. Between 1911 and 1921, control
over :man)r~ rural areas was contested by a variety of armed
groups. The immigrant-traders, by virtue of their obvious
foreign origin, were able to appear neutral. The ability to
travel throughout the countryside and distribute fabric to
travelling armies and rural villages allowed th~m to
consolidate their control over textile distribution chanJ1els.
After the Revolution, established links with upstream textile
suppliers made it easy for the immigrant-traders to backward
integrate into garment manufacturingQ They made the capital
the hub of garment commerce and production, clustering their
shops in downtown Mexico City.12
10 See Glade (1983) on Levantines in Latin Americae
11 Many immigrant-traders arrived with some amount of
capital, as Mexican immigration law required at the time. See
Alonso (1983).
12 The centralization of commerce in the capital has
historic roots. The Aztecs established a network of open-air
markets in the Valley of Mexico. The spanish later controlled
interregional trade in the colony by requiring all goods to
pass through the capital. See Walton (1976).
27
The newly established manufacturer-traders began by
sUbcontracting production to outside shops. Only later; afi
markets expanded and became more secure, did they establish
their o~n factories. As is the case with garment
manufacturing around the world, production sUbcontracting has
remained central to the industry. The manufacturer-trader
buys fabric, secures purchase orders for the final garment,
and oversees the design phase of production. Design is wllere
the skill-intensive tasks of garment production take placee
Design workers convert sketches of garments into wor-kable
patterns, grade these patterns according to different garment
sizes, and use the graded patterns to cut the fabric into
ready-to-assembly pieces in a manner that minimizes fabric
wastage. The manufacturer-trader delivers ready-to-assembly
pieces to subcontractors, whose sale task is to stitch the
garment together. The basic production unit in assembly is a
single worker and a single sewing machine. Assembly accounts
for 70 to 80 percent of garment employment. The machinists
who assemble garments achieve acceptable levels of
productivity after three to four mcnths on the job. Only
assembly of the final garment is subcontracted to outs ide
shops .13
Ethnic ties provided immigrant-traders ,..,ith a.ccess to
!J These are the natural divisions along which the
industry tends to separate when it is broken up. On garment
production, see Ghadar and Davidson (1987), Hoffman and Rush
(1988), Morawetz (1981), and Waldinger (1986).
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finance. 14 Whi Ie garment manufactur ing requir'es orlly fLl()clest
amounts of fixed capital, it requires rela'tively large
infusions of working capital. IS Many potential Mexican-born
industrialists lacked the means to obtain credit. The
immigrant-trader, on the other hand, not only had an
established credit record with textile suppliers, but also had
the advantage of being able to deal with relatives or other
members of his ethnic group. New manufacturers rely on
relatives to help them establish a reputation for credit-
worthiness. They place their first fabric orders with the
suppliers of an uncle or a cousin. Over time, they accumulate
reputational capital with these suppliers, which allows them
to make purchases which are not guaranteed by others and thus
expand production. A reputation with one supplier enables a
manufacturer to makes purchases from other suppliers. This
arr",ngement provides suppliers with access to inforlnation
about the background and business his~ory of a manufacturer.
A potential manufacturer who lacks working capital or contacts
with established manufacturers who can vouch for him is poorly
situated to enter manufacturing. An alternative is to begin
14 The predominance of immigrant-entrepreneurs was flot
unique to the garment. industry. Haber (1989) observes tl1at
foreign-born merchant-financiers were ubiquitous in Mexico's
early industrial growth. He attributes their success 1:0
commercial contacts and access to startup capital.
IS In 1980, for instance, the ratio of fixed to working
capital in garments was 4.5-tO-l, compared to a ratio of 0.5-
to-l in all manufacturing industries (Censo Industrial, 198Q).
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as a subcontractor for an established manufacturer-trader and
accumulate contacts and capital over time.
Second and third generation ethnic Jews and Lebanese have
remained in the garment industry. They play an important
role, if not a dominant one, in wholesale garment commerce.
The directory of the Mexico city delegation of the National
Garment Industry Chamber, to which all garment f irrns must
belong by law, provides evidence on the ethnic composition of
the industry. In 1989, 38.6 percent of registered garment
establishments in the capi.tal were owned by ethnic Arabs and
Jews .16 Among these shops were the largest traders and
manufacturers in the industry.
2. Relocation, g,qional Integration, and tba-lioneer Firm
Over time, the Mexico city garment district ceased to be
an ideal locale for both marketing and production activities.
Rapid urban growth drove up land rents in the downtown ar'ea
and new industries began to provide more attractive employment
options for the urban workforce. By the 1960s, wage
differentials between Mexico City and provincial regions had
become as large as two-to-one (see Chapter Thr'ee). 'fhis
created a dilemma for garment firms. In their capacity as
trader's, the garment district was a source of information
about new fashions and styles and provided ready 3ccess to
16 Ethnic origin was inferred from maternal and paternal
surnames.
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upstream textile suppliers and downstream garment retailers.
It was not just i.nformation that concerned g~rment firm~, but
the time required to obtain it. Garment styles and fashions
often have exceedingly short life spans. This is compounded
by the fact that new products require fixed investments in
creating new designs and patterns. Recouping front-end
investments places a premium on identifying new fashion trends
as soon as they appear.
In their capacity as producers, the only advantage of
locating in t.he Mexico City garment district was that it
minimized the need to transport ready-to-asselnble fabric
pieces from design shops to assembly workers. The labor·"
intensive nature of production made firms especially sensitive
to rising wages in the capital. Wage considerations
eventually out\"Jeigl1ed transport cost considerations. The
solution W3S to separate production activities from market.ing.
The activities that left the capital first were low fashion
items, such as production of socks and men's shirts and pants,
where long product cycles made presence in a marketing center
less important. Medium fashion items, such as sweaters and
children's outerwear, moved out later. Only recently have
firms in the capital begun to relinquish control over high
fashion items, such as women's outerwear.
Manufacturer-traders followed two distinct reIocation
strategies. The initial reSpOl'lSe of many manufacture:r:·-traders
was to continue the existing pattern of subcontracting, but at
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a greater distance. They kept their design and market.ing
operations in the garment district and relocated assembly to
subcontracting shops located in shantytowns and rural
communities surrounding the capital. other nlanufacturer-
traders pursued a more radical approach. They relocated both
design and assembly facilities to provincial regions far from
Mexico City. This move initiated the creation of new
production cnnters and greatly expanded the geographic scope
of trade in the industry. In their new locations, the
Ioanufacturer-traders continued to channel m\Jch of their
production through the Mexico City marketing center. Over
time, they expanded production for regional markets. Some
production centers have become regional distribution centers.
2.1 Satellite Co.-uniti•• ot Subcontractors
Traders seeking to relocate assembly chose communities
where local residents had few alternative employment options.
Shantytowns adjoining Mexico city and rural communiti.es in
states neighboring the capital were logical candidates. Each
type of community possessed a relatively immobile low-wage
labor force. In shantytowns, traders subcontracted to
homeworkers. The typical homeworker is a hOllsewife whose
responsibilities in the home preclude her from taking a job in
town. In rural communities, traders subcontracted to family-
run shops. Local agriculture was not sufficient to absorb the
ever expanding labor force; alternative employment was located
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far away in the capital. Many rural communities experienced
a steady out-migration of residents to Mexico City, but few
were ever totally abandoned. I? Migrants working in the
capital often sent a portion of their earnings home to support
family members. It was the individuals that remained in tl:e
rural communities that manufacturer-traders sought out as
subcontractors. The traders often repre~ented a community's
first involvement in industrial production for a broad market.
Many satellite communities of subcontractors developed
around Mexico City.IS Examples include Nezahuac6yotl (women's
and children's outerwear), Chinconcuac (sweaters), and
Almoloya del Rio (pants) in the state of Mexico; San Martin
TexmelucAn (shirts) in the state of Puebla; and Tlaxcala and
surrounding communities (sweaters, women's outerwear) in the
state of Tlaxcala. This section descr ibes two satell i te
communities in detail, one located in a rural community and
the other in a shantytown.
Almoloya 4.1 Rio, M8xico: Almoloya del Rio is a small. town of
10,000 inhabitants that lies forty miles to the west of Mexico
City. The community is a center for pants subcontracting. A
trader from Mexico City established the town's first
sUbcontracting shop twenty years ago, creating tne firs·t
industrial link between Almoloya and the capital. Priol~ ~o
17
is
MU~oz, de Oliveira and stern (1979).
See Alonso (1991) on subcontracting in Mexico C:ity.
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that time, most residents had been farmers, wood cutters, or
somehow involved in local agriculture. 19 The first shop, and
several that soon followed, served as a training ground for
local residents. After gaining experience on the job, workers
in the original shops became subcontractors. Typically, they
made this transition by travelling to the capital to purchasE~
second-hand sewing machines and make contacts wi th other
traders in the garment districte The proliferation of
subcontractors attracted other capital ~raders to Alrnoloya.
The current generation of Almoloya residents has grown up
around garment production. Most shops are located in the
home, thus mirlimizing rent, a11d rely exclusively on family'
labor except during the Fall (pre-Christmas) production cycle
when they may hire two or three outside workers. Child.ren
begin work as early as the age of six doing simple tasks such
as collecting fabric scraps and cleaning the workshop. By the
age of fourteen or fifteen, they have left school and become
full-time workers in the family shop. The town's largest shop
employs only twenty-five workers, and most employ no more than
five workers. Given the emaIl size of individual shops,
traders often divide orders between five or six
subcontractors. Approximately eighty percent of the fami.lies
in the community are involved in the garment industry a An
19 Indeed, as late as the 19706 communities in the
mountains above Almoloya continued to use firewood as currency
for many transactions.
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association of local garment producers has 176 members, which
accounts for less than half of the local area producers.
The growth of garment sUbcontracting in Almoloya gave
residents the idea to establish a garment market in town to
provide local shops a place to sell goods they had
manufactured themselves. Mexico City traders were not
interested in helping local producers expand the market for
their goods. Some traders even threatened subcontractors wi t.h
termination if they sought work from other traders. At first,
local producers manned their own stalls; over time, local
werchants began to appear who specialized in garment commerce.
Ninety local producers and ~ixt.y-five local merchants now
participate in the market. Each has an assigned stall, and
all are prohibited from selling goods that are not produced
locally. The Almoloya market attracts low income consumers
and small-scale retailers who serve remote rural communities.
These are individuals who previously travelled to the capital
to make retail or wholesale purchases.
He.ahuac6yotl, Mexico: Nezahuac6yotl is a sprawling marginal
neighborhood that adj oi.tS Mexico city. Urban squatters
established the community in the late 1960s on the salt flats
of the Texcoco lake bed. The community now has three million
residents. In 1970, manufacturers of women's and children's
outerwear from Mexico City began to subcontract assembly to
shops i.n the community. Loc.:al production remains concentrated
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in these products. Most shops are run by women who work out
of their homes; most operate clandestinely in that they fail
to pay taxes or comply with government labor standards.
Producing in the home allows subcontractors to conceal their
shops from government inspectors. They pick up and deliver
orders from traders in the garment district on a weekly or
biweekly basis. Homeworkers generally exhibit a low
attachment to the labor force. Many do not work on a
consistent basis throughout the year. A common practice is
for the homeworker to s·ubcontract dur ing peak production
cycles in the Fall and Spring, when demand for subcontractors
is high, but participate in ether activitiAs dULing the rest
of the year. Homeworkers' frequent movements in and out of
the labor force contribute to rapid turnover in sUbcontracting
relationships between traders and subcontractors.
Subcontractors rotate between traders as often as every two or
three months. Traders suggest that for this reason they are
constantly in search of new subcontractors.
A survey by Alon\so (1991) estimates that in 1976
Nezahuac6yotl was home to 1, 500 garment shops, whictl employed
a total of 5,000 women. Three-fourths of these shops were
clandestine. w The average number of sewing machines per shop
was 1.2. Only a quartE~r of the shops hired workers from
20 Clandestinity implies much of the industry is hidden
from view. The 1980 Mexit:o Industrial Census, for instance,
only identifies 101 establishments that employed 504 workers.
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Qutaide the home; none employed more than five workers. In
the 19808, production in Nezahuac6yotl declined as Mexico City
traders moved assembly to smaller and more isolated
communities in neighboring states.
2.2 H•• Production Centers
Firms initially did not have to travel far from Mexico
City to find a low~wage labor force. The spectacular growth
of the capital quickly changed this. As Mexico city enveloped
surrounding comm'uni ties I local populations gained access to
more attractive employment alternatives and became less
willing to put up wi th the low pay of garment work. The
growth of Nezahuac6yotl, for instance, attracted furniture
producers, metal workers, and food processing plants. 21 At
the same timf~ that satellite communities of subcontractors
were springing up around the capital -- and in some cases well
before -- a few Mexico City garment traders embarked on a more
ambitious relocation strategy. These pioneer firms relocated
the entire production apparatus design and assembly
facilities to regions far removed from the capitala
Several pioneers initiated industrial development in their new
locations. Pioneers brought with them access to marketing
21 A more recent blow to the Mexico City garment industry
was a major earthquake in 1985 that devastated mu~h of the
capital. The downtown area, where the garment district is
located, was the hardest hit. Dozens of factor ies were
destroyed and hundreds of garment workers killede
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channels in the Mexico City garment district. Opening a
location to production required training local wor~cers in all
aspects of garment design and production. The most promising
employees often became business partners of the pioneer. The
marketing contacts and training the pioneers brought opened
the way for local residents to become subcontractors, or even
launch independent enterprises. This section describes the
formation and growth of five regional production centers.
)(onterr.y, Nuevo Le6n: Monterrey, a city of two mi 11 ion
people, is the principal garment manufacturing and
distribution center for northeast Mexico. The city has been
a major industrial center since the turn of the century.
Throughout its history, Monterrey has maintained an unusual
degree of political and economic autonomy from the capital.
Its independence is rooted in its geographical isolation from
the rest of the country and its relative proximity to the
U.S., with which it has always maintained relatively close
cODlIt1ercial and financial ties. Under the closed economy,
Monterrey was the only city to develop an industrial base that
rivaled that of the capital. Just before 1900, a few large
firms initiated production in the beer and steel industries.
These firms later expanded into glass, cement, and chemi.cals
and still control most industrial activity in the region.27.
22 On Monterrey's economic development, see Saragoza
(1988), Vellinga (1979), and Walton (1977).
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The pioneers of the Monterrey garment industry were two
Arab immigrants WIlD came to the reg ion in the 193 Os. They
established a pattern of specialization that shaped the local
industry's development for four decades. The first pioneer,
a Mr. Marcos, was an Arab text.i Ie mercha~lt WIll) moved to
Monterrey from Mexico City in search of trading opportunities
with Texas. He began by exporting shirts that were assembled
by local seamstresses. The Texas market collapsed with the
Great Depression and Marcos shifted to production for local
consumers in Monterrey, which at the time was emerging as an
industrial center. The continued expansion of the local beer,
steel, arld glass industr ies created suff icient demand for
Marcos to launch his own factory, Camisas Palma, which remains
one of Monterrey's largest garment establishments.
The second arrival, a Mr. Canavati, was a Palestinian
shirt manufacturer who came to Mexico in 1900. He worked a
variety of odd jobs in the capital, while searching for an
opportllnity to return to shil-t ma'nufactur ing. He carne to
Monterrey in the 19305 after hearing of Marcos' success.
Canavati began producing at home with a few sewing machines.
Within three years demand had exceeded his capacity and he
established a small factory. This venture went bankrupt
during World War II. After the War he established the shirt
factory Manchester, which remains one of Monterrey's largest
garment establishments. The two pioneers made Monterrey a
center for shirt production. Along wi th Mexico City, the
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region dominated shirt production in Mexico until the 19805.
In the 1960s, two other Arab imnllgrants, a Mr. Kalifa and
a Mr. Zablah, moved to Monterrey to launch garment
manufacturing ~nterprises. Each had experience in Mexico City
garment comm~rce. Kalifa was a brother-in-law of Canavati.
Together, they launched Portefino, Monterrey's first large
pants factory. The venture coincided with the dramatic rise
in the popularity of jeans in Mexico. Portefino later split
into two firms along family lines, but the venture served as
the point of entry for Kalifa into the Monterrey garment
industry. Kalifa's sons used Portefino as a base from which
they established six other garment firms, each a separate
enterprise controlled by a different sibling.
There have been numerous intermarriages among the second
and third generations of the pioneer families. n Today, the
four pioneer families account for a total of thirty-five local
garment manufacturing firms. Of the nine local gc.\rment
factories that employ more than 250 workers, the four pioneer
families founded all but two. The existing pioneer firms and
thnir off-shoots are run by members of the third generation,
who are now in their twenties and thirties. The tllird
generation has shown a greater interest in establishing their
n There have been at least four inter-marriages. In the
second generation there is the Marcos Canavati family, and in
the third generation there are the Zablah Marcos, Marcos
Murra, and Zablah Murra families (in Spanish, the first sur-
name is the paternal and the second surname is the maternal) .
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own ventures, perhaps because opportunities for advancement
are limited in the original enterprises. Most.. begin as
subcontractors for parents l uncles, or cousins. others have
become fabric distributors and count relatives as their
principal clients. The tendency to transact with relatives in
no way means that firms are run cooperat i vely. In .... laws,
cousins, an~ even brothers often compete directly with one
another in final product markets. At the same time, they
share information with one arlother about net" business
opportunities. One cousin may supply another with fabric at
the same time they compete as pants producers.
Guadalajara, Jalisco: Guadalajara, a city of four million
people, is the prirlcipal garment manufactul-ing and
distribution center for northwest and west-central Mexico.
Under Spanish colonial rule, Guadalajara emerged as a local
marketing center for agricultural products. Like Mexico cit1r,
it experienced its first rapid growth during the Mexican
Revolution as rural inllabitants sought refuge in the city from
bloodshed in t~e countryside. Unlike Monterrey, Guadalajara
has traditionally maintained close ties to the capital. Local
political elites tend to take their orders from Mexico City
bosses and most large local industrial enterprises are
subsidiaries of industrial groups based in the capital. 24
24 On Guadalajara, see Arias (1985) t de la Pefla ,and
Escobar (1986), and Walton (19/7).
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Also unlike Monterrey, Guadalajara's industry is dominated by
small and medium firms in light industry.25
The pioneers of the Guadalajara garment industry were
Lebanese textile merchants who carne to the region just af~er
the turn of the century. Guadalajara served as an overflow
destination for immigrant-traders from the capital. The
city's role as a reg iona 1 distr ibution centel'" made it a
natural destination for the immigrant-traders. Similar to the
experience of traders in the capital, the urban growth that
resulted from the Revolution created a large con~umer nlarket
for ready-to-wear garment s. Local immigrant-traders used this
opportunity to expand from textile commerce into garment
production. 26 The first immigrant-traders to produce garments
began with knitwear, and in particular socks. By 1935 there
were twenty small knitwear establishments in Guadalajara, by
one estimate half of which were owned by I.Jebanese
immigrants. v High and medium fashion garments, such as
women's outerwear, were from the outset dominated by Mexico
City producers. The Guadalajara garment industry remained
concentrated in knitwear until the 1970s.
~ Walton (1977) attributes the diffuse ownership
structure to the pattern of land tenure around Guadalajara,
which historically was among the least concentrated in all of
Mexico. Histor ic patterns of land tenllre around Monterrey, as
in much of northern Mexico, were highly unequal.
26
27
Lailson (1988).
Ibid.
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Unlike Monterrey, the influence of Guadalajara's pioneer
was short-lived. Many of the pioneer firms were out of
business by 1950, replaced by new entrants. 28 Also in
contrast to the experience of Monterrey, most Guadalajara
garment producers have remained small and medium-size
enterprises. Few firms employ more than forty or fifty
workers. There are few remaining ethnic networks in th.e
Guadalajara industry, but firms associate with each other in
the industry through informal grupos, or groups D Grllpos
consist of ten to fifteen enterprises that are based on family
or neighborhood ties. They share information on new fabrics,
fashion trends, and commercial opportunities with large
buyers. Less frequently, firms share production orders;
rarely do they launch joint ventures. There are five or si>c
widely recognized grupos in the Guadalajara garment industry.
Two grupos have alternated leadership of the Glladalajara
delegation of the National Garment Industry Chamber over the
last ten years. Local firms are required by law to pay dues
to the chamber. The local chamber organizes COIDlnercial
activities, which include a regional trade fair and a
wholesale commeI"cial plaza. These activities allow firms to
make contacts with regional and national garment traders. The
dominant grupo at any point in time appears to erljoy
28 Ibid.
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privileged access to these benefi.ts. 29
Aquascaliont.s, Aquascalientes: Aguascalientes, a city of
500 1 000 people and the capital of a centrally located state of
the same name, is the principal manufacturing center for
children's outerwear in Mexico. until the 19708,
Aguascalientes was a cattle town. A dwindling ground water
supply was causing cattle production to slowly die out, and
many residents were migrating to other regions in search of
work. In the last two decades, the region has undergone a
dramatic industrial transformation. The growth of the local
garment industry has played a key role in this transition.
Aguascalientes. is unique among garment production centers
in Mexico for it has a history that predates industr ia 1
garment manufacturing. The region is home to a traditional
form of embroidery that first became popular in the early
1800s. Local artisans produced embroidered goods and sold
them in open-air markets. Artisan production grew up around
the San Marcos trade fair, an annual agricultural event that
was the largest of its kind in north-central Mexico. It was
not until the 19605 that local garment producers shifted from
handicraft to industrial production. At this time, several
firms began to mechanize embroidery by replacing workers with
29 As the activities of the chamber nostly pertain to
trade liberalization, we postpone discussion of the chamber
until the next section.
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special i zed equipment. One firm in particular, Bordados Maty,
was a pioneer in converting embroidery into a large-scale
industrial activity. other f irn\s follo\fred Maty' 5 lead and the
region became a center for mass-produced embroidered linens.
In the late 19705, the market for embroidered linens
suddenly declined. Local garment firms looked to Maty for
guidance. Many of the founders of the area's garment
establishments had started as workers in Maty's shops. Maty
had financed a number of these firms with loans of equipment
or cash. Maty choose to switch from embroidered linens to
children's outerwear. Most other firms in the area followed
suit, with many directly imitating styles and designs. Maty
nearly went bankrupt during the turbulent early 19805, as a
series of devaluations greatly increased the peso value of
foreign bank loans it had at the time. The firm never
regained its earlier preeminence, but its actions established
a new pattern of regional specialization. By 1985, children's
outerwear accounted for over half of employment in the local
garment industry and Aguascalientes had surpassed Mexico city
in the production of children's clothes.
A close working relationship among local firms has played
an important role in the recent growth of the Aguascalientes
garment industry. Coordination among firms has smoothed the
transition into children's outerwear. Most activities have
been coordinated by the local delegation of the National
Garment Industry Chamber, which is the most active chapter in
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the country. The chamber has established a commercial plaza
where eighty manufacturers have retail outlets, a credit
union, and, more recently, an export trading company which
organizes groups of firms to produce large orders for u.s.
buyers. The commercial plaza was created in 1974 to give
local firms a place to sell mass-produced linens. To
successfully move from handicrafts into production for a mass
market, firms needed access to wholesale buyers from
Guadalajara and Mexico City. A commercial plaza, they
thought, would allow buyers to visit a number of firms at
once. with the move into children's outerwear, firms doubled
the size of the commercial plaza. The industry chamber has
also worked with the lc.'cal pUblic university to create a
program in fashion design. Chamber members train students in
technical tasks, such as pattern-making and grading. Chamber
members attribute the spirit of cooperation in their
delegation to the fact that current members are children or
grandchildren of artisans. They have known their fellow
members since childhood and share a respect for the role of
the garment industry in the region.
The growth of the local garment industry has launched an
industrial boom in Aguascalientes. since 1985, Nissan, Xerox,
Texas Instruments, and Moto Diesel have built assembly plants
in the city, converting the region into one of largest
assembly platforms in interior Mexico. Foreign firms have
chosen Aguascalientes in part due to a large labor fOI"ce
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accustomed to assembly work from experience in the garment
industry.~ Indeed, many garment manufacturers complain they
have lost workers to foreign assembly plants and fear a
regional labor shortage in the near future. A second factor
that has lured foreign firms to the region is the relative
lack of labor conflict. The leaders of the state's principal
business organizations, which includes the local delegation of
the garment industry chamber, meet on a regular basis with the
governor and the state's principal labor federation to
negotiate potential conflicts. There has been only one strike
in the last dozen years. This contrasts with more volatile
lab0r relations in the capital and certain border states.
Tabu.can, Puebla: Tehuacan is a city of 200, 000 people
located four hours driving distance south of Mexico City.
Until the 19708, most residents of TehuacAn were involved in
one of two activities: poultry production or bottling of
mineral water from nearby spr ings. Two garment i.ndustry
pioneers have transformed the regional economy. A thriving
local garment industry now specializes in tile assembly of
jeans and men's shirts and dress pants.
The first garment industry pioneer was a IJebanese
immigrant who came to TehuacAn in 1962. The immigrant had
spent several decades in the Mexico City garment district and
30
"De Rancho a ImAn Industrial," Expansi6n, 7-24-85,
pp. 90-98.
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was looking for a new location where he could produce men's
pants. His principal client was the Haddad family, three
Lebanese brothers who ran a textile and garment wholesale
business in Mexico City. The Haddads produced all their
garmen'cs through subcontractors. When the immigrant went
bankrupt, the three brothers bought his business and moved to
Tehuacan. They continued to manufacture under their own label
until 1979 when they switched to assembly of jeans and dress
pants for Mexico City traders, many of whom had been their
business associates in the capital. In the switch to
assembly, the brothers ceded control of purchasing fabric and
designing the garment to client firms; they retained control
over converting designs into workable patterns, cutt ing fabric
for production, and assembling the final produc'to
The brothers have added five additional garment
factor ies I which together now employ 1, 600 workers. The
Haddads run a tight-knit family enterprise, in which the
brothers or their sons make all management decisions. All
enterprises are jointly owned, but in each shop a si.ngle
family member has primary responsibility for day-to-day
operations. The Haddads have expanded their operation in part
by attracting workers from Oaxaca, a poor state located just
to the south of TehuacAn. This has required busing in workers
from their homes in rural communities. Labor turnover among
rural workers is high, as many workers maintain a primary
attachment to agriculture. They take garment assembly work
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during low periods of agricultural production and return to
the fields for planting and harvest. Even after five or six
years of garment labor, workel.-s may still be active in
agriculture, if not directly for themselves then for a
relative.
Tehuacan's second pioneer was Alfonso Fernandez, a
Spanish immigrant who came to TehuacAn in the early 1970s to
subcontract for several Mexico City traders. Fernandez also
specialized in men's pants and jeans. Shortly after his
arrival, he saw opportunities for expansion. He invited a
fellow Spanish immigrant from the nearby city of Puebla to co-
invest in a pants factory. This venture lead to two
subsequent joint ventures, also with Spanish immigrants from
Puebla. After these initial ventures, f'ernAndez began to
finance startups by employees he thought showed considerable
promise. He has financed four such startups. The employees
he has chosen were production supervisors or design workers.
Whereas the spanish partners had suffi.cient capital to ent.er
directly into a juint venture, the employee-partners have had
to borrow funds from Fernandez to finance their investments.
In each arrangement, Fernandez is the majority owner and
leaves day-to-day decisions to the other partner. Fernandez'
local business empire now includes twelve factories ttlat
employ 2,000 workers.
Fernandez' three most recent ventures are located in
rural areas surrounding TehuacAn.
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Workers are increasillgly
not from town but from rural cownunities nearby and in Oaxaca.
A rural factory location provides better access to the
relevant labor force. Fernandez has follow£.;d a carfeful
strategy of penetrating particular communities to find the
most suitable workers. Garmt:!nt assembly is generally a rural
worker's first involvement~ in an activity other than
agriculture. The first worker from a given community serves
as a vehicle for bringing other rural workers into the
industry. After testing the waters, a worker may be followed
by a sibling or a neighbor. Fernandez' production sllpeI-vi.sors
suggest that good workers -- \1,orkers who return to the factory
month after month -- are ml:>re likely 'to draw other good
workers.
The pioneers' activities have expanded opportunities for
local individuals in TehuacAn. A number of former employees
of the two pioneer firms have launched their own enterprises
and now subcontract independently for traders in the capital.
The new subcontractors generally know little about the
distribution end of the busines.s. Mexico City traders deliver
fabric and garment designs and subcontractors return a final
product. The traders closel~' guard information about the
final destination of their I:~roducts. 'I'hey often attactl
garment labels themselves to prevent subcontractors from
discovering the brand of clothing they are producing.
Irapuato, Guanajuato: Irapuato is a city of 500,000 people in
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the centrally located state of Guanajuato. The city is a
crossroads for the major rail and truck lines that connect
Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City. Garment firms in tIle
city specialize in the assembly of jeans. Irapuato is not yet
a major garment productiol1 center, but the development of the
local industry exhibits many of the same characteristics as
the agglomerations described above, suggesting it is in an
earlier stage of the same trajectory.
In the 19405, two Lebanese immigrants, a Mr. Nazar and a
Mr. Tome, founded Irapuato's first garment factories. These
shops were among the first industrial enterprises in the
region. Nazar had been a manufacturer in Mexico City. He
moved the contents of his shop to Irapuato after hearing about
the success of other Lebanese immigrants in the nearby state
of Michoac~n. The local garment industry remained small until
the 1960s, when the dramatic rise in the popularity of blue
jeans provided new opportunities for the pioneer firms. Nazar
closed shop in the early 19705, but left a lasting imprint on
the industry. A number of his former employees used their
training and experience to start their own enterprises.
Tome's operations have survived. Beginning in the 1960s, he
expanded his enterprise by financing the startups of several
former employees. The first such venture took place in 1962.
Tome entered into a joint venture with Fernando Barba, then a
production supervisor who had worked his way up from the shop
floor. Tome and Barba have since established several new
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shops and in the second generatioll are linked by marriage.
Tome and Barba rely on subcontractors for ~ost of their
production. Many of their subcontractors are located in rural
communities surrounding Irapuato. The residents of these
communities, and in particular the young women, have few
employment alternatives. Rarely do rural subcontracting shops
meet fiscal obligations. Local area residents are grateful
that the women of the community do not have to travel or move
t.o larger towns to find work. They view client firms like
Tome and Barba as conserving the fabric of the community, and
often protect sUbcontracting shops from detection by
government officials.
3. Tbe Liberalization of Trade
In 1985, Mexico initiated a process of trade
liberalization. within two years, most trade barriers had
been eliminated, or at least drastically reduced. The impact
of the opening to trade on the organization of the garment
industry has been dramatic. Under the closed economy, the
industry was organized around the Mexico city marketing center
and served the domestic market. with trade liberalization,
both the reference market and the competitive landscape have
changed. For all intents and purposes, trade liberalization
for Mexico implies integ~ation into the North American
economy. The reference market for producers is becoming that
of the u.s. Access to markets means producers must develop
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contacts with traders in u.s. marketing centers. Mexico City
traders face direct competition for control over design and
marketing activities from the larger and more sophisticated
garment districts of Los Angeles and New York.
This section describes how different agglomerations of
firms in the Mexican garment industry are responding to trade
liberalization. The effect of trade liberalization upon
different regions varies greatly, depending on the function
they served under the clo~ed economy_
3.1 The Mexico city Marketibq Center
For the Mexico City industry, the opening to trade has
meant chaos. Centralized garment distribution networks have
provided ready channels for imports. Many traders have shut
down their factories and subcontracting operations to become
importers. 31 In some cases, relatives in New York, Los
Angeles, and Panama assist traders by directing them to
foreign buyers and ensuring orders arrive intact and on time.
There is a general consensus among retailers that immediately
following trade liberalization, importers brought in a poor
quali ty goods. 32 Importers lacked experience in foreign
markets and wer~ easy prey for foreign distributors. Limited
31 Expansi6n, April 17, 1991, pp. 72-73.
32 See "La Industria del vestido Contraataca, II Expansi6n,
4-11-90, pp. 21-33. R. Benitez, "Estrictos Requisitos de
Calidad Cubrir~ la Ropa de Importaci6n, El Financiero, 10-22~
90, p. 18.
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variety in the Mexican market had made them more focused on
price than quality. Buyers were not prepared to deal with the
variety of goods they faced in foreign markets, and lacked the
specialized knowledge necessary to distinguish between
different fabric qualities, patterns, and styles. The
personalized nature of transactions between retailers and
manufacturers in Mexico had also left buyers unpr~pared to
deal wi th the international garment market. Few ilnporters
knew how to ensure proper shipment of goods by adding clauses
to letters of credit. Foreign djstributors took advantage of
novice Mexican buyers. In order to get pr ice discounts,
exporters required buyers to purchase orders that were too
),arge for the Mexican market; others sent shipments late; and
still others sent damaged goods or wrong sizes. Importers
have learned from experience by observing foreign traders and
by attending foreign trade and fashion shows.
The producers that remained in the capital during the
1960s and 19705 were mostly those involved in women's
outerwear. The importance of fashion makes proximity to a
marketing ,-' .·'n~:er essential in this market segment. Wonlen' s
ou'terwear producers find themselves at a disadvantage in the
ne~ly open economy. At the high end of the market I they
cannot compete with designs from Paris, Milan, or New Yorka
At the low end of the market, they are undersold by simple
products from China. In mid-range markets, they are under
greater pressure from competitors in other regions of Mexico.
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Satellite communities of subcontractors have felt ripple
effects from the troubles of Mexico city manufacturer-traders.
•I
I
Subcontractors rely on t,J:."aders i.n the capi,tal to market tile
goods they assemble. Traders exiting the industry, whether
-r
they shut down to become impor"C.ers or due to increased
competition, leave their subcontractors without work. The
commercial isolat~on of satellite communities limits their
access to alternative markets.
There have been several industry-wide attempts to respond
to the opening to trade. hll have been coordinated by the
national office of the National Garment Industry Chambf'r. The
National Garment Industry Chamber collects an annual
membership fee that is a percentage of each member's sales.
There is a national. office in Mexico city and local chapters
in Monterrey, Guadalajara, Aguascalientes, TehuacAn, Merida,
and Irapuato. Of the 14,000 garment firms in the country,
7,000 belong to the chamber, 3,000 of which are located in
Mexico City. The original idea behind industry ctlambers was
to create institutionalized communication channels between
business and government. 33 In practice, the principal
functions of the national office of the garment chamber have
been to communicate relevant information about goverrllnent
decrees to memb~rs and to lobby the exec\ltive branch on behalf
of individual members or groups of members. This role has
underscored the importance of good relations between the
33 See story (1986).
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chamber and the PRI, the rUling party. Good standing with the
PRI appears to be necessary for ascendancy in chamber
leadership. Local delegations of the chamber, on the other
hand, tend to be more focused on local industry concerns.
The national office of the garment chamber has
coordinated two activities to help Mexico City firms adjust to
the opening to trade. The idea for the first carne from a
World Bank-funded study by the Boston Consulting Group, which
concluded that Mexican firms needed. to export in order to
survive. Two problems, according to the study, were i.mpeding
the industry from breaking into export markets: firms
produced in quantities that were too small for foreign tuyers!
and firms lacked the ability to make foreign contacts.~ To
remedy this problem, the study recommended creating
intermediaries that could group togeth~r small firms to
produce large orders for foreign buyers. The idea was to
replicate a strategy the Italian firm Benettoll had followed to
great success. The nationa 1 ofr ice, w'.i th the f inancia 1
backing of several government ministries, followed up on this
recomme:nda'tion by creating the Fashion and Design Center. 'rhe
center was outfitted with German computer-aided-design
equipment and computerized cutting equipment at the cost of
US$1.5 million. 3s The new technology was intellded t.o
eliminate a perceived bottleneck between the design and
3S
Boston Consulting Group (1988).
Expansi6n, 4/11/90, p. 27.
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assembly stages of production.
Neither the Bast.on Consulting Group or the na.ti.onal
office of the inci.~stry ci'lamber consulted the small firms that
were the intendad beneficiaries of the program, most of which
still utilize cardboard patterns in uesign and simple
electrical cutting t001s. The center has been in operation
for two years. Its client base consists exclusively of medium
and large firms; none a!' L. exporti.ng. Few small f irITIS have
considered using the center's services. The fee structure for
computeri~eci cutting favors large batches, and use of the
facilities requires fifty percent payment upfront. Firms lack
the working capital to make large upfront payments and do not
have the technical know-how to utilize the new equipment.
A second activity of the national office has been to
lobby the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Promotion to impose
tougher restrictions on imported clothing. Local
manufacturers of T-shirts and underwear have accused Asian
knitwear producers of dumping garments on the Mexican market.
In the name of defending Mexican consumers, th~y proposer}
import restrictions which would require imported garments to
carry a label which provided information or, fabric
composition, country of origin, name and address of exporter,
name and address of importer, and date and location of entry
into Mexico. In October, 1990, the import restriction \.[as
imposed by presidential decree. 36
El Financiero, 4/10/90, p. )6~
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Th~re is a widespread belief that President Salinas plans
to do away with obligatory membership ill industrial ctlarnbers.
This has caused concern in the national office of the garment
chamber. Ttle chamber' 5 leadership believes that there are few
services the chamber could provide that would be of interest
to large firms, and has decided to focus on the needs of small
and medium-size members. To prepare itself for the change,
the national office is for the first time surveying members in
Mexico City about the services they would be willing to pay
for. Members overwhel~ingly request two services: contacts
with foreign buyers, and worker training programs, including
basic programs for seamstresses and intensive courses for
skilled workers, such as graders, markers, and designers.
3.2 Production Canters in Outlyinq Regions
In outlying regions, the opening to trade is viewed much
differently. Firms are gaining access to superior designs and
far larger markets than were ever available through the Mexico
City garment district. Agglomerations of producer firms are
de-linking themselves from Mexico City and trying to develop
contacts with traders from U• S • market ing centers in Los
Angeles and New York. In some cases, provincial firms are
trying to use these new opportunities to capture activities
that under the closed economy were the exclusive domain of
·Mexico city firms. This section revi.ews the experience in
four of the regional production centers discussed above.
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Monterrey: The Monterrey garment industry is shifting from
shirt production into women's outerwear. The owners of new
ventures include descendants of the pioneer families, as well
as ne",- entrants into the indu::;try. The local industry
includes a boutique line of expensive items and an economical
line of fashion-oriented items for the popular market. In
contrast to the original pioneer enterprises, most firms in
the new market segment are small. There are only four women's
outerwear manufacturers with more than 100 workers; the rest
have between ten and fifteen workers per shop. The growth of
the local women's outerwear industry has come at the expense
of manufacturers in Mexico City. Numerous industry observers
suggest that Monterrey firms are surpassing the capital in
design and in quality. The proximity of the u.s. makes
Monterrey a testing ground for new fashionso Producers can
check which items are doing well in the u.s. market by taking
a two-hour trip to visit shopping malls in l,aredo, Texas.
Consumers are reportedly now more aware of fashion trends and
quality standards in the u.s.
The new Monterrey garment firms are forming grupos I
similar to those that exist in Guadalajara. New producers of
women's outerwear, especially those in high fashion segments,
often share information about designs, fabrics, and sewing
techniques with a select group of colleagues. The grupos are
generally an extension of some existing set of relationships,
such as the extended family or long-time acquaintances. 'rhese
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grupos do not yet actively participate in a more structured
organi zation 1 ike the garnlent industry chamber.
Gua4alajara: The Guadalajara industry is also shifting into
women'19 fashions II The local delegation of the National
Garment Industry Chamber is playing a key role in this
transition. The delegation's principal activity is Exhimoda,
a twice yearly trade fair ongoing since 1980. Exhimoda
attracts buyers from Mexico, the U.S., and Canada, and has
become the largest garment industry event in Latin America.
The trade fair helps local firms adjust to the opening to
trade. Firms that have lost big clients, like department and
supermarket chains, to imports have used the trade fair to
develop a new client base, especially among retailers in
smaller cities who have less access to foreign goods.
The local industry chamber is consciously promoting
regional specialization in women's outerwear. wi th the
decline of the women's outerwear industry in the capital,
leaders of the local chamber hope to convert Guadalajara into
the new center for women's fashion in Mexico. An
agglomeration of manufacturers, they maintain, is more likely
to attract the attention of buyers, both domestic and foreignQ
It also allows them to jointly provide certain public goods.
The local chamber reinvests profits from the trade fair in
numerous proj ects. These include an industr ial park, a
wholesale commercial center with space for 130 garnlent
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manufacturers to display their products, and a design center
which allows members to share computer-aided--design equipment.
Aquascalient•• : In response to trade liberalization, firms in
Aguascalientes have formed an export trading company. The
trading company was created in 1986, just after the government
announced Mexico was joining GATT. The initiative began as
the brainchild of two local manufacturers, but the leadership
of the local garment i.ndustry chamber convinced them to make
it a region-wide activity. The trading company has forty
members and organizes groups of five or six firms to produce
orders for u.s. buyers. Member firms range from shops with as
few as twenty machines to as many as 650. Most of the
contracts are through foreign brokers and are for off-shore
assembly, not manufacturing. One of the motivations behind
the trading company is to help firms make contacts wi th
foreign buyers that are interested in long-term joint
ventures. The trading company is currently negotiating
projects with two large u.s. retailers.
Many firms that participate in the trade company
initially had trouble coordinating manufacturing, which is
primarily for the domestic market, and assembly, which is
primarily for the u.s. market, in the same plant. Assembly
does not require many of the fixed costs tllat are necessary in
manufacturing, such as maintaining personnel to design
garments, create patterns, purchase fabrics, and handle sales.
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To streamline operations, grO\lpS of member firms have
established separate assembly plants in the fornl of joint
ventures. So far the trading company has only been able to
obtain part-time sUbcontracting work from u.s. clients. As a
result, capacity utilization in the assembly plants remains
low. Firms have had to expand the range of products they
produce in order to appeal to a broader scope of clients which
has created further difficulties in managing assembly.
Tehuacin: Since 1985 the local garment industry in Tehuacan
has expanded rapidly, doubling employment from 5,000 jobs to
over 10, 000 jobs . with the opening to trade, the local
industry is becoming an off-shore aseembly center for shirts
and pants. The sale business class hotel in the city reports
that u.s. buyers are visiting TehuacAn at the rate of two or
three per month. TehuacAn' s two pioneer firms are leading the
transition. The contacts they develop with foreign buyers
create opportunities for other local firms. Mr. Fernandez has
five shops dedicated to off-shore garment assembly. The
Haddad brothers began to export in 1986, and tllree of their
six plants are dedicated to export production. They began
with off-shore garment assembly of jeans for Bugle Boy and
Levis-strauss. After three years, they graduated to private
label manufacturing. They purchase the fabric and assemble
the garment, and the client firm distributes the final product
and provides assistance in quality control.
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4. concluding Remarks
The descriptive analysis of this chapter sets the stage
for the theoretical and empirical analysis of following
chapters. It raises a basic set of questions about
industrialization, geographic concentration, and trade.
Knowledge about markets and production do not flow smoothly
across space. Localized knowledge tends to contain productive
activities within an industrial center. This is especially
true where the commercial relationship between regions is
limited. Firms do not leave an established agglomeration and
open new locations to production until the gains from trade
are considerable. The pioneer firms that link I:egions by
trade stand much to gain. They emerge as central figures in
the industrialization of undeveloped regions.
As industrial activities disperse across regions, the
pattern of geographic concentration that emerges is dictated
by the reference market. When the reference market changes,
such as through trade liberalization, the existing pattern of
industry agglomeration is no longer relevant. Adjustment
requires dramatic changes in the organization of the industrye
Knowledge in existing industrial centeI"S may be useless for
the new reference market, in which case firms must develop a
new set of trading relationships. The following chapters
provide a careful study of these issues.
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2.1 INTBRVIEW METHODS AND THE SAMPLE OF FIRMS
Interview data come from 95 firm··level interviews conducted
between September, 1990, and May, 1991. Interviews were
arranged throll
'
) h five organizatic)ns: the National Garment
Industry Chamber (78 interviews), Dynamic Consultants to
Micro-Enterprises (6 interviews), the September 19th Garment
Workers Union (5 interviews), the National AutonOmOtlS
University of Mexico (2 interview:s), and the Authentic Labor
Front (2 interviews). Inter'..'iews followed a general
questionnaire (available on request from the a\lthor), but
maintained an open-ended format.
The following is a breakdown of thE! total number of interviews
by region and activity:
Mexico City (52)
Garment Industry Chamber:
Fashion and Design Center:
Men's outerwear:
General Subcontracting:
other:
Monterrey, Nuevo Leon (13)
5
2
9
3
5
unions: 4
Women's outerwear: 8
Knitwear: 5
Retailers/Traders: 11
Guadalaja~Jalisco(10)
Women's outerwear:
Pants:
Shirts:
other
Aguascalientes, Ags (9)
Children's Outerwear:
Linens:
other:
6
2
2
3
5
2
2
Women's outerwear
Other
Tehuacan, Puebla (7)
Pants:
Shirts:
6
4
4
3
Nezahuac6yotl, Hex (2) Almoloya del Rlo A ~ex (2)
Subcontracting: 2
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SUbcontracti.ng: 2
CHAPTER THREB:
GBOGRAPHY AND TRADE 1M MEXICO:
AGGLOMERATION, DISPERSION, AND THE PIONEER FIRM
The Mexican garment industry exhibits a pattern of
geographic concentration that is characteri.zed by a number of
distinct stages. The industry begins concentrated in a single
marketing center. Over time, production activities separate
from the marketing center and relocate to periphery regions.
A pioneer firm relocates first, a~d undertakes investments in
training workers that are necessary to open a new location to
production. The pioneer emerges as the dominant firm in its
new location, and instigates the formation of a new production
center by financing the startups of former employees. We term
this process dispersed agglomeration.
Dispersed agglomeration derives from a basic tension
between marketing and production. In marketing, access to
information about frequently changing consumer tastes
necessitates proximity to concentrated areas of demand. In
production, the predominance of low-skill work compels firms
to locate the activity in low-wa.ge ar~as. Translati.ng
marketing knowledge into product designs requires a cadre of
skilled workers. Opening a new location to production
requires initial investments in training design workers, even
though these workers comprise a minority of the work force.
Marketing knOWledge gives firms from the center a first-~mover
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advantage in relocating production to the per iphery. Tra ining
costs imply firms delay relocation until wage differentials
between the center arld the periphery are substant.ial. A
firm's incentive to become a pioneer is temporary monopsony
power in the periphery as the sole intermediary th~ough which
local agents can transact with the marketing center. other
marketing center firms allow the pioneer to move first, as
they benefit by free riding off pioneer investments in later
periods.
This chapter develops a theoretical framework to explain
the process of dispersed agglomeration we observe in the
Mexican garment industry. We focus on the development of the
industry in a closed economy; Chapter Five extends this
framework to an open economy. The chapter has three sections.
section one presents a series of generalizations about
geographic concentration in the Mexican garment industry.
Section two offers a theoretical framework to explain
dispersed agglomeration. And section three provides
concluding remarks.
1. Agglo••ration, Dispersion, and the pioneer Firm
This section presents a series of generalizations about
how industry agglomerations form and how they develop over
time. The generalizations build on the interview matel-ial
presented in the last chapter by incorporating data the from
the Mexico Industrial Census. Census data make it possible to
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verify empirical regularities suggested by interviews, and
follow these regularities back in time.
1.1 Industrialization and Geoqrapbic Concentration
The agents that pioneer industrialization are individuals
with previous experience in marketing. Production and trade
begin concentrated in a single marketing center. Industry
pioneers divide production into a series of vertical stages,
in which they retain control over skill- and kno~Nledge-
intensive tasks and subcontract low-skill tasks.
The previous chapter describes the rapid assimilation of
immigrant-traders into the Mexican garnlent industry. The
pattern of geographic concentration that resulted is evident
in Table 3.1, which provides employment levels for the garment
industry, for all manufacturing industries, and the share of
employment in each activity located in the Federal District,
the federal entity that contains Mexico City. In 1965, the
first year for which data comparable to later years is
available, 58.7 percent of garment manufacturing employment
was located in the Federal District. Garment jobs remained
concentrated in the capital until the mid 1970s. Marketing
activities were also highly concentrated in the capital. In
1980, 69.8 percent of wholesale trade in garment, textile, and
leather goods was conducted in the Federal District. fl
37 Unfortunately, data on commercial activities is only
available for 1980.
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3.1 THB SBARB OP NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IM MEXICO CITY, 1965~88
LEVEI.S/Shares
(levels in OOOs) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
NAT'L GARMENT
EMPLOYMENT 75.9 98.5 102.4 144.0 116.8 173.3
Federal District
Share 0.587 0.554 0.508 0.447 0.332 0.292
NAT'L MANUFACT.
EMPLOYMENT 1,410 1,581 1,708 2,701 3,269 2,473
Federal District
Share 0.339 0.311 0.289 0.311 0.230 0.192
As discussed in the last chapter, the immigrant-traders
divided garment manUfacturing into four vertical stages:
fabric purchase, garment design, garment assembly, and
marketing. They retained control over fabric purChase,
design, and marketing, and divided assembly between their own
shops and a large number of small subcontractors. The Mexico
Industrial Census offers further evidence of the vertical
organization of the industry. Table 3.2 provides a size
distribution of garwent industry establishments and of
manUfacturing establishments in general. The 1980 Census
lists 12,199 garment establishments that employed 144,346
workers. At one extreme are a small number of large
manufacturer-traders. The 250 est.ablishments with 100 or more
workers accounted for 43.0 percent of total garment
employment. At the other extreme are a large number of very
small subcontracting establishments. Of the 12,199
establiShments, 7,047 did not employ remunerated labor; the
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average shop employed 1.5 workers. Another 2,186
I
establishments employed between one and five workers. 18
3.2& SIZE DISTRIBUTION OP MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS, 1980
ESTABLISHMENT TYPE
NUMBER OF
ESTAB5 WORKERS
SHARE OF TOTAL
ESTAB. WORKERS
Total
wI Paid Labor
w/o Paid Labor
131,625
65,244
66,381
2,701,137
2,587,260
113,877
0.496
0.504
0.957
0.042
Workers
per
Estab.
1 to 5
6 to 25
26 to 100
101 +
36,266
16,727
7,880
4,371
98,141
201,735
395,931
1,891,453
0.276
0.127
0.060
0.033
0.036
0.075
0.146
0.700
3.2b SIZB DISTRIBUTION OF GARMENT BSTABLISHMENTS, 1980
ESTABLISHMENT TYPE
NUMBER OF
ESTAB. WORKERS
SHARE OF TOTAL
ESTAB. WORKERS
Total
w/ Paid Labor
w/o Pa~d Labor
Workers
per
Estab.
1 to 5
6 to 25
26 to 100
101 +
12,199 144,346
5,152 133,831
7,047 10,515
2,186 6,188
1,842 22,468
874 43,185
250 61,990
0.422 0.927
0.578 0.073
0.179 0.043
0.151 Oil156
011072 0.299
0~O21 0.430
38 The Census reports that shops with five workers or
less accounted for 11.6 percent of garment employment. This
is likely a gross underestimate. As discussed in Chapter Two,
many small shops are clandestine; they actively avoid
governm~nt officials, including census takers. An interview
I had with a Mexico City subcontractor illustrates this point.
After an hour-long interview, during which it became clear I
was a foreigner I the subcontractor still believed I was a
government inspector and was expecting me to ask for a bribe.
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1.2 V.rtical separation and the Dispersion of Production
Over time, the industry disperses: production activ i ties
move to outlying regions, while marketing activities remain
concentrated in the initial agglomeration. Relocation
preserves the pattern of localization: the production of
individual goods moves to specific regions, as agglomerations
of specialized producer firms are formed. Industry dispersion
coincides with the persistence of wage differentials between
the center and periphery regions. Wage differentials lessen
as relocation proceeds.
Beginning in the 1960s, the share of garment employment
located in Mexico City began to fall, as new production
centers developed in outlying regions. Initially, this was
due to faster job growth in outlying states, but by the 1980s,
Mexico City was experiencing a net outflow of garmellt jobs.
Table 3.1 shows that the Federal District's share of garment
employm~nt declined from 55.4 percent in 1970, to 44.7 percent
in 1980, and tc. 29.3 percent in 1988.
The exodus of garment jobs from Mexico City coincided
with the persistence of wage differentials between the capital
and outlying states. Table 3.3 shows the ratio of average
nominal state wages to average nominal national wages in the
garment industry from 1965 to 1988 for selected states. The
table shows figures for states where garment production
ultimately relocated; similar wage differentials existed
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J.J RATIO OP AVERAGE NOMINAL STATE .AG~ TO AVERAGE
FEDERAL DISTRICT WAGE FOR THE GARMENT INDUSTRY, 1965-88
-
--
STAr~rE 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Aguascalientes 0.518 0.539 0.727 0.750 0.837 0.712
Guanajuato 0.425 0.572 0.463 0.535 0.572 0.630
--_.--._.-
Jalisco 0.606 0.553 0.693 0.693 0.715 0.716
.-
Nuevo Le6n 1.020 0.981 0.965 0.893 0.949 0.802
Puebla 0.4~6 Olt580 0.595 0.483 0.572 0.612
-
Tlaxcala 0.083 0.339 0.459 0.569 0.763 0.560
between the capital and all other states. In the decade
before garment jobs began to leave the capital,. average
nomi:lal garment wages in the Federal District were higher than
all other states, except the state of Mexico, which borders
Mexico City, and Nuevo Le6n, which by that time was already an
industrialized state. In 1965, the differentials between the
Federal District and the states of Aguascalientes, Guanaj\Jato,
Jalisco, and Puebla were approximately two-to-one.
A similar pattern of regional wage differentials exists
for manufacturing activities in general (see Table 3.5
following the text). These wage differentials were one
feature of a broader process of geographic concentration in
Mexico. This pattern is evident in Table 3.1. In 1965, 33.4
percent of Mexico's manufacturing labor force was locat~d in
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the Federal District. ..
•
TIle exodus of garment jobs from Mexico city preserved. the
local ized nature of production. This pattern is clearly
reflected in Table 3.4, which shows employment levels in six-
digit industries for selected states. 39 Between 1970 and
3.4 STATZ SHARES OP NATIONAL GARMENT BNPLOYMENT
BY SIX-DIGIT INDUSTRY, 1970-85
EMPLOYMNT IN ACTIVITY/
state Share of Total 1970 1975 1980 1985
It---------------...........-----+----~-.--....._..----__+_-·-...---·-
CHILDREN'S OUTERWEAR
Federal Distl~ict
Aguascalientes
4,503
0.649
0.041
10,782
0.470
0.196
9,103
0.307
0.444
WOMEN'S UNDERWEAR
Federal District
Mexico (state)
9,902
0.675
0.104
8,945
O.50R
0.126
14,530
0.464
O.14G
10,373
0.469
0.381
INDUSTRIAL UNIFORMS
Federal District
Aguascalientes
3,651
0.673
0.001
6,036
0.570
0.035
5,717
0.339
0.230
u--------------.----+------+--..---t-------t-~-- -
SWEATERS
Federal District
Guanajuato
Mexico (Rtate)
Tlaxcala
3,808
0.793
0.038
0.029
0 .. 003
4,582
0.618
0.018
0~133
0.003
5,416
0.583
0.130
0.106
0.008
5,121
0.323
0.154
0.161
0.110 ill
I
f
...
9,990
o to 410 ~
O. 204 .
0.117 .
17,482 j
0.413
O.l~O
0.078
-~~
27,704
0.615
0.065
0.020
12,492
0.341
0.247
0.089
16,173
0.750
0.020
0.018
10,218
0.384
0.245
0.068
10,589
0.386
0.350
0.033
WOMEN'S OUTERWEAR
Federal District
Jalisco
Nuevo Le6n
SHIRTS
Federal District
Nuevo Le6n
Puebla
11
•
1985, production of individual garments relocated from Mexico B'I.
IL
39 The
industries:
g3rment industry consists of
clothing and knitwear~
two fOU1"'-digit.
I
r
ar
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III
•
city to new production centers in outly ing s1:ates. The
figures are at the state level, but in each case production is
I
•
concentrated in one or two municipalities. Children's
outerwear and industrial uniforms have relocated to
Aguascalientes, Aguascalientesi women's underwear has
relocated to NaucAlpan, Mexico; sweaters have relocated to
three communities in the states of Guanajuato, Mexico, and
Tlaxcala; men's shirts have moved to TehuacAn, Pueblai and
women's outerwear continues to move to Guadalajara, Jalisco,
and Monterr~y, Nuevo Le6n.~ other six-digit garment
industries (socks, leather apparel, and accessuries) are also
localized. It is also clear in Table 3.4 that garments have
left Mexico City in a particular order. Low fashion garments
(underwear and men 's shi.rts) were the first to mO"'Je, followed
by medium fashion garments (sweaters, children's outerwear,
and uniforms), and only recently by high fashion garlnents
(women's outerwear). High fashion garments have remained in
the ~apital despite persistent regional wage differentials~
From Table 3.3, it is clear that, as the relocation of
garment production has proceeded, wage differentials have
fallen between the Federal Oi2trict and the states where new
production centers are locaten. Wage differentials between
the Federal Di.strict ai1d outlying states have not been
~ In shirts and women's outerwear much of the shift has
occurred since 1985, and is not fully evident in Table 3.4.
In TehuacAll, for instance, interview data suggest garment
employment more than doubled between 1985 and 1~90.
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eliminated, but have in all cases been substantially reducedD
1.3 Tb. ForaatioD of IDdustry AggloMeratioDS
New agglomerations are formed by a single pioneer trader
from the marketing center. To open a new location to
production, the pioneer invests in training local workers.
The pioneer initially represents a periphery location's sole
access to downstream markets. The pioneer emerges as a
dominant firm in his new locatiok1 and expands product. ion by
financing local startups. Loca 1 f irms ultimately develop
independent links with the marketing center.
As Chapter Two illustrates, new garment production
centers were initiated by a single trader from the Mexico city
garment district. To move design and assembly operations to
outlying regions, a pioneer must make two types of initial
investments. 'fhe first is to train workers in design,
pattern-making, and fabric cutting -- activities in which
workers require two to three years before they achieve
standard levels of productivity. The second is to organize
machinists and subcontractors for assembly work. Interview
material suggest that pioneers initially hire workers with
little or no previous experience in industry. This was true
both in urban shantytowns, such as Nezahuac6yotl, and rural
areas, such as TehuacAn and Irapuato.
Initially, all individuals in the local garment industry
work for the pioneer in some capacity, either as machinists r
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subcontractors, or in the skill positions. All local contact
with garment retailers and with textile suppliers is through
the pioneer. Over time, a new production center grows up
around the pioneer, with firms specializing in the activity
the piol1eer has brought to the periphery. This tra11sformation
occurs along one of two paths: through starttlps by former
employees of the pioneer, or through the formation of an
ethnic enclave of producers. In both instances, the pioneer
supplies venture capital.
Tbe Adopted-SOD strateqy: Along this path, the pioneer
finances new ventures by adopting former employees into his
business empire. The pioneer chooses skilled employees, such
as production supervisors or design workers, as his business
partners. The pioneer employs a careful screening process in
selecting long-term partners. Where the partner is not a
family member, the pioneer and partner often become linked by
marriage. The pioneer firm in TehuacAn, for instance, has
equity investments in a dozen local firms. similar patterns
exist in Aguascalientes, TehuacAn, and Irapuato.
Tbe Bthnic-Bnclav. strategy: Along this path, the pioneer
invites a relative or associate to move to the region and
participate in a joint venture. Word of a pioneer's success
spreads within the ethnic community, attracting other
entrants. Where entrants come to the region uninvited, they
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soon develop ties wi th the pioneer. The second and third
generations of pioneer families fortify family and ethnic ties
in the industry, rather than diversify into other activities.
They reinvest in family firms, marry within the enclave, and
steer business towards in-laws or members of the extended
fami.i.¥. An enclave of four families in Monterrey, for
instance, owns seven of the ten largest local garment firms
and accounts for a total of thirty-five local garment shops.
A similar pattern exists in TehuacAn.
Over time, local firms develop independent access to
distribution channels. The emerging production center
attracts other traders from the marketing center. Local firms
capture some marketing activities from the capital, such as
'iholesale distribution of specific products, but do not fully
replace the initial marketing center. This process takes a
decade or more. While agglomerations ultimately shed the
dominant firm-satellite firm structure, the speed with which
this transition occurs varies considerably across locations.
In Aguascalientes and Guadalajara, pioneer fil-nlS faded quickly
into the background; but in Monterrey, TehuacAn, Irapuato,
pioneer firms dominated local production for several decades
after their arrival.
2. Theory
section one describes
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a process of geograpllic
concentration we term dispersed agglomeration. 1'his section
develops a theoretical framewo:rk to explain this process.
Dispersed agglomeration involves four stages:
1. An initial agglomeratic)n of industry activities"
2. The vertical separatiorl of the industry through the
geographic dispersion of production.
3. The relocation of production by pioneer firms.
4. Pioneer financing of indLstry expansion.
This is not the only pattern one can imagine, nl,r is it the
only one we observe. An exception to this pattern in the
study is Aguascalientes, where an agglomeration of garment
producers has developed around a local population of artisans
.nose skills predate industrial production. Marshall (1920)
suggests induGtry agqlomerations generally form in regions
with a history of artisanship. As we discuss below, it is the
lack of such a history that creates a role for a pioneer.
2.1 The Dynamics or Dispersed A9qlomeratioa
Interview material suggest dispersed agglomeration
results from the interaction of three factors: (1) knowledge
spillovers between firms in marketing activities, (2) a
separable production process that requires workers with
specific skills, and (3) regi.onal variation in wages, due to
some exogenous process. 'rhis section explains how these
factors give rise to the four distinct stages of dispersed
agglomeration. Figure 3.1 provideR a graphic illustration.
1. I..lli.t.i.al Agglomeration:
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Knowledsr ~ spi llovers in
marketing lead firms to agglomerat1e. Frequent changes in the
style of garment consumers demanct imply firms must remain
abreast of constantly shifting tas1:es. Firms gain access to
information about market conditions by locating near other
firms. This occurs indirectly thr()ugh spy ing and imi tation
and directly through open communication between firms. All
else equal, firm locate marketing and production together.
Knowledge spillovers are a widely cited characteristic of
the garment industry. Lichtenberg (1960), Steed (1981), and
Waldinger (1986) describe similar external economies in the
New York and Hong Kong garment industries. In low income
countries like Mexico style changes are less important than in
industrialized countries, but communication costs between
locations are higher, due to poor telephone service and
inefficient transportation systems.
2. Vertical Separation and Industry Dispersion: Wage
differentials between the center and per iphery cause the
ind'ustry to separate. Firms move production, the labor-
intensive activity, to low-wage regions, and leave marketing
concentrated in the initial agglomeratione Production
involvt:!s two activities: assembly and design. Marketing
knowledge gives traders a first-mover advantage, and it is
they that open periphery locations to production.
3. Relocation and the Pioneer Innovation: In a given
per iphery locatiofl, a single trader aE)Bllmes the :r'ole of
pioneer. The pioneer makes front-end investments in trainirlg
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a cadre of design workers and organizing machinists for
assemblye Initial training costs imply firms delay relocation
until wage differentials become sUfficiently large.
The pioneering activities we identify correspond with
Leibenstein's (1968) notion of entrepreneurship in developing
countries. He suggests the entrepreneur's main function is to
create channels for input supply and expand channels for the
distribution of output. What sets apart pioneering activities
as a distinct form of entrepreneurship is the integration of
regions by trade.
An obvious question is, why do periphery workers not
invest in acquiring skills themselves? Training in design is
general to garment manufacturing and not specific to
individual firms. Human capital theory suggests workers
should be willing to absorb the costs of general on-the-job
training in the form of below market wages dllring the traini.ng
period. 41 It is rational for them to do so as training
increases their productivity, and hence their expected
compensation, in future periods. If design workers paid for
their own training, marketing center firms would be willing to
relocate production as soon as wage differentials emerged
between the center and periphery. In this event, there would
be no role for a pioneer and no delay in the spread of
industrial production across regi.ons.
A role does exist for a pioneer because periphery workers
41 See Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974).
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do not perceive design skills to be general in natureD Prior
to the pioneer's arrival, periphery workers remain dedicated
to local agriculture and have scant contact with any broader
industrial economy. To willingly cover the costs of their
training, periphery workers must understand how such training
affects their future compensation. Nothing in their previous
experience allows them to make this sort of calculation; they
are unable to internalize the impact training has on their
future productivity. If a pioneer wants skilled workers, he
is obliged to provide the training himself.
This argument is analogous to Becker's (1964) distinction
bet~een general and firm-specific on-the-job training. From
the point of view of the firm, design training is general to
garment manufacturing. From the point of view of the worker,
however, design training is f irm-specif ic.. Workers are
unwilling to bear the costs of firm-specific training, as this
training is of no value to them in the market as they perceive
it. During the training period, the pioneer must at least pay
workers their alternative wage. The pionee~ is willing to
cover training costs, as long as he is conf ident he can
inhibit turnover and delay entry by competitors for
sUfficiently long to recoup his training investments.
A broader interpretation of the pioneer is that of an
agent who brings industrial work habits to the periphery.
Endowing workers with general industrial skills is a task
common to early industrial entrepreneurs. One such example is
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that of Josiah Wedgwood, the founder of the British pottery
industry.42 Wedgwood developed a durable form a pottery that
could be mass produced, but lacked industrial workers to man
his shops. He had to train workers not only in the 'l:asks
specific to pottery, but also in the work habits that are
essential to industrial production. A similar task faces
pioneer firms in the Mexican garment industry: the pioneer
must lure workers out of the fields and into the factory
before he can identify a cadre of capable workers to train in
design activities.
Our view of how agglomerations are formed contrasts with
Rotemberg and Saloner's (1990) model of regional
specialization discussed in Chapter One. They suggest
agglomerations are formed through a sequence of related
actions by workers and firms. Firms move to a given location
in bunches in order to give workers an incentive to invest in
acquiring industry-specific human capital. If a single firm
moved by itself, workers, fearful of a solitary firm's
monopsony power, would not acquire necessary skills. This
framework may be appropriate for some developed country
contexts, but does not capture the flavor of the transition
Chapter Two describes. Pioneers initiate a fundamental
transformation in the organization of economic activity in the
periphery. It is only a select group of workers, those in
design, that require industry-specific skills. The bulk of
42 Langton (1984).
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workers are in assembly, who require not so much training as
organization; they must be convinced to leave thei.r
agricultural activities and join the assembly line. A role
for a pioneer exists precisely because workers do not foresee
the future stream of benefits industrial work holds for them.
The above discussion begs a second question: why do
traders avoid competition over the right to open a given
location? other marketing center traders -- a pioneer's
potential competitors -- benefit by delaying entry and free
riding off pioneer activities in later perIods. Pioneer
investments in training create a non-appropriable asset in the
per iphery. Property rights on ski lIs are by def inition vested
in workers. A firm considering whether to joi.n a pioneer in
the periphery prefers to wait until the pioneer has trained a
cadre of design workers and organized workers for assembly.
Later entrants can free ride off pioneer investments in
training. The incentive for the pioneer to move first is that
he enjoys temporary monopsony power in the periphery. The
pioneer is the only firm in a given periphery location with
knowledge about downstream markets. This makes him the sole
intermediary through which local agents can transact with the
marketing center. The pioneer also has, at least initially,
knowledge about the local labor market that other marketing
center traders lack. He knows the abilities of different
individuals, and how much training each has received; he may
also command some degree of loyalty on the part of periphery
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workers. Local knowledge initially inhibits entry by other
marketing center traders.
In dispersed agglomeration, the location decision
involves investment issues that are similar to an innovation
process. At any point in timet the pattern of localization
appears Marshallian: firms agglomerate to obtain information
about demand conditions and to gain access to skilled design
workers. Across time periods, industry location resembles a
.
n
Schumpeterian (1942) innovation process: short-teI·m rents
justify investments in developing a new technology -- which in
this case is opening a new location to production -- even
though innovating firms know they may be surpassed by later
entrants. This type of innovation process has so far only
been linked to the development of new products or new
production processes, such as the patent race literature
surveyed in Tirole (1987) and the Aghion and Howitt (1990)
model of growth through creative destruction.
4. Entry Pre-Emption and Rent-Sharing: Training design
personnel and organizing assembly workers ultimately reduces
relocation costs for other traders. The pioneer is aware of
this externality. To pre-empt entry, the pioneer expands his
operations through partnerships with former employees or other
potential entrants. He chooses business partners from the
ranks of his most skilled employees. These are the
individuals whose training best equips them to launch their
own enterprises. Converting them into partners is a form of
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rent-sharing that keeps them from becoming direct competitors.
Expanding capacity in the periphery also deters other
marketing center firms from relocating to the pioneer's
periphery location, but at the cost of bidding up periphery
wages. That is, to prevent other marketing center traders
from joining him in the periphery, the pioneer must expand his
operations until the incentive for them to do so -- a wage
differential between the periphery and the marketing center --
is eliminated, or at least substantially reduced. Ultimately,
some entry is inevitable, both by periphery workers who have
acquired sufficient knowledge to develop direct contacts with
the marketing center and by other marketing center traders.
Rent-sharing accounts for a common form of family-based
entrepreneurship that is widely cited in the literature, but
never fully explained. In this arrangement, a family-owned
business group illcorporates employees who are often not family
members to run new enterprises in return for an ownership
stake in the business. Business ties with employee-partners
are cemented through direct ties to the family, such as
marriage. Piore and Sabel (1984) refer to this type of
arrangement as a federated enterpr ise. A first example i.s
employment practices in Japanese zaibatsu, as described by
Hirschmeir and Yui (1981). The zaibatsu were confederations
of firms in complementary activities, such as trading,
insurance, and mining, that were owned and controlled by a
single family. The zaibatsu came into being after the Meiji
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Restoration (1868) and reached their apex of ecorlomic power irl
the 19208 and 19305. Zaibat.su expanded into new lilies of
economic activity by endowing sons or promising managers from
within the enterprise with sufficient capital~ Where business
pa~tners were not family members, they were treated as adopted
sons and often married into the family.
A second example is the syste111e Motte, a strategy of
family-based enterprise development in the nineteenth century
French textile industry described by Landes (1976) Cl At
marriage, sons and daughters of textile families received
sufficient capital from their parents to establish their own
firms. Parents directed children into lines of activity which
complemented the family's existing operations, and would often
pair their children with a capable technician from their own
shops. Over time, fathers, sons, uncle5 and cGusins formed an
interconnected web of complementary enterpr i3es ~ In the
zaibatsu and the syst~me Motte, children and former employees
represent potential competi tOl S whose entry threatens the
competitive position of the incumbent family firm. Offering
them an ownership stake comes a~ the cost of shared rents, but
ensures that junior members, who have acquired industry-
specific skills and knowledge from the incumbant family firm,
do not become direct competitors.
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2.2 A Mo4.1 of Regional Industrialization and Trade
The basic ideas of the last section can be captured
formally in a simple model of industry location. We model the
location decision as a two-period non-cooperative game between
traders, the agents that 1 ink reg ions by trade. 43 rfhe model
hos three elements:
1. N traders Cournot compete in a si.ngle market"
There ~re two periods; in each, traders first choose where
to produce and then choooe how mtlch to produce. All moves
are simultaneous~ Demand is given by
•
-
r
(L
I
I
r
I
p P (Q) , pI < 0, P I I .:5. o (1)
where Q is total industry output.
2. l.'here are three production locations: a Marketing
Center and two ident~ '7: a 1 periphery locations. In the
center, traders face zero fixed costs and constant marginal
costs W. In the periphery, fixed costs 3re positive and
traders Cournot compete for labor services. Marginal costs
in periphery location i are
C' > 0, C/·" .2:. o. (2 )
where Q~ is total output produced in location i.
3. Fixed costs in the periphery take the following
form: If the location was unoccupied in a previous period,
fixed costs equal F for all traders choosing the location
that period. In the next period, fixed costs in that
location are zero.
The fixed costs are those required in training a cadre of
skilled design workers and of organizing assembly workers.
Traders do not face fixed costs in the Marketing Center. A
history of production in the Marketing Center provides traders
43 Dudey (1990) and Eaton and Lypsey (1979) also offer
location models based on strategic interaction.
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with access to the skilled personnel they need. In periphery
locations, there are no skilled workers. Once a trader opens
a periphery location, the design facilities he creates are
free for all to use. There is a lag in this externality, as
traders can only free ride in the period after investments are
made, and not within periods. The model invol~es the
unrealistic assumption that training is a one time investment
and sufficient for any level of produ~tion. The model can be
easily complicated by adding additional periods, additional
locations, or making fixed costs a function of past output,
without altering the basic re:sul ts. The formation of the
marketing center is consciously left in the background to
focus on the location of related industry activities.
Under a plausible set of conditions, the following pair
of strategies is a Nash equilibrium:
1. One trader chooses a pioneer strategy: he opens
a periphery location in period one and remains there in
period two.
2. All other traders follow a free ride strategy:
they allow the pioneer to enjoy monopsony power in period
one and free ride off his investments in period tWOa
We term this equilibrium the pioneer localization path. We
begin in the second period and wOI~k backwards. Period two
competition depends on location investment decisions made in
period one. Before making period one investments, traders
look forward to determine how thel3e decisions impact their
long-run profit stream.
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P.rio4 Tvo Quantity an4 L~c.tion Decisions: Per iod two
competition depends on which of the three possible period one
outcomes obtains: both locations are open, one location is
open, and neither location is open~
First, consider the case where both periphery locations
are opened in per iod one. In this event, traders can
costlessly source production to any locatioll they choose.
Equilibrium requires that marginal costs in the periphery are
bid up to Marketing Center levelsa We assume the level of
output at which periphery marginal coats are bid up to W is
small relative to total illdustry output, but not relative to
the output of an individual trader. Consider the quantity
choice for trader i. If both locations are open, there is no
in\l'estUlent decision to be made, and the second period problem
reduces to a one-shot Cournot ~uantity game.
Call the periphery sites Location A and Location B. Let
Q be the total output of the N traders, which consists of
three components: Q~, total output in the marketing center;
QA, total output in periphery location Ai and Qb , total output
in periphery loca~ion B:
Q == omc + Qa + Qb ( 3 )
Trader i must decide how much output to source to each
location. In the Marketing Center, trader i faces zero fixed
costs and wage W. Naturally, no trader would choose to source
production to a per iphery location past the point where
marginal costs exceed W. In other words, trader i will choose
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c( such t.hat I
(4)
given QI. Def irle 11- to be Cournot prof its for trader i when
all traders face mar-ginal productioll costs equal to W. If
both periphery locations are open, all traders earn symmetri.c
prof its 11-. This is shown in an appendix. Entry equates
periphery and Marketing Center marginal costs, and traders
earn the same level of profits they would have earned had all
traders remained in the Marketing Center.
Next, consider the case where Location A is opened in
period one, but Location B is not. For Location A, the above
logic applies: traders will source production to the open
location until marginal costs are bid up to w. will any
trader be willing to open Location B? If no trader opens
Location B, all traders earn symmetric profits 11(.. since
Location B remained closed during period one, any trade~ who
wishes to occupy Location B in period two must incur fixed
costs F. A period two Ioeational Nash equilibrium requires
that no addi tional trader, taking other traders' actiorls as
given, wishes to invest in opening Location B.
Consider the problem of the trader who is deciding
whether to become the first pioneer.
maximizes
max [P(Q) - ~(c()].c(
c(
As a pi.oneer, he
(5)
given the output choit:es of other traders whell they' face
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marginal production costs W. The first order condition for
(5) is
P ( Q ) + P' (Q) *qa - ca (qa ) - C· I (c() *qa 0 ( 6 )
where we apply the assumption that the pioneer trader's
optimal choice of qa does not bid periphery marginal costs up
to w. Since the pioneer's marginal production costs are less
than W, he is able to capture market share from the other
traders, and ~arns higher prof~ts that he did in the marketing
centero Let "p be the Cournot profits a first pioneer trader
earns in a periphery location when the N-l other traders face
marginal costs W. A trader will be willing to open Location
B in period two as long as,
llP - F > fl- ( 7 )
Expression (7) is a necessary condition for any periphery
location to be occupied. Whether (7) holds depends on the
relationship between F, W, and periphery marginal costs.
Suppose W is rising exogenously over time. At some point, W
reaches a level where (7) binds and the location process gets
under way.
tlow many traders will choose to occupy Location B in
period two? Define 11-- to be the profits the N-l traders i.n
the Marketing Center earn when a monopsonist trader occupies
Location B. As the Marketing Center tradArF;: ha''.re higher
marginal costs than the pioneer, they earn lower profitR than
they <.10 in the absence of a ~)j orle~r ~
11'- > 1e _.
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(0)
Define "w to be profits a duopsonist trader earns in Location
B wh.en the N-2 othe~ traders face marginal costs W. No second
trader will be willing to open Location B in period two if
free > 1TPI' - F (9)
This will certainly be true if (7) binds and the presence of
two traders in a periphery location is sufficient to bid
periphery marginal costs up to W. Assume for the moment that
(9) holds. The next section explains why we expect this to be
the case.
Fil1ally, consider the case where neither location is
opened in period one. In this case, a period two Ioeational
Nash equilibrium requires that no additional trader, taking
the actions of other traders as given, wishes to open a
periphery location. If no trade!:' opens a location, all
traders earn symmetric profits "e. By (7), it follows that at
least one location, say Location A, will be opened. will
Location B also be opened? Let"r be the profits a monopsonist
trader earns in Location 8, given there is a monopsonist
trader in Location A arid N-2 traders in the Marketing Center.
Location B will remain unopened if,
fT-- > 11' - F ( 10)
Since periphery marginal production costs are less for a
second monopsonist than for a duopsonist,
Tr f > Trw (11)
or that (9) holds as long as (10) holds.
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Tbe Period One Location Decision: In period one, traders make
investment decis ions before they make qllanti ty decis ions. In
deciding whether to open a periphery location, they look ahead
to period two in order to determine the total profit stream
associated with different actions, taking the actions of oth~r
traders as given. If both locations are opened in period one,
all traders earn symmetric profits n- in period two, as entry
bids marginal costs up to W in all locations. If only one
location is opened in period one, our assumptions imply in
period two that one trader earns "p - F and N-1 traders earn
11
oe
• These profit outcomes also obtain in period two if
neither location is opened in period one.
Consider the effect of an exogenously rising Marketing
Center wage. When W reaches the level where
(11 )
a single trader just becomes willing to open a periphery
location. The potential pioneer trader knows that if he opens
a periphery location, say Location A, in period one, i.t will
be worth it for some other trader to open Location B in period
two. Taking the actions of the other traders in period one as
given, and using his perfect foresight about period two, the
potential pioneer trader will open Location A if
which is guaranteed by (11).
(12)
The left-hand side CJf the
inequality in (12) shows total pioneer profits, which are the
sum of first period moncpsony profits, fixed costs, and second
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period profits when one location is opened in period one,
given the N-1 other traders remain in the Marketing Center in
period one. The right-hand side represents total profits in
the alternative case, in which the trader remains i.ll the
Marketing Center dur ing per iod one and per iod two. ('fhis
implicitly assumes the pioneer ignores the possibility that he
is the trader that opens Location B in period two.)
For the pioneer localization path to be an equilibrium,
it must be true that, given one trader chooses to be a pioneer
in period one, no other trader finds it profitable to
simultaneously open Location B or occupy Location A with the
pioneer. That is, no trader can want to be a second pioneer
monopsonist or a pioneer duopsonist. This will be the case if
l1 f - F + fT- < 11-- + 11-- ( 13 )
The left-hand side of the inequality in (13) shows the sum of
period one monopsony profits for a second pioneer, fixed
costs, and period two profits when both locations are opened
in period one, given that in period one a first pioneer opens
Location A and the N-2 other traders remain in the Marketing
Center. The right-hand side represents the profits a trader
earns by remaining in the Marketing Center during period one
and period two. (Again, this implicitly assumes the second
pioneer ignores the possibility that he opens Location B in
period two.) For (13) to hold, (10) must also hold, so our
assu~ptions are consistent.
Combining (12) and (13) yields the following sufficient
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condition for the pioneer localization path to be a Nash
equilibrium:
(14)
which rearranges to yield
7TP - Tr f > 2 [11- - 11·- ] ( 15 )
The expression in (15) says the loss in profits for the first
pioneer monopsonist when a second pioneer opens another
periphery location must be greater than twice the loss in
profits the representative trader in the Marketing Center
endures when a single trader leaves the Marketing Center to
become a monopsonist.
Is (15) a plausible condition? An appendix decomposes
(15) into market shares, price-marginal cost ratios, and
industry revenue to demonstrate the condition is plausible.
'I'here is also a clear intuiticn for (15). When a pioneer
leaves the Marketing Center to open a periphery location, he
captures market share from the remaining traders. The loss in
market share is split among N-l agents, so the loss in profit
an individual trader faces is small relative to the gain in
profit for the first pioneer. When a second pioneer opens the
other periphery location, he captures market share from the
first pioneer and the N-2 traders that remain in the Marketing
Center. It is the first pioneer that suffers the greatest
relative loss in profits as he now faces a competitor with the
same degree of monopsony power. This effect will be most
significant when N is large and the capacity of periphery
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locations is small relative to industry output.
As long as (15) holds, the pioneer localization path is
a Nash equil ibrium. Which trader becomes the pioneer and
which free ride is indeterminate, as is the order in which the
periphery locations are opened. What is determinate is pow
periphery locations are opened to production. All traders are
equally capable of becoming pioneers. Who moves first is
determined not by innate characteristics but instead by some
random process through which traders gain access to
information about conditions in the periphery.
3. Concluding Remarks
An essential feature of industrialization in the creation
or expansion of markets. This chapter provides a detailed
analysis of the relationship between industrialization,
geographic concentration, and regional trade. We identify a
dynamic process of industry location we term dispersed
agglomeration. Dispersed agglomeration resembles a process of
technological change. The innovation, in this case, is
opening a new location to production. One firm develops a new
technology, while other firms wait, knowing tlley can free ride
in future periQjs. Agglomeration implies the development of
periphery regions is tied to the region where industry first
begins. Wage differentials allow periphery regions to pUll
production out of the center, but not until these
differentials have reach impressive levels. When firms from
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the center do rf~locate to the periphery, they bring only
activities where external economies are weak, implying
regional disparities in industrial composition persist.
The initial pattern of concentration also determines who
leads the process of industrialization. It is agents from the
center that bring industry to the periphery. The knowledge
they accumulate in the center gives them a first-mover
advantage over potential entrants in the periphery. These
agents remain dominant actors in per iphery industry for a
considerable per iod of time. Where history capr iciously
bestows certain agents with the opportunity to link regions by
trade, they stand to capture, at least for a while, the 1ion-
share of gains from trade.
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3.5 RATIO OF AVERAGE STATE WAGE TO AVERAGB HATI ONAL WAGE
POR SELECTED STATES AND ACTIVITIES, 1965-88
STATE/
act.ivity 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
FEDERAL DIS'rRICT
Manufact. 1.167 1.130 1.087 0.949 1.092 1.100
Knitwear 1.041 1.005 1.083 1.089 111128 1.088
Clothing 1.212 1.172 1.132 1.201 1.146 1.185
MEXICO ( STATE)
Manufact. 1.224 1.262 1.200 1.217 1.293 1.215
Knitwear 1.378 1.220 1.106 1.269 1.216 1.182
Clothing 1.160 0.999 0.983 1.088 1.269 llli32
AGUASCALIENTES
Manufact. O.4AO 0.517 0.538 0.538 0.637 0.725
Knitwear 0.919 O.S73 0.630 0.563 0.537 0.835
Clothing 0.628 0.632 0.823 0.900 0.960 0.844
NUEVO LEON
Hanufact. 1.305 1.270 1.180 1.201 1.191 1.176
Knitwear 0.662 1.038 0.973 1.149 0.748 0.841
Clothing 1.237 1.150 1.093 1.073 1.008 0.951
JALISCO
•Hanufact. 0.840 0.881 0.870 0.855 0.613 0.737
Knitwear 0.747 0.857 0.815 0.773 10108 0.875
Clothing 0.734 0.684 0.784 0.932 0.819 0.8-18
PIJEBLA I
Manufact. 0.813 0.923 0.977 0.914 0.906 O~960
Knitwear 0.466 0.625 0.799 0.875 0.932 0.899 fD
Clothing 0.553 0.679 0.674 0.580 0.743 0.725
GUANAJUATO lB.
Manufact. 0.586 0.569 0.595 0.707 0.736 0.661 .
Knitwear 0.536 0.235 0.392 0.291 0.435 0.388 I
Clothing 0.516 0.670 0.524 0.642 0.655 0.747
!
TLAXCALA ~Manufact. 0.658 0.491 0.551 0.656 08863 O~810 it[II
KnitweaI-' 0.012 0.377 0.178 0.156 1.255 1.013 I
Clothing 0.100 0.397 0.519 0.684 0.875 0.663 l
Sou,,~ce : Censo IndlJstr ia1, 1981. l
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APPEHUIX
A. Cournot Competition with Two Open Periphery Locations:
consider the optimization problem for trader i. He chooses
how to divide productif.ln between the Mar)ceting Center·,
Location A, and Location S, given the decisions of other
traders. For trader i I let qi be total output, qDlC i be.:., output
sourced to the Marketing Center, q~ output sourced to ~ocation
A, and q~ output sourced to Location B, where,
=
Trader i's period two optimization problem is
max P(Q)*qi - W*[qi - cti - qbil - CA(Q-)*cf. - Cb(Qb)-Irqbi
{qi' ct I qb}
where Q is total industry output, and ~ is industry output
sOurced to location j. The first order conditions are
P(Q> + P' (Q> *qi - W = 0
w - C· ( Qa ) - C·, (Q.) *cti = 0
W - Cb( Qb > - Cb I (Qb) *qbi = 0
(a. 1)
(a.2)
(a II 3)
First order conditions for the N-l other traders are
symmetric. Given these 3*(N-l) first order conditions, trader
i solves for qi' cti' and qbi. Conditions (a. 2) and (a. 3) show
that each trader sources output to Locations A and B up to the
point where periphery marginal production costs equal W, given
the output sourced to the location by other traders. r'or
(a.2) and (a.3) to hold, each trader must source the same
level of output to each location. Given the symmetry of ·the
problem, all traders choose the same level of O\ltput i.n
equilibrium. Denote symmetric Nash equilibrium output levels
{q - I ct-, qb-}.
since periphery marginal production costs are bid up to W,
profits are the same as the case where the N traders I"emairl in
the Marketing Center. Let "~ be symmetric cournot profits for
trader i, which can be written aa
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B. A ~::;ufficient. COlidition for Pioneer IJocalization:
The text derive~ ~he following sufficient condition for the
pioneer localization path to be a Nash equilibrium:
It can be Ghown that \ b. 1) is
expression into its components
fTP = [P(QP) - C·(qP)]*qP
1f f -- [ P (Qf) _ C. (qf) ] *qf
. [P(Q·) W] *q.11 ==
.. (P (QP) W]*q..fT = -
(b ~ 1)
platl~.iible, by decomposing the
parts. Rewrite profits as
(1st pioneer profits)
(2nd pioneer profits)
(symmetric Marketing
Center profits)
(Marketing Center profits
wi a single pioneer)
Profits can be written in terms of three components:
Q. = qi/Q firm i's market shareI
~ = [P - C i ] IP firm i's price-cost ratio
R = P(Q)*Q indus'try revenue
In terms of ai' Lil and R, conditi.on (b. 1) is
First, consider Q. It is clear that
..
a (b. 3)
as this ordering represents decreasing relative monopsony
power. It also appears likely that,
(b. 4)
To see this, note that t·~he fall in market share in going from
being the on1X monopsonist (aP) to being one of two
monopsonists (Q) is large. cr- and Q_. can be rewr i tten as
. N-1a =
.. 1 a PQ = -
N-l
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(b. 5)
For large N, Q- / Q •• apr'rc~::hC:b one, whi le r.t. P! of ; ~ 1; KP 1Y t-n h~
much larger than one.
Second, consider industry revenue, R. Industry output
increases with the number of monopsonist firMs, as the lower
costs of these firms lead them to expand production. Revenue
will rise if demand is elastic, which we expect to be the case
under Cournot oligopoly, as it is under monopoly~ In this
case,
(b. 6)
If industry revenue rises at a decreasing rate for each firm
that moves to a periphery location, it will be true that,
(b 0 7)
If (b.4) and (b.?) hold, (b.l) is plausible.
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CHAPT~R FOUR:
AN EMP I~t I (;l~r~ 1\.PJAI.YB I 8 ()11'
AGGLOMERATION E:F~J:l"iECT8 I!4 I}'\JLH.J1Vll jJ
'},Ihis chapter t.ests the empir ical impl icat~ iuns of the
theory of geographic concentrati.on developed in Chapter Three~
The theory predicts that industry location will be dett.~l"'nlirl(~d
by the interaction of wage differenticlls arld indu::::~t~r)/'-Sl)c~r~ific;
agglomeration economi~s. The industry we consider involves
two distinct activities: marketJl1g ili)(:] I)r·()cltlc::t,ic)n. rrl t11e
absence of regional wage differentials, both activities
agglomerate in a single l(')cation, frOIll vlhich firms serve a
national market. Over time, wage differentials emerge between
the marketing center and periphery regions. Firms respond by
relocating prOd\lction to the periphery. To open a new
location to productio~, firms must train a cadre of design
workers who translate marketing knowledge into designs for a
broader production work force. Training costs imply firms
delay relocation. Training by first movers reduces set\lp
costs for later entrants. The availability of skilled labor
implies that, all else equal, relocating firms prefer
"occupied" locations to "unoccupied" locations.
This chapter tests for agglomeration effects ill the
location decision of Mexican garment firms. The Mexico
Industrial Census provides state-level observations on sixteen
six-digit garment industries. Using a probit model, we
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estimate the p~obability a location will be occupied as a
function of the difference between local marginal productj.on
costs and tho5e in Mexico citYo Theory suggests agglomeration
in a previous per iod makes a location more attractive in
future pe~iods by enhancing the productivity of local workers.
The results show positive S\lpport for this theor'y.
Agglomeration, by reducing unit labor requirements, raises the
provability a location will be occupied in the future.
Two strands of the empirical literature on illdustry
location address agglomeration effects. A first strand
studies agglomeration economies using aggregate data Ofl a
cross-section of industries. Nakamura (1985) and Henderson
(1986) use a production function approacll to test for
agglomeration economies, in which agglomeration has -the effect
of Hicks-neutral technical change. Both use data on two-digit
industries located in large urban areas (Nakamura with data
from Japan, Henderson with data from the u.s. and Brazil);
both distinguish between general urbanization economies and
industry-specific locali~ation economies; and both find strong
support for posi.tive localization economies in a variety ot
industries.~ A second strand of the literature uses firm-
level data to study the general determinarlts of firm location,
where agglomeration is one factor among many. Carlton (1983,
1979) uses firm-level data on three four-digit u.s. industries
44 Nakamura finds evidence of significant localizati.on
economies in the garment industry, but Henderson does not.
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to examine the location decision of new firms and the location
of branch plants by existing firms. 4S F irlDs choose from a
variety of loeational alternatives. Using a multinomial logit
model, he finds agglomeration at the four-digit level raises
the probability a location will be chosen.~
The present work makes several contributions. (1) Data
from firm-level interviews suggest specific functional forms
for production technology and the nature of agg lomeratiorl
effects. The aggregilte approach of Nakamura and Henderson
assumes all industries use a general production technology
that varies only in terjns of the magnitude of certaill
parameters. (2) The Mexico Industrial Census provides data
at the six-digit level on all establishments in a single two-
digit industry. This allows us to makes use of the
information implicit in the fact that some locations remain
unoccupied.
The chapter has five sections. Section one provides an
empirically tractable model of industry location. Section two
describes the data. Section three presents estimation
45 The industries are Fabricated Plastics (SIC 3079),
Communication Transmitting Equipment (SIC 3662) , and
Electronic Components (SIC 3679).
46 Related work studies a variety of issues. On new
plant location see Bartik (1989), Sch~nner, Huber, and Coo~
(1987»; on firm migration see Nakosteen and Zimmer' (1987);
and on intra-urban Ioeational choice see Erickson arld
Wasylenko (1980), McGuire (1985). There is also a 'fast
literature on the impact of tax rates on firm location; see
Bartik (1990) and Papke (1989) for recent work.
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probability a location will be occupied
differentials and levels of agglomeration.
offers concluding remarks.
results. Section four uses the resul ts to predict the
for given wage
And section five
1. AD Bmpiriaal Model of IDdustry Location
Chap'ter Three discusses agglomeration in the initial
stages of industrialization. Data limitations require we
study the industry during the period 1980 to 1985. By this
point in time, most pioneering activity had taken pl~ce in the
industry and garment manufacturing had become widespread in
Mexico. Pioneers in some regions had been in place for
several decades. We are limited to an empirical analysis of
industry location in the aftermath of pioneering activities.
There are a host of interesting questions the Census data do
not allow us to address: What causes some pioneers to succeed
and others to fail? Are there noticeable differences in
industry development between the adopted-son and ethnic-
enclave paths? What distinguishes an outlying region's
ability to capture distribution activities?
It is likely the nature of competition between firms in
the industry has evolved with industrialization. We make -tIle
simplifying assumption that the post-pioneer phase of industry
development is characterized by perfect competition. Under
perfect competition, the location decision can be studied from
the point of view of the representative firm. Firms choose
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location to minimize total costs. In garment manufacturing,
the basic production unit is a single worker, a single sewing
machine, and a given amount of fabric. A natural assumption
II
I
is that production technology is Leontief.
production costs for industry j in location i are
Marginal
ap.f ..
J U (1.1)
where Wi is the wage in location i, r .. is the rental cost ofIJ
capital for industry j in location i, fij is the cost of fabric
for industry j in location i, and the a I s are Ilni t factor
requirements.
Labor markets are regional in nature, but markets for
mC\chinery and fabric appear to be national in scope. In
Mexico, virtually all industrial sewing machines are imported
and fabric comes from a few concentrated textile production
centers. Both inputs are distributed through the Mexico city
Itarketing center. unit capital and fabric costs can be
expressed as the sum c)f a base pr ice and uni t transport costs:
r· o =IJ
f·· =lJ
where r bj and fbj are base input prices in industry j, Zi is
transport costs per unit distance to location i, d i is the
distance from the marketing center to location i, and rand f
are input-specific scale factors that do not vary across
industries. As data are available at the state level, we
refer to locations as states.
Interview data discussed in Chapter Three suggest
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agglomeration expands the local skill base in design
activi ties. 47 This has the effect of making existing
assembly-line workers more productive. In terms of' the model,
agglomeration reduces unit labor requirements Q Interview data
~lso suggest agglomeratiol1 effe~ts operate witll a lag. It
takes some time before training provided by one firm has an
effect on the local skill base. This can be captured by
making unit labor requirements in one period a function of
agglomeration in the previous period. An appropriate measure
of agglomeration is tIle number of six-digit establishments in
a given location. Ther~ are two reasons for this choice:
training occurs at the firm level and design skills are
specific to individual products.
Def ine Ei.it-I to be the number of industry j establ ishments
in state i at time t-le We write unit labor requirements for
state-industry ij at time t as a decreasing linear function of
E·· I:Ift-
a 1jj = ( 1. 3)
Incorporating (1.2) and (1.3) into (1.1), marginal production
costs at time t for state-industry ij are
Cijt =
(1.4)
A serious issue for estimation is the potential
47 From Chapter Two, design includes three activi.ties:
convel:ting garment sketches into workable patterns; grading
patterns according to different garment sizes; and using
graded patterns to cut fabric into ready-to-assemble pieces.
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endageneity of wages. The wage may be related to past
industry agglomeration. Local labor demand is a function of
current industry agglomeration, and CUL_ent agglomeration is
associated with past agglomeration. The state wage will be
independent of local garment production where the local
garment labor force is small relative to the local
manufactur ing labor force .. As this is the case fOI- most
states during the time period ullder study, it is reasonable to
assume from the firo's perspective that wit and Eijt-1 3re
exogenous at time t.
The second component of costs is the expense of
transporting final goods to market. Firms in one state can
pot~ntially export to consumers in any other state. with 32
states, there are 496 distinct trading routes. The existing
organization of the industry implies the actual trading system
in the Mexican garment industry is much simpler. Chapters Two
and Three make clear that the garment district in Mexico city
functions as the country's garment marketing center; in 1980,
69.8 percent of wholesale trade in garments and textiles took
place in the Federal District. 48 A reasonable simplifying
assumption is that all states trade through the capital. In
this case, total transport costs for industry j are
48 The Federal District is the federal entity that
contains Mexico City. We use Federal District activity levels
to approximate those in the capital. This is an imperfect
measure given that the capital has spread into the neighboring
state of Mexico.
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NE (zl"d1 ) .M1j
1. :; 1
(1.5)
where zi*di are uni t transport costs from state i to Mexico
City and ~ is net shipments from Mexico City to state i for
industry j (all variables are for time t, unless otherwise
noted; denote Mexico city by i=l). Assume per distance unit
transport costs are equal for all industries in a gi\ren state.
rrhe stylized decision framework of this model can be
described in the following manner. Each period, firms observe
the realization of state manufacturing wages as the result of
some exogenous process. From the wage, th~y calculate
marginal production costs in each location, based on their
knowledge of how many firms located in each state during the
previous period. Firms then choose to serve a given market
from the location where production costs, inclusive of
transport costs, are lowesto
Let Dij be demand for product j in state i,
output of j in i. Total costs for industry j are
and Q.. beIJ
N
.E (Z1 "d1) • (Dlj - 0lj )
1=1
(1 .6)
where Dij - Qij replaces My_ Industry output is sUbject to two
constraints. output in state-industry ij must be non-negative
and total industry supply must satisfy total industry demand:
110
NE (Q1 - D 1 ) ~ 0,
~=1
i = 1, ... , N
(1.7)
r
Minimizing (1.6) with respect to Qij subject to (1.7) yields
the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions;
c·· - z·*d· + It .. - 6· < 0 i=2, •.• ,N,IJ I I "'IJ J
c. s. Q1j
c. s. Q ij
(1.8)
where lJij is the mUltiplier on Qijl 6"j is the multiplier on
excess dema~dr and c.s. stands for complementary slackness.
with no excess demand, 6j is positive and has the obvious
interpretation as the market price. There will be a
corresponding set of Kuhn-Tu.cker conditions for each industry.
For industry j, the solution to (1.8) involves a
production plan in which the market in each state is served
from the location that has the lowest marginal costs,
inclusive of transport costs. In principle, it is possible to
serve the entire country from a single location (indeed, the
Mexico city p.roduction center served rnost of Mexico for
several decades). state-industry ij will have zero production
if there is some other state k where
(1.9)
That is, state-industry ij will have zero production if it is
cheaper to serve consumers in state i from an alternative
location. If the alternative location is not Mexico City,
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this would involve transport from state k to Mexico City, at
unit transport cost Zt*dk , and transport from Mexico City to
state i I at uni t transport cost zi*d i •
We make the following crucial assumption: the relevant
alternative location for all state-indus~ries is Mexico Citlc
In this case, state-industry ij will be occupied only if
C.. - z·*d· < C IJ·y I' (1.10)
That is, a state-~ndustry will have positive production if it
is cheaper to satisfy state demand locally than from Mexico
city. 49 Interview data presented in Chapters 'rwo and Three
suggest this assumption is reasonable. Provincial locations
are opelled to production by firms from the Mexico ci.ty garment
district. Commercial contacts with the Mexico City marketing
center are necessary for a firm to initiate garment
production, making marketing center firms the natuI'al first-
movers. The progressive geographic decentralization of the
industry is likely to change this pattern, but the centrality
of the Mexico City marketing center is a valid wOI-]cing
assumption for the period of time period under study.
The decision to open a state to production is amenable to
discrete choice analysis. Define the dummy variable Yij:
Yij = 1
Yij = 0
if Q.. > 0IJ
otherwise (2 .1)
Redefine marginal production costs as
49 Technically, Mexico City is the relevant alternative
location if there is no state 1 where Cij + z.*dl < C1j •
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c··1J =
(2 • 2 )
where f i represents unobserved factors that affect marginal
costs in state i. Assume €i is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance 0 2 • The probability a location will be open
to production is
Prob(Qij > 0) = (2 _3)
In this framework, the decision is whether to locate in s1:ate
i or remain in Mexico City. For each state, J industr ies ma)/:.e
this decision and each decision involves a realization of E i -
There is no necessary reason why the process that generates €
is the same across states_
problems for estimation.
This fact presents potential
For industry j, the difference in marginal production
costs between Mexico City and state i is
=
(2 • 4 )
The expression for transport costs has several
interpretations. Transport costs represent the additional
cost of transporting inputs from the mal"keting center to
outlying regions. An equivalent interpretation is that these
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costs represent the per unit costs of opening a location to
production. Note that the cumulative expression for trarlsport
costs has an ambiguous sign: as distance from the marketing
center increases, the unit costs of shipping goods from the
marketing center rise, but so do the unit costs of non-labor
inputs for local producers.
For expositional ease, redefine the marginal cost
differential according to observed and unobserved factor~
C1j - (Cij - zi*d i ) = (X 1j - Xij){3 + f 1 -- f i (2~5)
where (Xlj - Xij) is a 1x3 vector of factor price differences and
~ is a 3xl vector of parameters. The probability a state has
positive production becomes
Prob(Qij > 0) = Prob[Ei - E 1 ~ (X 1j - Xij)fj] (2.6)
In terms of the standard normal cumulative distriblltion
function, (2.6) is
(2.7)
The coefficients can be estimated using maximum likelihood.
The resulting coefficient estimates are of {3/a and not {3
alone.
2. The Dat,
The data come from the 1980 and 1985 ~exico Industrial
Census. The Census aggregates over establishments at ttle
state and six-digit industry level. There are 32 states in
Mexico. The garment industry consists of two four--digit
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industries and sixteen six-digit industries:
Four-Digit Industry
Knitwear
Clothing
Six-Digit Industry
Socks and Hosiery
Sweaters
Knitted Underwear
Knitted Fabric
Knitted outerwear
Men's Outerwear
Women's Outerwear
Shirts
Industrial Uniforms
Leather Clothing
Children's Outerwear
other outerwear
Women's Intimate Apparel
Underwear
Sombreros, Hats
Accessories
I
..
The Census provides observations on a number of variables,
including the number of establishments, number of workers,
total operating costs, total revenue I total remUJleration,
value of total output, raw material in stock, and value of
fixed capital. There is no direct data on unit factor costs.
Census data always present problems for empirical
research; these problems are acute in developing countries.
One concern is that the Census aggregates over both firms and
municipalities. Interview data suggest firms are
heterogeneous. Aggregating over establishments ignores inLer-
firm differences. Industry agglomerations are located in
municipalities, not states. Aggregating over municipalities
bunches agglomerations together. This is fortunately not a
serious problem in most states. In Aguascalientes and Nuevo
Le6n, for instance, ~irtually all manufacturing is located in
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each state's largest city, making state-level data essentially
equivalent to municipality-level data. In other states, the
effects of aggregation across municipalities is ameliorated by
the fact that different industries are agglomerated in
different municipalities. In Puebla, for instance, shirt.
production is concentrated in Tehuacan, while knitwear
production is concentrated .in the city of P\lsbla.
A more fundamental problem is with the collectioll of
Census data. A significant share of garment industry
employment -- some industry observers say as much as half --
takes place in clandestine establishments. Clandestine shops
do not meet fiscal obligations or comply with labor
regulations, and go out of their way to avoid detection by
government officials, including census takers. As a result,
Census data may be drawn disproportionately from larger
establishments. Once a census taker locates an establishment
there is no guarantee he will ob~ain an accurate account of
its contents. The range of accounting practices in the
industry is considerable. Some managers have graduate
business degrees and maintain computerized accounts of their
operations. Many small shopown~rs, in contrast, do not even
keep records of their transactions. They know what orders are
currently in the pipeline, but can only hazard a guess at the
annual value of their activities. In the absence of pr-.ior
knowledge about how detection of clandestine firms var ies
across states or industries, we are powerless to correct for
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these potentially serious errors in data collection.
3. Bati.atioD
The expression in (2. 7) can be estimated as a probi t
model using maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is
L{p,a)
J
= n ~ [(X -x ) J!.]YJJ(l-~ [(X -x )J!)) l-Ylj
. 1j ij a lj ij a)=1
The unit of analysis is the decision and not the decision-
maker. The decision to be studied is whether a state will be
open to production. The technically correct approach is to
consider each of the 31 states separately and estimate a
separate probit model for each. This limits the number of
observations to 16 per state. A more serious problem is that
observations for a number of states are either all "successes n,
(j's where Qij > 0) or all "failures" (j's where Qij = 0). One
solution is to group states and estimate the location decision
in a single probit. This approach has theoretical appeal on
two counts: the location decision for each state is the same
produce in state i or produce in Mexico City; and
technological parameters should not vary across states (or
should not vary in a way for which we cannot systematically
account) . GrOllping states increases the number of
observations to 496, a substantial gain. Grouped estimation
is unwarranted if a varies across states.
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£ includes
unobserved factors that affect marginal costs. All relevant
economic information should be conta i ned in the wage d-/ld
agglomeration variables, leaving no obvious functional f0~m
for a. 50
A sensible solution is to proceed as follows. 51 First,
estimate (2.7) on grouped data. The likelihood function is
(3 .2)
Second, estimate (2.7) separately for each state. This will
be possible only for sta'tes where there are both successes and
failures. ~ is a vector of technological parameters that we
expect does not vary across states. The estim~ted
coefficients are of ~/a and not ~ alone. A a that is constant
across states implies both the estimated coeff icients and
their ratios should be the same for each state. An informal
test of a constant a is to compare the coefficient estimates
and their ratios from the individual state probits with those
from the grouped probit.
The dependent var iable is OPENu' which is def ined as
follows:
so Dealing with non-constant variance in f is not as
simple as in OLS, where one can often postulate a relationship
between a and right-hand-side variables.
51 Bruno Boccara provided key advice on estimation,
including suggesting this approach.
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OPENij = 1
OPEN·· = 0\1
if Q.. > 0 in 1985IJ
otherwise (3 .2)
OPEN takes a value of one if state--~industry ij had output
greater than zero in 1985 and zero otherwise. The explanatory
variables are the difference between marginal production costs
in Mexico City and marginal production costs less transport
costs in state i. From (2.3), Prob(OPENij = 1) is equal to the
probability that the difference in total marginal cost between
Mexico City and state i for industry j is greater than zero.
From (2.4), the cost difference is
C1· - [C.· - z·*d·]I IJ I I =
(3.3)
The wage variable is .G~, average annual remuneration in
1985 per manufacturing worker in state i. The measure of
agglomeration is BST~I' the number of establishments in state-
ind\lstry ij in 1980. The measure of transport costs is
DUSRRS., distance in hours of bus travel from the capital of
state i to Mexico City; this is a more accurate measure of
transport costs than miles since the quality of roads vary
greatly across states. Table 4.1 lists variable means~
The estimated model is
Prob(Qij > 0) = Prob(~o + 131 (WGE1 - WGE.) + ~2(WGE1*ESTljt_1
u .. )
IJ
(3 .4)
where the error term is
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(3.5)
Consistent with (3.3), we expect ~~ to be positive, ~2 to be
negative, and ~3 to be either positive or ~agative.
Technological parameters may vary across industries. We
control for industry effects at the fo'ur-dic;(1..'t level with the
var iable IHD, which takes a va lue of O!le if tile activi ty is in
the knitwear industry and zero is 1::he activity is in the
clothing industry. It is likely other factors that affect
marginal costs, such as transportation and communication
facilities, vary across regions. We control for regional
effects with a second set of dummy variables distinguishes
between five regions in Mexico:
Region
BRD ( Border) :
CEN (Center):
NOW (Northwest):
NCEN (North-
central) :
SOU (South):
states
Baja California, Coahuila,
Chihuahua, Nuevo Le6n, Sonora,
Tamaulipas.
Guanajuato, Hidalgo, M~xico,
Quer~tero, Puebla, Tlaxcala,
Veracruz.
Baja California Sur, Nayarit,
Sinaloa.
Aguascalientes, Durango t Jalisco,
San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas.
Campeche, Colima, Chiapas,
Guerrero, Michoacan, Morelos,
Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco,
Yucatan.
A widely used measure of goodness of fit is p2:
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(3 • 6)
where LL(,sMLH) i~; the log-likelihood of the unconstrained
regression and LLo is the log-likelihood of the regression
where all coefficients are constrained to be zero. 52 A
related measure is p2 corrected for degrees of freedom, or
iL2 = 1 - (LL(,sMLE) - k) /LLo
where k is the number of estimated coefficients.
(3 • ..,)
Table 4.2 gives probit estimates for grouped data.
Column (1) shows estimates of unit labor requirements and
transport costs, without agglomeration effects. Column (2)
includes BUSHRS!, bus hours squared, to test for nonlinear
transport costs. The coefficient on BUSHRS? is significant
and the variable is included in subsequent es,timation. Column
(3) includes the agglomeration effects var il!ble, WGE 1*EST1jt_1 -
WGEi*ESTijt_l- The coefficient estimate for agglomeration effects
has the wrong sign, and is not significant. Column (4) adds
right-hand-side variables interacted with IND, to test whether
technology parameters vary across four-digit industries. We
reject the null hypothesis that technology is constant across
four-digit industries at a 5% level of significance; allowing
technology to vary across industries improves the goodness of
fit moderately. Column (5) includes regional dummies, which
improve the goodness of fit substantially.
The results on agglomeration effects are disappointing.
52 See Amemiya (1981) for a discussion of goodness of fit
in discrete choice models.
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One problem with the estimation reported in Table 4.2 is that
the coefficient on agglomeration effects is constrained to be
the same for Mexico City as it is for outlying states. This
is consistent with the model, but it may be inconsistent with
reality. The impact of past agglomeration is likely to be
markedly different in the marketing center, where the industry
has a long history, than it is in outlying regions, where
garment production is a relatively new activity. We estimate
a second probit model in which the coefficient on
agglomeration effects is allowed to be different for outlying
states. This model is
Prob(Qij > 0) = Prob(l'o -t- 11 (WGE1 - WGEi ) + 'Y2WGE1*ESTljt_1
.f- "VJWGE.*EST.. 1 + "V4BUSHRS. + "V 4t BUSHRS.2 > u .. )I 1 1)1- I 1 I J I - IJ
().7)
Consistent wi th (3. J) I we expect to be 1'1 and -YJ to be
positive, l2 to be negative, and ~4 and ~5 again to be either
positive or negative.
Table 4.3 shows results for the unconstrained probit.
The change is striking. We reject the null hypothesi.s that 1'2
= -1'3 at any level of signif icance. Agglomeration effects
enter with the correct sign and are highly significant. These
results are unaffected by allowing technology to vary across
industries or by introducing regional dummies. What is most
impressive is that the unconstrained model dramatically
impl-oves the goodness of fit. Compar ing constra ined and
unconstrained estimation with industry and regional effects --
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column (5) in Table 4.2 and column (3) in Table 4. 3 -- Q2
rises from .184 to .384.
Questions remain about using grollped data. Tables 4.4
and 4.5 provide probit estimates for individual states. Bus
hours and the wage differential are excluded from the
estimation, as both are constant across industries in a given
state. T~ble 4.4 shows probit estimates where agglomeration
effects are constrained to be constant across locations. The
coefficient on agglomeration effects has the correct sign in
13 of 26 states, but is signif icant in none. The table
includes t.:he ratio of the estimated coefficient on
agglomeration effects to the coefficient on the constant term.
Both the coefficient estimates and their ratios vary widely
across states, suggesting that grouping states is unwarranted.
Table 4.5 provides probi t estimates for individual states
where the coefficient on agglomeration effects in outlying
states is allowed to be different from Mexico City. Again,
the unconstrained results are positive. The coefficient on
agglomeration effects in outlying states has the correct in
every case. The caeff icient on agglomeration effects in
Mexico city has the correct sign in 13 of 20 states. The
table also reports the ratio of the coefficients on
agglomeration effects. Again, both the coefficient estimates
and their ratios vary widely across states, raising further
questions about using grouped data for estimation.
123
4. Prediotion
It is interesting to know not just whether agglomeration
effects matter, but how much they matter. A useful feature of
the probit model is that it allows straightforward prediction
of the probabilities that a particular event occurs for given
values of the explanatory variables. To generate interesting
results, we need to use parameter estimates from the grouped
model. The results of the last section suggest there may be
problems with grouped results. We must qllalify our results in
this section, but it is still inte:tas,ting to know what
estimation implies in broad terms for industry location.
This section uses grouped estimation results to address
two questions: what is the effect of marginal changes in
explanatory variables on the probability firms occupy a
location; and, for given values of the explanatory variables,
what is the predicted probability firms occupy a location.
Table 4.6 reports the effects of :n:arginal changes in the
explanatory variables on the probability that a location is
occupied. The effect of a change in Xu on Prob(Qij > 0) is
t,PIob(Ojj > 0) =
aXjj
(4 • 1)
where ~() is the density function of the standard normal. The
estimated caeff icients are those from column (2) in Table
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4 . 3 . S3 The corresponding probi t model is
(4 .2)
As the value of ep () varies with the vallle of (Xli - Xjj ) {3/a, so
does the effect of a marginal change. A natural criterion for
selecting values of right-hand-side varii!bles is the predicted
probability associated with their cumulative total. Table 4.6
shows marginal effects, given probabilities that range from .1
to .9. The magnitude of marginal effects varies widely across
variables. This is due to tile fact, that the underlying
var iables take on different magni tudes. S4 The effects of
small change in wages, for instance, appear to be sUbstantial,
but not when it is taken into account that wages take on a
value that is near one.
Table 4.6 contains three findings of interest:
1. A small increase in the number of establistlments
occupying a location in the previous period raises the
~J Column (2) does not include regional dummies. 'I'he
coefficient estimates are for the clothing industry;
calculations with coefficient estimates for the knitwear
industry yield similar effects.
S4 The fact that marginal effects are largest for a
probability of 0.5 is an implicit feature of the form of the
cumulativa normal distribution function.
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probability the state will be occ,-\pied in the next peric)d by
as much as 8.7 percent. This suggests there is a herd effect
in relocation: once a location has been open to produc:1:i.on,
other producers follow quickly. Marketing center firms dt) not
wait until a sizable agglomeration of producers has enu~rged
before relocating production. This is not inconsistent with
the theory of the last section. It only takes a fi ingle
industry pioneer to open the way for other firms to follow.
2. A small decrease in the number of industry
establishments located in Mexico City increasef:J the
probability a state will be open to production by at mo~~1: .076
percent. This suggests there is no herd effect in departure.
Once firms have begun to leave an industry agglomerat:ion in
Mexico City, it does not appear that other firms rush to move.
3 . A small increase in distance (where the di.stance
variable is comparable in magnitude to the agglonlE~ration
variable) at most reduces the probability a state ~lill be
occupied by 1.18 percent. It appears that distance from the
marketing center does not play a large role in det.E~rminillg
whether a location will be occupied.
The results in 'lIable 4. 6 are intr iguing, but t~€: var~/l.ng
magnitude of the expJ.anatory variables somewhat clouds Ollr
abi 1 i ty to interpret their marginal effects. Pi clearer
picture emerges from examining the predicted proi)'="6bility a
location will be occupied. Table 4.7 reports the predicted
probability a state will be occupied for different values of
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the explanatory variables. To isolate agglomeration effects f
we vary ESTijt_1 , the number of establ ishments in state- industry
ij in 1980, and leave other explanatory variables fixed. The
table reports predicted probabilities as the number of
establishments in a state increases as a fraction of the
number of establishments in Mexico City from 0 to .2 at .05
increments. The coefficient estimates are again those from
column (2) in Table 4.3. The predicted probabilities are
calculated according to expression (4.2). We first calculate
the sum of the explanatory variables times tile estimated
coefficients and then obtuin probabilities from tables for the
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
Table (a) gives the predicted probability a location will
be occupied, where explanatory var iables take their mean
values. The mean ratio of the state wage to the Mexico City
wage is .78. When no establishments occupied a location i.n
the previous period, the probability a location will be
occupied in the following period is .21. With three
establishments or five percent the mean number of
establishments in Mexico City -- the predicated probability
rises to .47; with seven establishments, the predicted
probability is e 75; and with ten establishments predicted
probability is .92. The critical mass of establishments
necessary to virtually ensure a location wi.ll continue to be
occupied is approximately ten. The presence of a few firms
may be insufficient evidence that a location is a viable
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production site, but the threshold level of agglomeration
necessary to attract firms remains relatively low.
Table (b) gives the predicted probability a state will be
occupied, where the state wage is one-half the Mexico City
wage, and other variables take their mean values. Even with
a substantial wage differential, if a location was unoccupied
in the previous period the probability of being occupied in
the following period is only .31. Hence, low wages are not
suff icient to attract firms to a location. Aga in, the
threshold level of agglomeration is low. with three
establishments the probability a location will be occupied is
.49, and with seven establishments the probability is .68.
Table (c) gives the predicted probability a state will be
occupied where bus hours equals its means plus one standard
deviation, or 14.2 plus 14.05; other variables take their mean
values. It is instructive to compare these results with those
in Table (a). Where a location was unoccupied in the previous
period, the increase in distance lowers the predicted
probability by only .05, from .21 to .16. The effect with
more establishments is approximutely the same. Hence,
distance does not seem to be an important factor.
5. Concluding Remarks
Probit estimation with unconstrained agglolneratioll
effects offers positive support for the theory of geographic
concentration developed in Chapter Three. Agglomeration in a
128
previous period reduces unit labor requirements and raises the
g-
probability a location will be occupied in the futureL The I[
coefficient estimates for individual states vary considerably,
raising questions about estimation with grouped data. More
importantly perhaps, the unconstrained results for individual
states point in the same direction as the results for grouped
data. Prediction with probit estimates paints a clear picture
of how cost differentials and agglomeration effects interact
to determine industry location. Agglomeration has a large
impact on the future prospects of a location. Where a
location was unoccupied in a previous period, even large wage
differentials are insufficient to a'ttract firms. The
threshold level of agglomeration necessary to attract firms
remains relatively low. The presence of ten firms is
sufficient to virtually ensure a location will be occupied in
the future at the mean wage differential. In other words,
wage differentials matter, but only once a critical mass of
firms has become established in a location. Transport costs
playa small role in industry location. Substantial increases
in distance have only a marginal affect on the probability a
location will be occupied in the future.
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variable
4 • 1 VARIABLB KRANS
Mean std. Deviation
OPEN
WGE
EST1jt_1
EST.. IIJ'r
WGE1*EST1jt•1
WGE·*EST·· II ut·
WGE1*EST1 -
WGE·*EST·· II Ift-
EMP1j
EMP··IJ
BUSHRSi
BUSHRSi2
No. of Obs. = 496
1985
1985
1985
1985
1980
1980
1985
1985
.403
1.139
.899
.240
131.750
6.762
150.073
6.668
143.405
2799.188
177.238
14.217
398.587
.491
.264
.264
159.351
29.515
181.512
36.465
180.075
2259.334
458.276
14.031
848.309
SUbscript 1 denotes the Federal District (Mexico City).
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4.2 PROBIT RBSULTS FOR GROUPED DATA
variable ill III ilL ill ill
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
CONSTANT .0226 .2689 .2215 .1693 13.0450
(0.25) (2.33) (1.81) (1.32) (2.29)
WGE1-WGEi .3585 .5586 .5565 .6291 1.9344
(1.52) (2.30) (2.29) (2.21) (4.56)
WGE1*EST1jt_1 - .00037 .. 00027 .00032
WGEi*ESTijt_l (1.16) (0.82) (0.93)
BUSHRSi -.0265 -.0690 -.0697 -.0645 -.0858(-4.99) (-5.15) (-5.18) (-4.56) (-4.16)
BUSHRSi2 .00079 .00080 .00079 .00098
(3.55) (3.58) (3.45) (3.09)
IND· -.2308 --.2381
(WGE1 - WGE i ) (-0.46) (-0.43)
IND* .00308 .00368
(WGE1*EST1jl.-l - (1.84) (21109)
WGEi*ESTii'-I)
INO*BUSHRS i -.0209 -.0237
(-1.82) (-1.90)
p2
.0443 .0621 .0641 .0734 .1513
iJ.? .0502 .0711 .0761 .0943 .1842
LL -319.65 -313.68 -313.02 "'309.91 -283.85
LLo -334.45
Regional no no no no yes
Dummies
Obs No. 496 496 496 496 496
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4.3 UNCONSTRAINED PROBIT RESULTS POR GROUPED DATA
Variable ill 1ll ill
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
CONSTANT -.4534 -.5857 10.1998
(-3.03) (-3.68) (1.56)
WGE. - WGEi .7843 .9917 2.1800
(2.80) (2.94) (4.28)
WGEI*EST1jt_1 -.00138 -.00167 -.00144(-2.98) (-3.36) (-2.83)
WGEi*ESTijt_1 .2212 .2423 .2214
(8.40) (8.02) (7.28)
BUSHRS i -.0334 -.0296 -.0616(-2.17) (-1.81) (-2.73)
BUSHRSi2 .00039 .00041 .00077(1.55) (1.58) (2.23)
IND· -.5118 -.5051
(WGE. - WGE i ) (-0.91) (-0.83)
IND*WGE1*EST1jt_1 .0062 .0066
(3.1.7) (3G22)
INO*WGE·*EST.. 1 -.0735 -/t0720I ut- (-1.17) (-'1.19)
INO*BUSHRS i -.0209 -.0231(-1 .. 72) (-1.75)
p2
.2954 .3118 .3453
iJ.? .3103 .3387 .3842
LL -235.66 -230.18 -218.96
LLo -334.45
Regional no no yes
Dummies
Obs No. 496 496 496
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4.4 CONSTRAINED PROBIT RESULTS POR INDIVIDUAL STATES
state WGEI~ljt_l - WGE·*EST·, I CONSTANT iJ.2J1t)I IJI-(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Grouped .00034 -.02277 -.01476
Data (1.05)
Aguascalientes -.00053 .23390 -.00225
(-0.29)
Baja .00308 -.40686 -.00756
California (1.03)
Baja -.00012 -1.5159 .00008
California Sur (-0.04)
Campeche n.8.
Coahuila .01018 -1.0918 -.00933
(1.67)
Colima n.s.
Chiapas -.00026 -1.4962 .00018
(-0.08)
Chihuahua .00339 -.61134 -.00555
(1.09)
Durango .00095 -1.0430 -.00092
(0.50)
Guanajuato .00450 .29662 .01518
(0.77)
Guerrero -.00093 -.54944 .00169
(-0.41)
Hidalgo ~OO203 .06012 .03373
(0.75)
Jalisco n.f.
Mexico n.f.
MichoacAn .00618 .06799 .09087
(0.96)
Morelos -.00013 -.65487 .00020
(-0.07)
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4.4 CONTINUBD
state ~1~ljt-l - WGE·*EST·· I CONSTANT £1JJkI Ijt-
NayarIt -.00023
-1.1172 .00020
(-0.09)
Nuevo Le6n .00689
-.17775 -.03877
(lQ12)
Oaxaca -.00242 -.00886 .27356
(-0.81)
Puebla .01267 .30939 .04097
(0.83)
Quer~tero .00414 -.52182 -1100793
(1.09)
Quintana Roo -.00012 -1.5163 .00008
(-0.04)
San Luis Potosi -.00157 .22036 -.00710
(-Oc74)
Sinaloa -.00443 -.42013 .01053
(-0.74)
Sonora .00007 -.68487 -.00010
(0.04)
Tabasco n.8.
Tamau!'ipas
-.00043 -.61265 .00070
(-0.20)
Tlaxcala .00501 -.61078 -.00820
(1.17)
VeracLuz
-.00093 -.02789 .03317
(-0.46)
YucatAn .01021 -.86224 - .. 01184
(1.58)
Zacatecas
-.00114 -.52009 .00220
(-0.47)
Obs. per state = 16
n.f. = no failures
n.8. = no successes
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4.5 UNCONSTRAINBD PROBIT RESULTS POR INDIVIDUAL STATES
state WGE 1*EST1jt_1 WGE·*EST.. 1 ':i.2bJI --IJI-
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Grouped -.00138 .22116 -.00622
Data (2.80) (8.40)
Aguascalientes -.00381 .24105 -.01581
(-1.24) (1.26)
Baja .00170 .26357 .00647
California (0.40) (0.70)
Baja **
California Sur
Campeche n.5.
Coahuila .00706 .23026 .03067
(0.95) (1.34)
Colima n.5.
Chiapas *.
Chihuahua .00037 .14400 .00255
(0.10) (0.87)
Durango -.00049 .14194 -.00343
(-0.19) (1.24)
Guanajuato .00138 .28359 .00488
(0.07) (1.12)
Guerrero -.01013 .72141 -.01405
(-0.58) (1.22)
Hidalgo .00006 .07676 .00078
(0.02) (1.04)
Jalisco n.f.
Mexico n.f.
MichoacAn **
Morelos -.00394 .45368 -.00869
(-1.03) (1.16)
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4 • 5 CONTINUED
state
Nayarit
Nuevo Le6n
Oaxaca
Puebla
Quer~tero
Quintana Roo
San Luis Potosi
sinaloa
Sonora
Tabasco
Tamaulipas
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
YucatAn
Zacatecas
WGE 1*EST1jt_1
**
.00076
(0.09)
-.00578
(-1.66)
.01363
(0.67)
**
**
-.00180
(-0.81)
-.02296
(-1.01)
-.00027
(-0.09)
n.s.
-.00159
(-0.54)
-.00163
(-0.26)
-.00170
(-0.72)
**
-.00114
(-0.46)
WGE·*EST·· II IJt-
.09112
(0.98)
.60784
(1.61)
.09212
(0.71)
.06472
(0.48)
3.9556
(0.53)
.74763
(2.14)
.24160
(0.64)
.20591
(1.47)
.05250
(0.91)
.00525
(0.03)
~00828
-.00952
.14795
-.-02779
-.00580
-.00036
-.00657
-.00791
-.03238
-.21705
---------------------------------
Dbs. per state = 16
n.f. = no failures
n.s. = no successes
** = variable dropped due to
collinearity or perfect prediction
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4.6 BPPBCTS OF MARGINAL CHANGES IN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
OM THE PROBABILITY A STATB IS OPEN TO PRODUCTION
p .• Z···· WGE1 WGE i EST1jt.1 ESTijt~1 BUSHRS jI IJ
---
. 1 -1.180 .1743 .1242 -.00038 .0433 -.0059
.2 -.840 .2458 .1752 -.00054 .0611 -.0083
• 3 -.525 .3047 .2172 -.00066 .0757 -.0103
.4 -.255 .3386 .2413 -.00074 .0841 -.0114
.5 .000 .3498 .2493 -.00076 .0869 -.0118
.6 .255 .3386 .2413 -.00074 .0841 -.0114
.7 .525 .3047 .2172 -.00066 .0757 -.0103
.8 .840 .2458 .1752 -.00054 .0611 .-. 0083
.9 1.180 .1743 .1242 -.00038 .0433 -.0059
.
Pi Prob(Qij > 0) •=
.. Z.. = (X lj Xij) ~ / (J •-1J
The probit model is that in expression (4.2). The following
lists the effect on Prob(Qij > 0) of a marginal change in each
variable:
¢(Zjj) *6Zij/6WGEI = 4t ( Zij) * [1'1 + 1'2ESTIjt·l ] (a)
q, (Zij) *6Zij/ 6WGEi = <P ( Zij) * [ -"1 + l'JESTijt_l] ( b)
cP (Zij) *c5'Zij/ &EST1 = 4> (Zij) *1'2WGElj (e)
cP (Zij) * cS Zij/ 6ESTj = ep ( Zij) .'Y3WGEij ( d)
where estimated coefficients are from Table 4.2. For (a)-(d),
marginal effects are calculated using mean values of the
variables EST and WGE.
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4.7 PREDICTED PROBABILITY A STATE IS OPEN TO PRODUCTION
Tabl. Ca>
mean values for WGE I , WGEi , EST 1jt_l , BUSHRSi
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.14
Table (b)
.9
• 9
.9
.9
.. 9
69
69
69
69
69
BUSHRSi
14.2
14.2
14.2
14.2
14.2
o
3
7
10
14
Z,,-
IJ
-.816
-.070
.677
1.424
2 .. 170
p".
I
.21
.47
.75
.92
.98
WGE i = O. 5 *WGE,
mean values for WGE l , ESTljt_ll BUSHRS.
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.14
Tabl. (c)
WGEi
.57
.57
.57
.57
.57
EST 1jt_1
69
69
69
69
69
BUSHRSi
14.2
14.2
14.2
14.2
14.2
o
3
7
10
14
Z·o·IJ
-.490
-.017
.456
.929
1 .. 402
p,••
I
.31
.49
.68
.82
.92
BUSHRSi = mean + std. dev.
mean values for WGE 11 WGEil ESTijt_l
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.14
1.14
.9
.9
• 9
.9
.9
EST1jt_1
69
69
69
69
69
BUSHRSi
28.25
28.25
28.25
28.25
28.25
ESTijt_1
o
3
7
10
14
Z·.-
lJ
-0987
-.241
.506
1.253
1.999
p .••
I
.16
.41
.70
.89
.98
• Zij = (X 1j - Xij) (jla .
•• Pi = ProbCQij > 0).
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CHAPTER PIVE:
INDUSTRY LOCALIZATION, VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION
AND MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE
The creation of a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
would integrate two regions with unprecedented differences in
their levels of economic development. It is the magnitude of
the differences between M~Aico and the u.s. and Canada that
have heightened expectations about the potential gains [rum
free trade. The relatively small size and poor state of the
Mexican economy has lead many to believe the et"fects of
integration would be felt most strongly south of the Rio
Grande. Proponents of a NAFTA cite two familiar sources of
gains from trade for Mexico. The first is efficiency gains
from specializing in goods that are intensive in their use of
Mexico's relatively abundant factor, labor. The secorad is
positive scale effects Mexico would achieve by producing a
smaller range of goods in larger, more efficient quantities.
In Mexico, there has been much di.scussion of a third
effect: the conversion of Mexico into an off-shore assembly
plant, or maquiladora, for the u.s. economy. 55 When Mexican
5S See R. R. Cavazos, "Maquiladoras e Integraci6n
Industrial," El Financiero, 1-31-90, p. 50. J.L. Gaona, "No
se han integrado las maquiladoras con la industria nacional,"
El Economista, 9-18-90, p. 17. "lNos InvadirA la maquila?" El
Exportador Mexicano, 6-13-90, p. 1.
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industrialists look north, they see an industrial complex in
which firms have access to skilled labor, specialized buyers
and suppliers, and new technologies on a scale that gives them
a huge cost advantage. They fear integration will relegate
Mexican producers to low value-added activities like assembly
where proximity to an industrial complex is less a factor.
Mexican industrialists have in mind a model of trade where
agglomeration economies are significant, but vary across
production activities. Skill- and knowledge-intensive
activities, where external economies are strongest,
concentrate near large markets, leaving less developed areas
with low-skill activities, where external economies are weak.
In this scenario, North American integration deindustrializes
Mexico.
This chapter extends the discussion in Chapter Three to
consider the relationship between agglomeration and economic
integration. We continue to focus on ttie garment illdustry.
Recent Mexican trade policy provides a natural experiment of
sorts. Between 1985 and 1987, Mexico dramatically eliminated
most barriers to trade, bringing an end to four decades of
import substitution industrialization. The opening of the
Mexican economy has initiated a process of integration with
the u.s. Important trade barri.ers remain, but the recent
experience makes it possible to examine emerging patterns of
industry organization and location between the two countries.
The discussion in earlier chapters illustrates l10W under
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a closed economy, agglomeration economies give rise to the
geographic concentration of garment production and
distribution. This chapter argues that due to agglomeration
economies economic integration will redefine the pattern of
vertical specialization between Mexico and the U.S., and the
location of production within each country. with free trade,
a pattern of vertical specialization emerges in which small
country producers provids assembly services for firms in the
large country marketing center. Mexican garment producers,
who previously served the domestic market, are shifting to
off-shore ganaent assembly for firms in the u~s. U.SA firms v
given their ties to the New York and Los Angeles marketing
centers, provide Mexican producers with access to markets.
Integration also leads to a relocation of activities ~ithin
each country: in the small country, production shifts to
regions near the large country market; in the large country,
integrdtion favors marketing centers with better access to
small country producers. Garment production in Mexico is
relocating from central Mexico to the Mexico-U. S ~ border
region. In the U.S., the Los Angeles marketing center has
been the principal beneficiary of the opening of the Mexican
economy.
The chapter has three sections. section one uses the
Mexico Industrial Census and unpublished Mexican government
trade figures to build on interview material presented in
Chapter Two. We outline the organization of production and
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trade in the Mexican garment industry before and after trade
liberalization. section two develops a theoretical framework
to explain the relationship between industry location,
vertical organization and trade policy, and uses this
framework to discuss the integration of the Mexican garment
industry into a North American Free Trade Area. section three
provides concluding remarks.
1. Industry Localization and Trade in Nexico
This section describes the impact of the openirlg to trade
on the Mexican garment industry. Under a closed economy, the
industry divides into two distinct segments, one oriented
towards the domestic market and the other oriented towards
foreign markets. The distinguishing feature of the domestic
industry is the geographic concentration of production and
distribution. Parallel to the domestic industry is an enclave
of off-shore assembly plants that provide subcontracting
services for firms in foreign marketing centers. These plants
locate in border regions, and have virtually no linkages with
the domestic economy, outside of hiring labor. with trade
liberalization, the domestic industry becomes more vertically
specialized, and production ~elocates to regions with easy
acc~ss to foreign markets.
1.1 Indu.try Localization in a Closed Econoay
Chapters Two and Three discuss at length the organizat.. iorl
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and development of the domestic garment industry under 'tile
closed economy. Salient characteristics include the initial
concentration of production and marke'ting activities in Mexico
City and the subsequent relocation of production to
specialized agglomerations of producer firms located in
outlying regions. This basic pattern is clearly illustrated
in Table 3.1, which we reprint below as Table 5.1. The table
shows Mexican employment in garments and general ma!1ufacturint]
from 1965 to 1988 and the share located in the Federal
I
L_
~
;--
District. The industry began concentrated in Mexico City.
Over time, wage differentials emerged between the capital and
outlying states. In response, firms established new
5.1 THB SHARB OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMBHT IN MBXICO CITY, 1965-88
LEVELS/Shares
(levels in DOCs) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
.-
TOTAL GARMENT
EMPLOYMENT 75.9 98.5 102.4 144.0 146.R 173.3
Federal District
Share 0.587 0.554 0.508 0.447 0.332 0.292
TOTAL MANUFACTo
EMPLOYMENT 1,410 1,581 1,708 2,701 3,269 2,473
Federal District
Share 0.339 0.311 0.289 0.311 0.230 0.192
production centers outside Mexico City. Distribution
activities, however, remained highly concentrated in the
capital.
In the last two decades, an enclave of off-shore assembly
plants has developed alongside the domestic industry. The
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plants are owned and operated by domestic agents, but rely on
foreign firms for input supply, product designs, and access to
foreign markets. Garment maquiladoras first began to appear
in the late 1960s, but did not proliferate until the 1980s.
Between 1980 and 1988, the share of national garment
employment in maquiladoras increased from 12.9 percent to 20.0
percent. The expansion of the maquiladora enclave was, until
r~~pntly; concentrated along the Mexico-U.s. border.
The maquila arrangement closely resembles subcontracting
in the domestic garment industry. u.s. firms, in a manner
similar to domestic manufacturers, undertake marketing and
design activities, and subcontract assembly to maquiladoras.
Maquiladoras have virtually no backward or forward linkages
with the domestic industry. Raw materials are supplied by the
foreign client firm. Between 1981 and 1988, domestic inputs
accounted for an average of O. 25 percent of tota 1 inputs
consumed by garment maquiladoras located along the border and
2.36 percent of total inputs consumed by garment maquiladoras
located in interior Mexico.~ Foreign firms distribute
assembled garments through their own marketing channels and
export virtually all output. The u.s. firms that engage in
off-shoI-e assembly are pr imar i ly national retai 1 chains, suell
as Sears and J.C. Penney, or firms with their own well-
established national or regional labels, such as Haggar, Levi
~ Estadlsticas
Exportaci6n, i22~~.
de la Industria Maquiladora
Aguascalientes: INEGI, 1989.
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de
strauss, and Warnaco. 57 Maquiladora production is
concentrated in four products: men's pants (primarily jeans),
men's shirts, bras I and underwear .l8
Table 5.2 provides the share of national employment in
garments and general manufacturing that was located i.;1 the
five border states between 1965 to 1988. 59 The border
region's share of national garment employment increased from
5.2 BKPLOYNBHT IN THB NBXICO-U.S. BORDER REGION, 1965-88
LEVELS/Shares
(levels in ODDs) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
TOTAL GARMENT
EMPLOYMENT 75.9 98.5 102.4 144.0 146 .. 8 173.3
Border Share 0.044 0.069 0.101 0.096 0.112 0.164
TOTAL MANUFACT.
EMPLOYMENT 1,410 1,581 1,708 2,701 3,269 2,473
Border Share 0.114 0.113 0.123 0.120 0.159 0.201
4.4 percent in 1965 to 16.4 percent in 1988. This expansion
coincided with an overall shift in manufacturing employment
towards the border. The border region's share of national
57
manufacturing jobs increased from 11.4 percent in 1980 to 20.1
Waldinger (1986: 78).
58 Waldinger (1986) suggests that delivery lags and
quality control impede the use of off-shore assembly for high
quality, small-batch garments, such as women's outerwear.
59 The five border states are Baja California Norte,
Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas.
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percent in 1988.
Policies in both the u.s. and Mexico have encouraged the
development of maquiladoras. In 1965, the Mexican government
initiated an official program to promote the expansion of an
off-shore assembly industry.ro The government waived foreign
ownership limitations for maquiladoras and exempted the plants
from taxes and import duties. This basic package of
incentives, with minor changes, has remained largely intact.
To be eligible for tax breaks, maquiladoras must export their
production. A presidential decree in 1987 lowered the export
requirement from 100 percent to 80 percent, and a second
decree in 1990 lowered the requirement further to 50
percent. 61 In the U.S., item 807 of the u.s. tariff schedule
allows firms to engage in the off-shore assembly of u.s.
manufactured components and only pay import duties on the
value-added abroad.~ In this arrangement, a firm exports
components from the U.S., assembles the components abroad, and
imports the final product. If firms were to use Mexican
textiles, they would have to pay duties on the value of the
entire garment.~
60 On maquiladoras, see Fernandez-Kelly (1983) 1 Gibson arld
Corona (1985), Grunwald and Flamm (1985), and Sklair (1989).
61 Ehrenthal and Newman (1988: 197).
62 MIT Commission (1990: 19).
~ In 1987, the u.s. weighted-average tariff on fabrics
was 11.5 percent (MIT Commission (1990: 17» _ until recently,
firms using Mexican textiles to manufacture garments fOl~
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1.2 Industry Localization in an Open Economy
In 1985, President Miguel de la Madrid announced that
Mexico was joining GATT. Over the llext two years I he
initiated a series of reforms that would eliminate, or at
least drastically reduce, most trade barriers in the space of
three years. The rapid opening to trade came as a virtual
shock to garment and other manufactur ing industr ies. Whi Ie de
la Madrid gave clear indications that he was serious about
dismantling the regulatory apparatus of import substitution,
relatively few firms began to prepare themselves for the
opening to trade. This was due perhaps to the fact.. that
previous administrations had threatened trade reform but never
followed through.
A first set of barriers were import tariffs, which had
been in place since the late 19408. For garments, the
production-weighted average tariff fell from 49.8 percent in
June, 1985, to 39.9 percent in June, 1987, and to tIle new
maximum allowed tariff of 20 percent in December, 1987. In
general, quantity restrictions on imports were a more
significant trade barrier than tariffs. Import licenses gave
the government discretion over which goods could be imported.
export also had to pay the 15 percent Mexican value added tax
(a presidential decree in 1989 allows exporting firms to
recoup taxes incurred in production). For domestic sourcing
of textile inputs to be cost-effective, Mexican fabrics would
on average have had to cost 26.5 percent less than U. s.
textiles.
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It was virtually impossible to import many goods, especially
where it appeared a domestically-produced substitute was
available. Trade reform completely eliminated quantity
restrictions. For garments, the coverage of import licenses
as a percent of domestic production was reduced from 100.0
percent in June, 1985, to 88.8 percent in December, 1985, and
finally to zero in May, 1988. M
This section details the impact of trade liberalization
on trade, employment, and industry organization in garment
manufacturing. Before doing so, we briefly describe the
international context in which Mexican garment producers now
find themselves.
1.2.1 World Oaraent Trade
Mexico enters the world garmellt trade perched tenuously
above low-wage countries producing low-quality, high-volume
products, such as China, Malaysia and the Philippines, and
below high-wage countries producing technology- or design-
intensive products, such a~ Italy, Germany, and Japan. M
Mexico shares this middle ground with the enormously
successful countries of East Asia. Hong Kong, Korea, and
Taiwan have dominated world trade in garments over the last
64 For texti les! the coverage of import 1 icenses was
reduced from 88.4 percent in June, 1985, to 3.4 pcrCcj-l"t .111
December, 1985, and to 1.9 percent in May, 1988.
6j See Mody and Wheeler (1987) for recent trellds in world
garment trade.
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two decades. In 1980, the three countries accounted for 59.8
percent of u.s. garment imports; in 1987, this figure was 46.7
percent. 66
Underlying Asian garment industries are a set of
production and marketing arrangements that link manufacturers
to foreign markets and allow firms to rapidly respond to the
ever changing demands of West~rn consumers. Two arrangerne11ts,
in particular, appear to have been fundamental in the rapid
growth of Asian garment manufacturing: the loea 1 export
trader and the network of Bubcontractors. These arrangements
are particularly common of the Hong Kong and Taiwan garment
industries.
Local export traders function as intermediar ies , dividing
production for large volume orders from foreign buyers among
myriad small shops. Pre-existing commercial linkages have
provided a basis for local garment traders to emerge. In Hong
Kong I for instance, the first garment manufacturers were
businessmen that had emigrated from Shanghai. steed (1981)
66
observes that their access to foreign markets came through
Hong Kong's British-owned merchant houses. The agglomeration
of garment manufacturers that formed around this link later
attracted a large number of foreign buyers. 67 Traders produce
garments through networks of subcontractors, where individual
Herzenberg (1990).
67 Steed (1981: 293). Levy (1988) describes a similar
process in the Taiwanese footwear industry.
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subcontractors work for specific traders. Steed (1981: 293)
describes the Hong Kong garment industry in the following way:
The competitive position of the Hong Kong manufacturers
was enhanced by both their free access to foreign fibres
and fabrics ... and their flexibility arising from the
evolving process of local sUb-contracting.. As the
industry grew, with employment increasing more than
threefold during the 19605, so did the range of
specialist suppliers and sub-contractors. The leading
manufacturers could accept and fulf ill orders beyond
their own production capacity knowing that they could
find suitable sub-contractors.
Over time, traders have moved across the Pacific and now
operate out of Los Angeles and New York. with rising wages in
Taipei and Hong Kong, traders are organizing agglomerations of
subcontractorq in neighboring countries. Industry observers
suggest off-shore traders account for most garment exports
from mainland China.
1.2.2 Trade Liberali••tioD in Mezico
Tariff barriers gave domestic producers a captive
national market and import restrictions limited access to the
inputs they would have needed to compete in foreign markets.
In the textile industry, firms lagged behind foreign producers
in the variety of fabric designs and colors they offered, in
the quality of dyeing processes, and in the delivery time of
production orders. Few garment manufacturers were able to
obtain import permits and the rest suffered the same problems
of poor fabric quality and late delivery.
since the opening to trade, the domestic garment industry
has stagnated. Table 5.3 provides quarterly employment
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indices for general manufacturing, the domestic garment
industry, and the off-shore garment assembly industry.
Between January, 1987 and January, 1990, employment in the
domestic garment increased by 0.16 percent, compared to a 2.7
percent increase for manufacturing as a whole.
=
5.3 QUARTBRLY INDEX OF BMPLOYMBHT, 1987-90
Quarter
Off-Shore Domestic
All Garment Garment
Manufact. Assembly Industry
87.01
87.02
87.03
87.04
88.01
88.02
88.03
88.04
89.01
89.02
89.03
89.04
90.01
90.02
90.03
100.00
101.65
102.26
102.88
101.34
102.78
102.06
102.06
101.34
104.22
104.53
104.32
102.26
100.00
104.39
114.54
117.78
117.78
113.76
122.25
136.27
136.54
138.93
100.00
102.20
99.09
101.03
98.85
100.21
97.99
99.06
95.38
97.79
101.16
102.23
100.16
99.07
95.79
Source: Unpublished data, Banco de Mexico.
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The stagnation of the domestic industry is due in part to
increased competi ticn from imports. The dramatic rise in
garment imports is evident in Table 5. 4, which provides
garment imports and exports for the domestic and off-shore
assembly industries. Garments imports increased from US$ 29.5
million in 1987 to US$ 214.8 million in 1989, and totaled US$
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183.0 million in the first eight months of 1990. In terms of
domestic consumption, the import share rose from 5.3 percent
in 1988, to 11.5 percent in 1989, and to 15.0 percent in 1990.
5.4 MEXICO INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GARMENTS, 1982-90
(in millions of 1985 $US)
Domestic Maquila Maquila Total
Industry Value Gross Net
Imports Exports Added Exports· Exports
(1) (II) CIII) (IV) ( II+III-ll
1982 161.723 20.697 67.338 196.128 -73.688
1983 9.282 13.571 50.909 217.521 55.198
1984 17.766 21.874 71.168 259.822 75.287
1985 33.546 16.695 71.87H 238.131 55.027
1986 28.735 19.191 82.971 266.538 730427
1987 29.485 52.630 100.868 299.954 124.013
1988 119.828 85.215 120.922 322.192 80.758
1989 224.990 68.263 160 .. 325 496.281 3.598
1990** 188.221 41.093 113.651 351.804 -35.431
* (IV)
inputs.
inputs.
reports tota 1
(III) reports
exports, including
total exports less
imported
imported
** January through August. Sources: Secofi,
unpublished data. INEGI, Industria Maquiladora de
Exportaci6n.
The poi.nt of entry for garment imports is the Mexico City
garment rt-l ~trict. As discussed in Chapter Two, interview data
suggest many traders in the garment district have closed down
their production activities to become importers.~ In making
the transition from domestic trading to importing, firms have
68 See also ExpansiOn, April 17, 1991, pp. 72~73.
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had ~o adopt a new set of commercial practices. Transactions
in the closed economy were conducted largely on a personalized
basis. International exchanges are based on formal contracts,
generally embodied in a letter of credit which defers payment
until certain conditions are met. Traders have learned from
painful experience that in the absence of formal contracts
they are unlikely to see their orders filled.~
A second reason the domestic garment industry has
stagnated is that few producers have succeeded in penetrating
export markets. This is evident in Table 5.4. Non-
maquiladora garment exports rose from US$ 52.7 million in 1987
to US$ 85.2 million in 1988 and decreased to US$ 68.3 million
in 1989. For the first eight months of 1990, non-maquiladora
garment exports totaled US$ 41.1 million, or 9.7 percent less
than the same period in 1989. These trade figures exaggerate
even the minimal export success of the domestic garment
industry. A substantial share of non-maquiladora garment
exports is due to a few large firms. The Ministry of Trade
and Industrial Promotion provides a special classif ication for
firms which export more than US$ 3 million a year. Of the 170
domestic garment firms currently listed as exporters, only
eight had exports in excess of US$ 3 million in 1989. A lower
M It might have been possible to reduce the costs of
adjusting to international buying practices through the
provision of basic information about contractual devices, such
as letters of credit. In general, there appear to be learning
costs that are an unavoidable feature of adjustment.
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bound for the total exports in 1989 of these eight firms is
US$ 24 million, or 27.1 percent of 1989 non-maquiladora
exports. Many of these large firms are either subsidiaries of
multinationals, former subsidiaries of mUltinationals, or
firms which hold licenses for the domestic productioll of
foreign labels.
The u.s. continues to be Mexico's principal trading
partner. Table 5.5 reports Mexico-U.s. non-maquiladora trade
in garments. Between 1985 and 1989, Mexican garment imports
from the u.s. increased from US$ 29.9 million to US$ 131.9
million; the share of Mexican garment imports from the u.s.
fell from 89.1 percent in 1985 t~ 52.9 percent iri 1990.
5.5 MEXICO-U.S. NOH-MAQUILADORA GARMENT TRADE, 1982-90
(in millions 1985 SUS, trade share in parentheses)
Exports Imports
Level Share Level Share
1982 14.121 (0.682) 74.802 (0.463)
1983 9.317 (0.687) 6.618 (0.713)
1984 18.196 (0.832) 15.780 (0.888)
1985 15.257 (0.914) 29.881 (0.891)
1986 15.107 (0.787) 25.139 (0.875)
1987 44.142 (0.839) 26.744 (0.907)
1988 37.749 (0.853) 52.384 (0.'754)
1989 54.512 (0.799) 131.866 (0.614)
1990
.* 27.273 (0.663) 96.817 (Q.529)
*. January through August. Source: Secofi.
- ~-
Industry observers suggest a large share of Mexican garment
imports from the U. S. are manufactured in Asia and merely
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distributed by u.s. traders in New York and Los Angeles~ Hong
Kong has been the most active new country ill the Mexican
garment market; the country's share of Mexican garment imports
increased from 1.3 percent in 1988 to 2204 percent in 1990.
The u. s. maintains quotas aI, Mexican garlnent expc)rts
under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). Recent Mexico-U.S.
bilateral textile trade agreements have made quotas more
flexible. The current agreement, which was signed in 1988 and
revised in 1990, allows Mexico to obtain quota increases for
most goods on request. Quotas appear to be birlding only for
a few select products. For the period 1988 to 1990 r average
quota utilization rates were over 60 percent in only four
products categories out of 61: overalls (112.9·%), pants
(102.1%), pajamas (88.6%), and shirts and blouses (80.9%) .70
Far from limiting Mexico's role in the u.s. market: qllotas
li.kely guarantee Mexico a share of u.s. garment imports it
would cede to Asia in their absence.
In contrast to the anemic performance of the domestic
industry, the maquiladora industry is booming. Between
January, 1987 and Janua~y, 1990, employment in the garment
maquiladora industry increased by 39.5 percente The reason
for this employment growth is clearly evident in 'fable 5. 4 I.
Maquiladora exports have increased dramatically since the
opening to trade, rising from US$ 300.0 million in 1987, to
W Quota utilization rates for 61 product categories are
available on request from the author.
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US$ 322.0 million in 1988, and reaching US$ 496a3 million in
1989. In 1989, value added in maquiladora exports alone
total exports less the value of imported inputs -- was 2.4
times non-maqui ladora garment exports. Virt\lally all Mexicall
maquiladora exports are destined for the U. s. market. Greater
flexibility in u.s. gdrment quotas has made this export growth
possible.
Most of the recent job growth in off-shore assembly has
taken place not along the border but in interior Mexico. This
is evident in Table 5.6, which provides total employment in
garment maquiladoras, and the division of employment between
border states and interior states. The share of maquiladora
•
5.' BMPLOYNBHT 1M TBB GARMBHT OFF-SHORB
ASSBMBLY INDUSTRY, 19;1-90
employment in interior states increased from 20.9 percent in
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1981 to 41.5 percent in 1988. Interview data suggest the
I
shift is the result of domestic producers converting to off-
shore assembly. An example from Chapter Two is the TehuacAn
garment industry, where firms are switching in dramatic
fashion from subcontracting for Mexico City traders to off-
shore assembly for U.S. client firms.
Not all domestic producers are converting to off-shore
I
..
I
assembly. Chapter Two describes how producers in a few
agglomerations have coordinated efforts to adjust to the
opening to trade. These attempts are still in their formative
stages, and are limited to specific regions, but they reveal
the extent to which adjustment strategies vary across regions.
A common feature of coordinated adjustment is the creation of
new distribution channels that give firms direct access to
foreign markets. Firms in the state of Aguascalientes have
created an export trading company that serves as a vehicle for
forming joint ventures with u.s. garment manufacturers. The
trading company is jointly owned and managed by local firms '"
Firms in Guadalajara have organized a trade fair to help local
area firms replace clients lost to imports. Profi.ts from the
trade fair are being used to create a design center that
provi.des technical assistance to local firms. The intentic)n
is to convert Guadalajara into the new center for women's
fashion in Mexico. Firms in Monterrey have taken advantage of
the decline of the Mexico city garment industry in tile
aftermath of trade liberalization to move into women's
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t
~
I
outerwear. Proximity to the border has given firms access to
new designs and fashions. Coordination among firms is less
extensive than in Aguascal ientes and Guadalaj ara, but the
active exchange of information still appears to playa role in
how firms learn about new business opportunities.
2. Industry Location, vertical Organization Ind Tr~d.
This section develops a theoretical framework that
relates industry location, vertical organization, and trade~
Chapter Three studies the dynamics of geographic concentration
in an industry ttlat. is characterized by vari.ation in the
strength of external economies across activities. Below, we
extend this framework to a general equilibrium context. The
industry we consider involves two activities: marketing,
which exhibits external economies, and assembly, which
exhibits constant returns to scale. There are two countries,
which each contain a number of regions; one country is
significantly larger in terms of it labor force tha~ the other
country. Agents also consume a region-specif ic resource,
land .. Agglomeration creates congestion costs by driving up
the regional price of land. Under autarky, external economies
lead regions to vertically specialize. The agglomeration of
marketing activities drives up wages and land prices in a
particular region. Assembly, the constant returns activity,
moves to the unagglomerated region, where wages and housing
prices are lower. with trade,
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countries vertically
specialize. The large country captures the strong external
economy activity and the small COllntry provides assembly
services for large country firms.
2.1 A Model of AgqlomeratioD and Vertical specialization
Consider two countries, Home and Foreign. Home consists
of two regions, North and South. For simplicity, assume
Foreign consists of a single region. In each country there
are two types of households: landowners, who own one unit of
housing, and laborers, who own one unit of labor. Labor is
mobile across regions, housing is fixed. 'rhere is no
international factor mobility. Tastes and technology are
identical in each country. Home's labor force, L, is smaller
than Foreign's labor force, Le •
There are two consumption goods, housing t T, and
garments, Y. Preferences are Cobb-Douglas: each country
spends a share a of its income on housing and a share i-a on
garments. Landowners and laborers supply their endowments
inelastically; landowners receive all rental income and
laborers receive all wage income. As the supply of housing is
fixed in each region, an inflow of labor bids up the regional
housing price. Labor is the only factor 'ased in garment
production. Garments are produced in two stages: assembly
yields an intermediate good, Z, that requires marketing
services to become a final product. The production of Z is
given by
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z = ~
Marketing combines Z with an additional
garment production is given by
( 1)
1T1_.L ... ,
.LUl,.Q.J..
0.5 < ~ < 1, a > 1 (2)
where ~ is labor used is marketing, Z is assembled garments,
and the final term captures external economies 8 71 External
economies are region-specific: the regional marginal product
of ~ depends only on the region-wide output of Y. As there
are no external economies in assembly, the marginal product of
~ does not depend on where Z is produced.
The external economies we have in mind are a widely cited
characteristic of the garment indus'try. n External effects in
marketing are due to frequent changes in the style of garment
consumers demand. style changes imply firms must remain
abreast of constarltly shifting tastes ~ Firms gather
information abc~t market conditions by locating near other
firms. This occurs indirectly through spying and imitation
and directly through the exchange of information between
firms. Rapid style changes also make it impractical to
standardize many assembly operations, and assembly remains
highly labor-intensive. Separating assembly from marketing
allows firms to keep production a footloose activity.
71 This approach follows Ethier (1982) and Helpman and
Krugman (1985).
T2 Lichtenberg (1960) and Waldinger (1986) describe
similar external economies in the New York garment districta
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Autarky: Consider autarky in Foreign. Foreign contains T·
landownsrs and L- laborers8 A landowner's income is P~, the
price of housing, and a laborer's income in w·, the wage.
Equating demand with supply for housing and garments yields
T- = P-T- + aw-L.:a \ p.PI t
y-
= (l-a) P-:r- + (l-Q)w·L· (3 )p. p.
y y
Marketing clearing in housing defines the wage in terms of the
housing price,
(4)
Using the fact that Z=Lz and that zero profit~ imply w=Pz , we
subsume ~ into production of Y.
garment production implies
Profit maximization in
(5)
Combinillg (5 ) with the full employment condition, Lz+Ly=L- ,
makes it possible to solve for Ly and ~ in terms of L-:
~ = (1-~) L-
Ly = CPL- (6)
This yields the following wage relative to the price of
garments:
(7)
The wage in terms of the garment price, or the price of Pz
relative to Py , is an increasing function of the labor force,
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due to increasing returns. Hence, larger countries are
relatively more eff icient in marketing 5 The relative pr ice of
housing to garments is
act>fwr ( 1~' 'P) 0(1 ~)Lo
T(l-a)
(8)
which is also increasing in L, as 1ncreases in the population
bid up the price of housing.
The autarky equilibrium in Home is complicated by the
fact there are two regions. Location-specific external
economies make it efficient to concentrate production of y in
a single location. Each region has its own housing stock; as
labor is mobile across regions, agglomeration in one region
bids up the housing price relative to the other region. There
are three possible configurations of production: (1) regional
autarky, where each reg ion produces its own Z and Y I (2)
agglomeration of y in a single region, with Z production
divided between the two regions, and (3 ) regional
specialization, where one region specializes in Z and the
other in Y. We show that regional specialization is the
unique equilibrium.
Suppose for the moment that North specializes in Z and
South specializes in Y. There are three markets for
consumption goods: the North housing market, the South
housing market, and the economy-wide garment market. Income
depends on the region in which households are located. Assume
there are an equal number of landowners, T, in North ancl
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South. Let superscr ipt n denote North and super~ cr ipt 5
denote South. Specialization implies L~Ll and L!=Ly, where
LI+L~L. Equating supply and demand for housing and garments
yields
rro = T = aPOJ' + aWOLz
pat POt
T 1 = T = aP',T + QV~
p' p.
t I
y = (l-Q)PD,T +
Py
(9)
Market clearing iri Ilousing defines the i,-=egioj-lal :eelative waqe~
(10)
As in (5), profit maximization in garment production implies
~ = (/JLy"'l~.y(cr-I)/(1
Py
wn = ( l-ep) LyfL.,.4t-1y(lI-l)/a
Py
(11)
which yields the following relative wage:
(12)
Given labor is mobile, equilibrium requires that workers in
each region enjoy the same level of utility. From (9),
consumption per laborer, C, for goods Y and T in South and
North are
C· = ~ en = Q~y y
Py Py
C· = L' -a) W- COt = (i-a) wn (13)1
p' POIt
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which yields the followi.ng labor market equilibrium condition:
[aw'la[ (I-a) w'] 1-<1 =
Py pi,
(14) reduces to
[aw"]Q( (I-a) WO] 1-0
Py POI
(14)
(15)
Combining (10), (11) I and (12) with the full employment
condition gives the geographic distribution of the labor force
Ly = ~-
l+Ji
Lz = --MIL where #J = [~]a-I
1+1£ 1-~
(16)
We can now solve for the regional relative wage and for
regional wages and housing prices in terms of Pyl
e =
pta,
(17)wn = ( l-ep) j.La( I-4t)-ILa--1 ( 1+IJ) l--a
Py
Given ~ > 1-~, ~ > ~ and p~ > P~. Agglomeration in the South
drives up housing prices and wages, pushing assembly into the
North.
Why is re.gional specialization is the unique equilibrium?
External economies in marketing imply all Y producers prefer
to be in the region with the largest share of Y production~
Agglomel.-ation of y in one region pushes production of Z into
the ether r~;ion, as no Z producer can bid workers away from
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Y production in the Y. production center. with constant
(18)
returns in Z, the marginal product of labor in Z is the same
in any region. Since the value marginal product of labor in
Y exceeds that in Z, producers of Z are only able to attract
workers by moving to the unagglomerated region, where housing
prices are lower.
Tra4.: Consider the res'll t of trade between Home al'1n Foreign.
The fact that Foreign has a larger labor force than Home
implies Foreign is more efficient in the production of y~ To
see this, compare w·1 p.y and wn/Py , the relative pr ice of Z and
Y in each country:
wo = (1-4» J,ia(l-'>-lLa-1 ( 1 +J£) l-a
Py
Foreign is more eff icient in marketing if w· /p.y > wo/Py • From
(18), this will be the case if
L· >
L
(j)[oa(l-')-a+ I-aV(a-l) ( 1-0) [~+1]/(0-1)
epa-I + (1-¢) a-I
(19)
A little algebra reveals (19) is true even for equal sized
countries if 0-1 > Qa~. (19) will certainly hold if ~ is
considerably larger than L, as is assumed to be the case. The
relative price of Z to Y. is lower in Home than in Forei.gn,
leading Home to export Z and import y. with increasing
returns in Y, Foreign captures all marketing activities and
Home specializes in assembly.
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A natural question is whether it is possible to recreate
the integrated economy equilibrium through trade. Given
external economies, this will depena on how labor is divided
between Home and Foreign. If Foreign's share of the labor
force is sufficient to provide the same level of marketing
services as in the integrated economy, factor price
equalization obtains and trade reproduces the integrated
economy. The minimum share of the labor force in Foreign for
the integrated economy equilibr:um to obtain is given by the
single region solution in (6). As long as,
L- > c/)(L- + L),
L- > ~
1-4»
or
(20)
the integrated economy equilibrium obtains. If L- exceeds the
level in (20), Foreign produces all Y and some Z, and wages
are equalized. If (20) exact binds, Foreign specializes in Y
and Home specializes in Z, and wages are just equalized
between the two countriese
Trade has a dramatic effect on both the location and
organization of production. Trade creates a pattern of
vertical specialization in which the small country specializes
in assembly and the large country specializes in marketing.
Trade also lead to a relocation of production in the small
country. Labor that used to engage in marketing in South
converts to assembly. Under autarky, L1 > La causing housing
pr ices in South to exceed those in North.
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Now that battl
regions produce Z, equilibrium requires the wage paid to L z be
the same in each region. For this to be true, trade must lead
to a migration of labor from South to North. Trade
deindustrializes the South and expands industry in the North.
Transport C08ta: Suppose there are transport costs between
Home and Foreign and that the costs between South and Foreign
exceed those between North and Foreign. The effect is to
further deindustrialize the South. 'l'o see this, suppose
trallsport costs are zero between North and Foreign, but
positive between South and Foreign. Suppose further that
transport costs take Samuelson's iceberg form: of each unit
shipped, only a fraction E actually arrives. Foreign firms
now will only be willing to pay f times the price for Z
produced in South, compared to Z produced in North or in
Foreign. Equilibrium requires
(21 )
For workers in South to be willing to work for a lower wage
they must be compensated with lower housing prices.
(15), the labor market equilibrium condition is,
From
(22)
From (10), equilibrium in the regional housing markets implies
(23)
Combining (21), (22), and (23) gives the distribution of labor
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across regions:
1L = E (I-a)/a < 1
LD
(24)
Trade in the presence of transport costs leads to a further
flow of labor from South to North.
2.2 Horth Aaerican Economic Int.gration
The rudimentary model of the last section captures many
of the essential features of the integration of the Mexican
garment industry into the North AlDer ican economy. Trade
shifts assembly from the UaS. to Mexico, given lower wages
south of the border. u.s. firms, given the larger size of the
u.s. market, capture marketing activities from Mexicoa The
process of moving assembly to the small country takes a
particular form. The agents that bring assembly work to
Mexico are firms from u.s. marketing centers, as they have
exclusive knowledge about the home market. The Mexico city
marketing center is being eclipsed by marketing centers in Los
Angeles and New York. The smaller size of the Mexican market
implies that Mexico cannot support a marketing center that
competes directly with those in the U.S.; traders in Mexico
city consequently drop their relationships with producers in
outlying agglomerations to become importers. The pattern of
vertical specialization is determined by market sizeM The
small country, in effect, becomes a periphery region of the
large country.
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Under the closed economy, border regions in Mexico played
little role in domestic garment production. Integration turns
the border into the natural assembly platform for marketing
centers in the u.s. Most U.S. garment firms doing business in
Mexico are from the Los Angeles marketing center; Los Angeles
is also the main channel through which garments imports arrive
in Mexico City. The small size of the Mexican market may not
initially affect the balance between the New Yo~k and Los
Angeles marketing centers I but over time it is likely Los
Angeles will emerge as the principal marketing center in the
U.S., at least for a certain range of products.
Are there alternative explanations for the growth of the
garment maquiladora industry? Many observers attribute the
expansion of maquiladoras to existing policies, such as item
807. n This view confuses in-bond production with off-shore
assembly. Item 807 gives garment firms that engage in off-
shore assembly an incentive to use u.s. fabric. It implies
nothing, however, about who should control design and
marketing activities. If contacts with U.SA marketing centers
were unnecessary, Mexican firms would participate in all
aspects of off-shore production including design and
distribution -- not just assembly. They could just as easily
take advantage of item 807, Mexican fiscal incentives, and low
Mexican wages by ~stablishing a plant in the u.s. to purchase
U.S. fabric and a second plant in Mexican to assemble
73 See FernAndez-Kelly (1983) and Sklair (1989).
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garments. In reality, Mexico's role is limited to assembly.
Mexican assembly plants depend on foreign clients to provide
product designs and access to markets.
2.3 Ia tb.re Lite after Haquila?
There are a variety of shortcomings to a maquiladora-
oriented developmen't path that reflect the fears of Mexican
industrialists allucled to at the outset of this chapter.
Maquiladoras often depend on a single client for access to
u.s. markets. Assembly also represents the least profitable
link of the value-addE~d chain in garment manufacturing; ,ralue
added by maquiladoras between 1981 and 1988 represented an
average of 32.7 percent of the value of maquila exports. A
more significant issue is that maquiladoras face highly
cyclical demand for their labor. When u.s. garment
manufacturers face a downturn in demand, it is maquiladoras
they layoff first. TallIe 5. 6 shows employment in garment
maquiladoras fell by 16.9 percent during the 1981-1982 u.s~
recession; Table 5. 3 Sh(lWS employment fell by 2. 0 percent
between June and September"', 1.990, during the beginning of the
current recession, as compared to a 6. 1 percent increase
during the same period the year before.
Is Mexico doomed to the task of off-shore assembly in the
North American market? 'rhe~ theoretical framework of the last
section suggests the loca'tion of the marketing cen'ter is
purely a function of market size. This implies off-shore
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assembly represents Mexican producers only access to U. s.
markets. Interview material suggest this characterization is
too stark. There are gradations between the two extremes of
pure assembly and integrated production and marketing.
Indeed, Chapter Three clearly illustrates that in the
development of the domestic industry producer agglomerations
typically controlled design activities, and in some instances
r
.
I
part of the wholesale distribution process. What
distinguishes the experience of domestic producer
agglomerations is that their participation in design and
marketing was limited to specialized tasks. Specialization
allowed ttlem to coexist with a larger marketing center in
Mexico City.
In the newly open economy, firms in Aguascalientes,
Guadalajara, and Monterrey appear to be following a similar
strategy of specialized vertical expansion. Firms have
selected a particular high valued-added activity and are
attempting to capture it from larger, more developed marketing
centers. In Aguascalientes and Guadalajara, the activity is
wholesale distribution; in Monterrey it is design of mid-range
women's outerwear. Firms in Guadalajara are also trying to
use their accumulated experiellce in distribution to establish
a des ign center. A con~mon feature of firm strategies in
Aguascalientes and Guadalajara is the reliance on a regioilal
trade association -- in both cases the local delegation or the
National Garment Industry Chamber -- to coordinate activi ties It
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Agglomerations of firms in Mexico may not be able to replicate
the success of Asian manufacturing agglomerations, but their
e)~perierlces suggest coordination is a necessary componerlt in
the transition from assembly to high value-added activities.
Is there a role for policy in specialized vertical
expansion? There would appear to be a natural role for policy
in coordinating actions to cdpture design and distribution
acti.vi ties from larger marketing center's. Indeed, the
Aguascalientes export trading company and the Guadalajara
trade fair would seem obvious candidates for replication in
other regions. It is essential to point out that these
initii.\tives were developed and implemented by f ir-rns
themselves. The coordinating organizational body, the local
industry chamber, is run hy fi~=~. Ab ciiscussed in Chapter
Two, the only government-sponsored initiative was the Fashion
and Design Center in Mexico City. This effort, while similar
in scheme and intent to those in Aguascaliel'ltes and
Guadalajara, has failed because the project coordinators
neglected to consult the target population of firms. There
remains little doubt that a role for policy exists; but there
remains a great deal of doubt about the ability of the
designated government agencies to carry out the appropriate
measures.
3. concludiNg ~,mark~
It was the architect of Mexico's first attempt at
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outward-oriented development, General Porfirio D1az (1876-
1910), who made the oft-repeated E~xclamation, "Poor Mexico!
So far from God and so near to the united states. II The
remark, though nearly a century old, still resonates i.n Mexico
as the country looks forward to a future of closer economic
ties with the u.s. For Mexico, integration is a two-edged
sword. Integration allows Mexican firms gain access to new
markets and technologies on a scale that would have never been
~ttainable under the old regime. The tradeoff for enhanced
productivity is a loss of control over the producti.on process.
Access to U.S. markets requires Mexican firms to shift from
fUlly-integrated manufacturi119 to a vertically specialized
role as subcontractors for u.s. client firms. In garments,
and other industries, this transition involves conversion to
off-shore assembly. Given the large size of the U. s. economy,
it is still likely the gains Mexican producers enjoy from
having access to the u.s. market will swamp any losses from
ceding external economy activities to the u.s.
There is a strong nationalist current in Mexico that
equates off-shore assembly with a loss in sovereignty. This
view overlooks the regional disparities that were an inherent
feature of import substitution industrialization. Under the
closed economy, Mexico City emerged as the country's principal
industrial center. The process of geographic concentration in
the capital peripheralized other regions in the country I
including northern Mexico, which under D1az had developed
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strong commercial ties with the u.s. A North American Free
Trade Area would transform the process of regional economic
development in Mexico. Integration would convert the former
center into a periphery region of the U.S., while granting the
North access to sUbstantially better markets and technology.
To calJ. this a loss in sovereignty is not a nationalist
perspective but a regionalist perspective that favors the
welfare of the center over the welfare of other regions.
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CHAPTER SIX: A MODBL OF INDUSTRY LOCALIZATION
AS A SOLUTION TO THE BHPLOYBE BOLD-UP PROBLEM
Chapters Three and Four study geographic concentration as
it relates to the initial stages of industrialization. A key
feature of this process is the diffusion of knowledge from the
location where industry begins to outlying regions. In this
context, firms leaving the initial agglomeration follow each
other in order to gain access to skilled labor. In later
stages of industrialization, there will be a large pool of
skilled labor in outlying regions. Is there still a reason
for firms to agglomerate?
This chapter argues that industry localization eliminates
hold-up problems created by spatially dispersed production~
We stUdy an industry where production and trdde are carried
out by two types of agents: traders and producers. Traders
make costly investments in expanding distribution channels;
producers have specific skills and offer production services
to traders. Once a trader undertakes investments and commits
herself to a particular location, she faces the risk that
producers may try to hold-up production and demand a larger
share of any pre-negotiated distribution of the surplus. The
risk of hold-up is greater in locations with fewer producersD
Through agglomeration, traders increase competition among
producers for the services they provide and reduce bargaining
problems.
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The similarity between
transaction-~ost view of the
this
firm is
framework and
intentional.
the
Using
williamson's (1985) language, agglomeration allows firms to
avoid the creation of relationship-specific assets.
Agglomeration can be seen as an al ternative to vertical
integration. Williamson suggests integration reduces
bargaining costs created by bilateral monopoly. (Though why
integration improves matters is not made explicit; see
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Kreps (1990) for alternative
views.) Integration, however, may bring with it unwanted
concentration of ownership; for instance, integration may
raise monitoring costs by replacing many owners with one.
Agglomeration reduces bargaining problems without
concentrating ownership.
The location process consists of a three-stage game
between traders and producers. Section one outlines tIle
nature of production and trade. section two describes the
timing of actions taken by traders and producers. section
three describes the bargaining process. Bargaining outcomes
are given by Shapley Values. As this device is not well-
known, we discuss it some detail. section four derives the
agglomeration equilibrium. Agglomeration represents an
efficiency gain over geographically decentralized production.
Traders benefit since they gain access to a larger pool of
producers with whom to transact; producers benefit since they
gain access to downstream markets. section five provides
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concluding remarks.
1. Production and Trade
Location outcomes are the result of a three-stage game
between traders and producers.
Produoers: There are N producers who distribute themselves
across K ~ N periphery locations. Each location is distinct;
there is no communication between agents in different
locations. Each producer has an identical production
technology that is characterized by the following total cost
function:
TC = c*q, (1)
where q is output, and c is unit cost. Cost is measured in
terms of the single good. Producers lack access to downstream
markets and rely on traders to market their output.
Trader.: There are J traders, each of whom is based in a
marketing center that is spatially separate from periphery
locations. The commercial possibilities for a trader are
given by a revenue function, R(), that is a function of e, the
level of effort invested, and q, the level of output, where
Rc(e,q) > 0 ~(e,q) < 0
Rq(e,q) > 0 ~(e,q) < 0
~(e,q,) ~ 0 for all e, q ~ 0 (2)
Investment of effort allows traders to expand the scope of
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their market, the concavity of R() in e implies traders are
limited in their ability to do so. Effort is costly fOl-
traders. This cost is given by a function, fee), where,
fe(e) > 0
f~(e) ~ 0 (3)
An individual trader chooses e and q independent of the
actions of other traders. This is somewhat disingenuous given
R() is concave in q, implying that traders face a downward-
sloping demand curve.~
Traders choose between producing for themselves and
travelling to a periphery location to transact with producers.
If a trader chooses to visit a periphery location, she forgoes
the opportunity to produce for herself or visit other
locations. If a trader chooses own production, she faces
marginal production cost e· , where
(4 )
implying thel"e are gains from trade between traders and
producers. Under own production, tradeI' prof its al"e
R(e,q) - fee) - (c·)q (5)
Profit maximization with respect to e and q leads to the
following first order conditions:
~ An example of this type of s~tuation is where traders
have divided up sales regions between them i.n a pie-like
fashion, and each trader is permitted to expand her market
away from the center, but not permitted to encroach on the
adjoining wedges allotted to her neighbors.
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Rq(e,q) = c· (6)
Given (2) and ~3) I there is a unique pair {e· , qe} that solves
(6). Define trader profits under own production to be n-:
(7 )
2. Timing
Location, production, and trade occur in three stages.
All decisions are irreversible; contracts which specify a
course of action across time periods are assumed impossible.
In period one, traders non-cooperatively make location and
investment decisions, incurring costs fee). In period two,
producers non-cooperatively make location decisions. In
period three, production and trade take place, which amounts
to choosing q and dividing up any surplus.
If a trader chooses own production, her choices on e and
q are given by (6). If a trader instead visits a periphery
location, she bargains with the producers and traders at that
location over the distr ibution of the gains from trade.
Bargaining occurs among the agents that share a location;
there is no interaction between agents in different locations.
Consider Location A, with n producers and J A traders. Given
period two decisions on e , tile surplus in period three is
Jr [R (eF I qj) - cqj] I
j=l
(8)
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where e,-- isJ trader j' S period one investment choice II If
YLi.th.in period contracts are possible, traders and prodllCer"S
can sign a period three contract specifying q and each agent's
share of the total surplus. Naturally, traders and producers
will choose q to maximize (8), given c and ~••. This yields
the following set of first order conditions,
all j at A (9)
For trader j, (9) yields the following period one reaction
function,
(10)
which is assumed to be increasing and concave in e.
Foreseeing the period three outcome, trader j incorporates
(10) into her period one decision on e, in Stackelberg-like
fashion.
3. The Bargaining Framework
Bargaining outcomes are given by Shapley Values. The
Shapley Value essentially generalizes the Nash bargaining
sOlution. 75 Consider a group of M agents. The Shapley Value
of agent i is her expected marginal contribution to a
coalition formed from M. In other words, an agent's Shapley
Value is her average marginal contribution over all coalitions
of agents that might form from M. Let V() represent the total
surplus generated by a given coalition of agents from M~
75 See Hart
discussion.
(1987) and Hart and Moore
180
(1988) for a
Consider a coalition S, to which agent i belongs. By
definition, agent i's marginal contribution to S is
V(S) -- V(S-{i})
in which case agent i's Shapley Value is
E(sli E s) p(s) • [V(S) - V(S-{i})] ,
(11)
(12)
where p(S) is the probability that the coalition S arises.
The probability peS) is derived straightforwardly. Arrange
the M total agents on a line, and include in s agent i and all
agents that precede her -- that is, all agents to her left.
Assuming the M! possible orderings of agents are all equally
likely, agent i's Shapley Value is
(13)
where s equals the number of agents in coalition S.
In principle, agent i's marginal contribution to a
coalition 5, V(S) - V(S-{i}), can take a different value for
every coalition. In the location game we consider, the setup
is very simple. M corresponds to the number of traders and
producers that share a given location. An agent's marginal
contribution takes only one of two values. A trader has a
positive marginal contribution in all coalitions in which she
is joined by at least one producer. This is due to the fact
that traders in periphery locations have foregone the
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opportunity to produce for themselves and rely on producers
for access to production facilities. As each trader has
access to a unique set of distribution channels, a trader's
marginal contribution, where it is positive, does not vary
across coalitions. A producer has a positive marginal
contribution in all coalitions in which he is the sole
producer; given producers are identical, a producer only makes
a non...trivial contribution to a coalition where he is the
coalition's sole access to production facilities~
Consider Location A, where there are n producers and J A
traders. Trader i has a positive marginal contribution to a
coalition in all orderings in which there is at least one
producer to her left. By (11), the margi.nal contribution of
trader i is
(14)
Given that a trader's marginal contribution to a coalition is
independent of the presence of other traders, (14) reduces to
(15)
Trader i' s Shapley Value is the expression in (15) t.imes the
probability that trader i is in a coalition with at least one
producer. It is easiest to calculate this probability
indirectly as one minus the probability that trader i is in a
coalition without a producer.
The following diagram lists the coalitions in Wllich
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trader i is preceded solely by traders:
Trader i's order
in coalition:
1st: Til •• 0 ••••••••••
2nd: Tt , Til .........
3rd: Tt I Tjl Til .....
J Ath : T~, .•••••• , TI , • • •
Numb~r of corresponding
coalitions:
(where ]e, j do not equal i) II
The probability trader i is in a coalition without a producar
is calculated by summing down the right-hand side of the
diagram and dividing this sum by the total number of
coalitions, which is (n+JA ) 1. One minus this probability is
the probability that trader i has ::l marginal contl-ibuticn
equal to R (e i-- , qi) - cqi. Trader i' s Shapley Value is then
- ~[1 ...
j=l
(16)
A littl~ algebra reveals that the expression inside the
brackets in (16) reduces to n/ (n~~l) • This is left to all
appendix. written compactly, trader i's Shapley Value is
(17)
Hence, trader i's share of the surplus is independent of the
number of other traders with whom she shares a given location.
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The Shapley Value for any producer k at Location A can be
calculated in a similar manner. A producer has a positive
marginal contribution only in those coalitions in which he is
the sole producer. Where producer k is the sole producer, he
represents the coalition's only access to production
facilities. Hence, his marginal contribution is equal to the
total surplus generated by the coalition, which equals the
expression in (15) times the number of traders ill the
coalition. with n producers and J" traders, a producers
Shapley Value is
~
}=1
(18)
Expression (18) is constructed in a manner similar to
expression (16).
appendix.
ThE: construction of (18) i.s left to all
4. The Agglomeration Equilibrium
Given lower marginal costs in outside locations, traders
are naturally interested in transacting wi th prOd\lCerS ill
periphery locations. The bargaining process reduces traders'
incentives to invest in effort, thereby dissipating the
potential gains from trade. For a given trader, the arrival
of an additional producer increases her bargaining power and
she takes home a greater share of the surplus. She naturally
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prefers locations with a larger concentration of producers.
From (17), the arrival of an additional trader leaves her
If
unaffected. These two factors are wt'lat lead traders to
agglomerate.
We claim that the formation of a single agglomeration is
a Nash equilibrium. Proof is by construction. We begin in
the last period and work backwards.
Period Tbr•• : In period three, production and trade occur.
This amounts to a choice on q and a division of the surplus.
The choice on q is given by (9), which yields a period one
reaction function for each trader. The reaction function is
given by (10). The period three distribution of the surplus
for an individual trader is given by (17), and for an
individual producer by (18).
Period Two: In period two, producers make location decisions.
Equilibrium requires that, given traders' period one decisions
and the location decisions of other producers, no indivi.dual
producer is better off by changing locations. It is not
necessary that producer profits in occupied location!; be
equal, but it must be true that, given the distribution of
traders and producers, no single producer call earn higher
profits by leaving his current location and moving to a new
one. If traders are agglomerated in a single location, no
producers can do better than choosing the agglomerclted
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location.
P.riod On.: For agglomeration to be a Nash equilibrium, it
must be true that, given a situation where all traders choose
a single location, r.o individual trader is better off by
moving to a new location. In other words, the ith tradel must
not be able to attract a suff icient number of producers te>
earn higher prof its ttlan she would in the agglomerated
location.
Consider a location with n prOd\lCerS and J traders --
that is, a situation where all traders have chosen the same
location. In period one, each trader chooses a level of
investment, e, which is given by (10), based on her expected
share of the surplus. Combining (10) with (17) yields the
following period one optimization problem for trader i:
max [n/(n+l)]*[R(e, q(e,c» - cq(e,c)] - fee), (19)
{e}
where sUbscripts denoting individual traders are dropped for
expositional ease. Maximization of (19) I yields the folIo\,' ing
first and second order conditions,
[ n / (n+1) ] * [Rc (e , q (e , c» + Rq ( e , q ( e , c) ) *qc (e ,e)
- cCle ( e , c)] - f e ( e ) = 0
[ n / (n+1) ] * [Rcc (e , q ( e , c» + ~ ( e I q ( e , c) ) • qc ( e ,e)
(20)
As long as the second order condition holds, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium {e··,q··}, givell nand c.
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Profits for' an
individual trader become
The profits given by (21) can be rewritten as
111 ( e (n) , q (n) , n , j )
(21 )
(22)
a function of the number of producer that occupy a location.
We can now show that no trader would be better off by
moving to a location with fewer producers. Trader i knows
that if all traders are agglomerated in a single location at
the end of period one, then in period two all producers will
choose the agglomerated location. This implies that n = N.
If trader i moves to an unoccupied location, her profits can
only decrease. To see this, consider the change in trader
profits due to a change in n, the number of producers at a
location. By the envelope theorem, the indirect effect of a
change in n on e and q will be zero; 6n1/on is
«STr1tet") ,gin) .n,;) = (n+l)-2*[R(e··,qee) - f(e·e) - cql)e] > 0
6n
(23)
Trader profits are at a maximum where n = N. Even if trader
i moves to a location where she is the sole trader, she wi.ll
be unable to earn higher profits than she earns in the
agglomerated location. As long as
(24)
the formation of a single agglomeratioll if] a Nash equilibrium.
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5. Concluding Remarks
There is a clear economic intuition why agglomeration is
an equi 1 ibr ium outcome. The agg lorneration of traders and
producers represents an overall eff iciency gain. In the
agglomerated location, traders take home a larger share of the
surplus they generate; this gives them a greater incentive to
invest in developing new markets. A higher level of
investment increases the total surplus. In a geographically
decentralized outcome, traders bargain with a smaller group of
producers, which gives producers greater bargaining power (but
does not necessarily increase their total earni.ngs, due t.o
dampened investment incentives for traders). Producers cannot
credibly commi t in per iod one not to take advantage of
whatever bargaining power they wi 11 have in per iod three.
Hence, trader incentives to invest are reduced. Localization
improves trader investment incentives by reducing the
possibility of ex-post opportunistic behavior. In the
agglomerated location, traders have access to a large pool at
potential clients that valup their services, and producers
gain access to downstream markets.
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APPENDIX
A.l Trader i'8 shapley Value
From (16), the probability a trader makes a positive marginal
contribution to a coalition is given by
1 - ~
j=l
We show the above expression reduces to n/(n+l), or that the
summation expression reduces to 1/ (n+1) G writing out the
summation expression yields
n! (J-l)! + (n+l)! (J--l)! + (n+2)! (J-l) ! + .... + (n+J-l) ! (J-l) !
01 11 21 (J-l) I
---- (n+J) 1
step one is to rewrite the numerator by carrying out the
implied division. This yields
J-l J~l
nl (J-l) !+(n+l) I (J-l) 1+(n+2) I IT (j)+(n+3) I IT (j)+ .. +(n+J-l) I
]=3 j=4 _
(n+J) I
step two is to carry out the implied division of each
expression in the numerator by the denominator. This yields
J-l
(J-l) I+(n+l) (J-l) I+(n+l) (n+2) n j+ ... +(n+l) •...• (n+J-l)
]=3
(n+l) (n+2) ... (n+J)
step three is to add the first two terms in the numerator to
obtain (n+2)(J-l)!. Since (n+2) ~nters every ternl ill the
numerator and the denominator it is dropped from the
expression. step four is to make use of the fact ttlat
J-ln (j)
]=k
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This makes it possible to collect product terms in the
numerator and progressively eliminate them from the
expression, as in step three, until we arrive at l/(n+l) e
A.2 Producer k', shapley Value
Producer k will have a positive marginal contribution to any
coalition in which he is preceded exclusively by traders. In
this case , he repr~sents the coalitiorl's only access to
production facilities; his ma~ginal contribution to the
coalition is the total surplus generated by the coalition.
The total surplus for a coalition with j traders is
[R(ei•• ,qi) - cqi] *j
Producer k's Shapley value aquals the above expression times
the probability that he is the sole producer in a coalition.
This probability is the probability that producer k is
preceded exclusively by traders. The diagram below lists such
coalitions (where h, i, and j are not equal).
Producer k's order
in coalition:
2nd: T b , PIl , ...............
3rd: Thl Tal PilI ...........
4th: T bl Til Tj I PilI ........
Number of corresponding
coalitions:
Summing down the right-hand-side and dividing by (n+JA)!, the
total nU.mber of coalitions, yields the probability that
producer k has a positive marginal contribution to a
coalitiorl. Producer k's Shapley Value is, then,
I!
j=l
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CHAPTER SBVB.: COHCLUSIOH
The thesis permits a number of conclusions about the
relationship between industrialization, geographic
concentration, and trade. Industrialization does not spread
across regions in a smooth fashion, rather a process of
industrial growth begins in a single industrial center. That
is, industrialization and agglomeration are equivalent
processes. Industrialization proceeds at first by drawing
resources into an initial agglomeration, instead of through
the geographic dispersion of new products and processes.
Chandler (1989) describes a simi~ar occurrence in the
industrial development of Europe and the U. S., which he
attributes to plant-level economies of scale. In the process
to which we refer, firms perceive constant returns. Firms
agglomerate in order to gain access to industry-specif ic
knowledge about markets and production. Knowledge about
markets depreciates at an accelerated rate, necessitating a
maintained presence in the initial agglomeration in order to
continually replenish the stock of knowledge. Knowledge about
production becomes manifested in the specific skills of
individuals. As production knowledge diffuses among the
agents that populate the industrial center, a new reason
emerges for firms to agglomerate: to gain access to ski.lled
workers.
Early in industrialization, knowledge about markets and
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production remains lccalized within the initial agglomeration.
The localization of knowledge creates gains from trade with
the periphery -- regions untouched by industrialization -- and
induces firms to disperse from the center. As competition for
skilled labor in the center increases, the benefits of being
agglomerated diminish. Firms are drawn to the periphery where
workers have a lower alternative wage. Firms do not disperse
immediately, as periphery workers lack appropriate skills. In
the initial stages of industrialization, these skills may be
as rUdimentary as punctuality. This is not a pejorative
statement; industrialization involves a fundamental
transformation in the way work is organized. The need to
train periphery workers implies firms do not disperse from the
center until the gains from trade are substantial.
A single firm, the pioneer, undertakes investments
necessary to open a periphery location to production. It is
this act that makes the pioneer an innovator: by transferring
industry-specific knowledge to the periphery the pioneer
enhances the productivity of existing r"esources.. The trainirlg
the pioneer provides links the periphery by trade to the
industrial center. As the sole intermediary in the trading
relationsllip, the pioneer enjoys monopsony power in the
per iphery" Real iz ing this latent market power, ~ lmos't by
definition, opens the way for others to share in the gairls
from trade. Creati~lg ur expunding markets confers
externalities on agents ln both the periphery and t~tle
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industrial center. The pioneer firm cannot internalize t.llese
effects, but is able to delay entry by other firms 0 The
pioneer maintains an advantage over later arrivals in terms of
knowledge about the skills and abilities of local workers.
Through rent-sharing arrangements with the most able workers,
the pioneer induces later arrivals to postpone ent.ry and
prevents employees from becoming competitors. The pioneer
thus emerges as a central figure in the industrialization of
the periphery.
The pattern of geographic concentration that emerges is
dictated by th~ reference market. periphery regions function
as satellite production centers for the industrial center;
they are sub-agglomerations tied to the initial agglomeration.
The center continues to supply the periphery with product
designs, new technologies, and access to markets. When the
reference market changes, such as through an opening to trade,
the existing pattern of industry agglomeration is no longer
relevant. The reference market ceases to be the original
industrial center. The center comes into competition with
existing industrial centers in other nations. If the markets
in these nations are larger, or in some sense more developed,
the home country industrial center is at a disadvantage, as
the value of the information a center provides is a function
of its size. Sub-agglomerations in the periphery gain
autonomy from the home country industrial center. They are
free to develop contacts with more prosperous industrial
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centers in larger countries. Foreign pioneer firms from large
country industrial centers come to the home country in search
of new production possibilities.
For a small country I economic opening is a two-edged
sworde Integration gives firms access to new markets and new
1:echnologies on a scale that would have never been attainable
llnder the closed trade regime. The tradeoff for greater
productivity is a loss in control over the production process.
Access to large country markets requires firms to cede
activities like product development, design, and marketing to
firms in large country industrial centers. Small country
firms typically assume a vertically specialized role as
subcontractors. This status is by no means permanent. Small
country firms have the potential to capture high-valued
activities from the industrial center, at least in certain
industries. A necessary condition for this to occur is the
formation of an agglomeration of firms that is sufficiently
large to compete with the center. Coordination among firms
can hasten this process. While small country firms are not
forever doomed to subcon'tracting I the ability to capture high
value-added activities i~ not given. Understanding what makes
firms able to graduate from one level to the next is clearly
a subject for further research.
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